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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is an investigation into the significance of the “ordinary” in the process of 
political self-fashioning in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan called Al-Wihdat. The 
goal of this thesis is to document how refugees living in Al Wihdat receive and respond 
to nationalistic messages about Palestinian identity more than 60 years after the 
establishment of the first refugee camp in Jordan.  
 
When I first moved to Al-Wihdat, I expected Palestinian refugee camps to be highly 
politicized spaces. Except for occasional political demonstrations and events, however, 
neither the political turmoil in Gaza and the West Bank, nor the constant footage of the 
Palestinian struggle in the Arab media, roused refugees out of what they described as 
the ordinary course of daily life in the camp. In contrast, my engagement with camp-
dwellers showed me that refugees’ remaking of their social world was carried out by 
striving to live what they described as an “ordinary life” (hayā ‘ādiyye): by working, 
praying, relaxing, watching football matches, surfing the internet, or idling in barber 
shops, for example.  
 
I argue that the performative and reiterative dimensions of ordinary activities have not 
precluded refugees from feeling an affinity for many of the meanings, ideals, and values 
of Palestinian nationalism. On the contrary, infusing nationalism with daily interests and 
needs has allowed people to recapture the meanings, values and promises of Palestinian 
nationalism from the inflexible interpretations provided by a sclerotic political system in 
Gaza and the West Bank. At the same time, such process of accommodation has also 
afforded them the possibility of living what they refer to as being an “ordinary life”. 
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS 
 
 
‘ādī   usual/normal/ordinary 
‘ā’ile family 
‘ayb shameful 
‘ashyra        tribe 
‘iltizām commitment 
’insān human beings 
’irhābiyyn    terrorists 
‘onsori racist 
‘umra  pilgrimage 
’urdunīn Jordanians (sometimes also “native Jordanians”) 
’ustāza educators/Mr  
adāb refined/civilized manners 
aghanīyā’ from the wealthy families or the wealthy 
ajaneb foreigners/strangers 
al-ʾikhwān al-muslimīn muslim brothers 
al-’urdun Jordan 
al-laje' al-filastīnī Palestinian refugee 
al-quds Jerusalem 
az‘ar good for nothing or thug 
banāt girls 
bedū’(pl. badawī) Bedouin 
bilad country 
bilad al-sham   Levant, literary Syrian countries/provinces or the 
Syrian region 
burnāmej al-shabāb youth programme 
dabke Palestinian traditional dance 
dairat al-mukhābarāt al-
ammah 
the Jordanian intelligent service 
dawanji (pl. dawawīn) trouble-maker/reckless street man, literary someone 
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who hangs out in the dīwān all day 
dhurūf al-ma’īsha living conditions 
dishdāsha/ jāllabiya an ankle-length garment with long sleeves, similar to a 
robe 
dīwān the place where men meet with other men to chat and 
discuss 
farīq team 
fatawy Fatah’s activists 
fidāʾīyyn Palestinian guerrillas 
gahwe coffee 
ghajarīn/nawari gypsies   
hafle al-shabāb stag party 
hajj the elder or Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) 
haki fadi nonsense/empty words 
halal religiously allowed   
haq al-‘awda    right of return’ 
harat sub-neighbourhoods 
hatta scarf/head-gear 
hayā ‘ādiyye    ordinary life 
hijab  veil (Islamic clothing) 
hizb (pl. ’āhzāb) political parties 
hub love 
hukūme    government 
intikhābāt elections 
jabha al-amal al-islami Islamic action front (IAF) 
jāhilīya pre-Islamic “time”, or time of ignorance 
jāsūs spy 
jumhūr crowd/fans 
kāfir (pl. kuffār) apostate/infidel 
karam hospitality 
karāme dignity 
kaslan lazy 
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ma’wa/malja’ shelters 
malal boredom 
malik king 
masākīn unfortunate ones/ poor/miserable   
mashakel problems 
mitwād‘e    humble style of life 
muhtaram (pl. muhtaramīn) trustworthy person/ honourable men 
mukhayyamāt refugee camps 
mukhayyamji camp-dweller    
muqawama resistance 
muta’asseb narrow minded 
nakba the ‘catastrophe’ 
naksa the ‘setback’   
nās people/ folks 
numar al-zinco   roofs for the shelters 
salāt ritual prayers   
shabāb young men and adolescents 
shahīd (pl. shuhadā’) martyr 
shāra‘ street 
sheikh (pl. shuyukh) man of faith/man of piety/tribal leader 
souk market/bazaar 
sumūd steadfastness 
sūra verse of the Quran 
syāse politics 
tawtīn resettlement/naturalisation 
thawra revolution 
toshe trouble/fight 
wasat al-balad downtown 
wāsta network of connections, working connections, 
relationships of patronage, connections and favours 
watanī patriotic 
wathīqa UNRWA id card or lasses passer used for travel 
za‘lān sad and angry 
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zahgān bored/fed up   
zakat alms-giving, one of the five pillars of Islamic beliefs 
and practices 
zinekh (pl. zinkhīn) ignorant of the fundamental principles of the Islam 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
For transliteration of Arabic words, I have followed the guidelines of the International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. However, I have chosen to leave personal and place 
names in their most common English forms (e.g. Nadi and not Nādī), or how I saw them 
transliterated in Jordan by refugees. There are also a number of Arabic words (most 
notably “intifada”) that have passed into common English usage, and are therefore not 
transliterated in the text. Furthermore I have decided to use colloquial Jordanian 
(specifically camp dialect) for my translation. This includes for example the substitution 
of the sound “q” with “g” or “k” and the adoption of words that do not exist in the 
vocabulary of standard Arabic (e.g. “dawawīn” for “troublemakers”). These purely 
colloquial terms are transcribed as phonetically as possible. I have also opted to leave 
the definite article always under the form of “al”, even in the case of “sun letters”. 
Finally when citing authors or quoting transliteration from other authors, I have simply 
followed the spelling used in the text to which I am referring. 
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A general source of inadequacies in all my material, 
whether photographic or linguistic or descriptive,  
consists in the fact that, like every ethnographer, I was lured 
by the dramatic, exceptional and sensational… I  have 
also neglected much of the everyday, inconspicuous, 
drab and small-scale in my study of Trobriand life. The 
only comfort which I may derive is that… my mistakes 
may be of use to others.  
 
(Malinowski 1935, p. 462) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN: THE “DILEMMA” 
 
When I began my 15 months of fieldwork at the Al-Wihdat Camp in Jordan, I expected 
refugee camps to be highly politicized settings. Persuaded to document the significance 
of “the political” in the everyday lives of refugees by my reading of recent 
anthropological work on the Middle East, I was instead quite puzzled by what seemed 
to me to be an ostensible absence of politics in the camp spaces. People in Al-Wihdat 
held quite a diverse attitude toward the political than what I expected. “‘Ādī” 
(usual/normal) was the general response given by virtually everybody questioned on the 
tenor of the rather rare political demonstrations and rallies held in Al-Wihdat. “Nothing 
changes… it’s three hours that are speaking! I heard that thousands of times and nothing 
changed... They are good only to speak”. This comment came from a friend, who was 
commenting harshly on the oratory skills of the speakers on the occasion of the annual 
celebration of the Nakba in the Camp1. Another man, instead, turned his criticism 
toward the audience: “these words enter in one ear and they get out from the other!” 
“They are all fatawy (Fatah’s activists)”, another stated, having paused for a moment 
then shrugging his shoulders: “Either fatawy or ’ikhwan (Muslim Brothers), Kullu nafs 
ishi (it’s all the same)!”. For many the whole demonstration was haki fadi 
(nonsense/empty words), and most agreed that these events would never change their 
situation. Blaming the ineffectiveness of the Peace Process in Palestine or the corruption 
of politicians and political parties was a regular feature of daily life in the Camp.  
 
Exhibitions of distaste and cynicism toward the political were especially evident during 
the so-called Arab Spring – the recent political turmoil in North Africa and Middle East 
that challenged many of the assumptions held by scholars and more popular 
commentators about the political passivity and inertia of the so-called “Arab masses”. 
Political anti/governmental demonstrations began to be held every Friday in the wasat 
al-balad (downtown) of Amman, the capital of Jordan, with unexpected regularity. 
Although generally quite small in terms of the number of participants, these 
demonstrations accompanied a sit-in held on the 24th of March at the Dākhilliyye 
                                                        
1
 Palestinians remember the year of the establishment of Israel as Al-Nakba (the Catastrophe). 
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Circle. Dubbed “The March 24 Youth movement”, organizers and participants set a tent 
encampment (named “Tahrir Square” after the Cairo square that hosted the revolt 
against President Hosni Mubarak’s regime) in the Circle. Like the demonstrations and 
protests in other Arab countries, the sit-in was initially organized by various social 
networks and blogs, and comprised a disparate coalition of people. Originally planned 
as on-going until their demands were met, it lasted only for a couple of days. On Friday 
morning, the participants were attacked by a group of counter-demonstrators (the 
“Loyalty March”), allegedly loyal to King Abdullah II, and eventually they were 
dispersed by the police in the ensuing chaos.  
 
This fiasco could have led some to predict the beginning of the end or, at least, further 
and more deadly clashes. The situation did not deteriorate, however, or follow the same 
developments of other countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. In Jordan, 
demonstrators were publically calling for the end of corruption and a change of 
government, but, at the same time, they publicly pledged loyalty to both the Jordanian 
nation-state and the Hashemite regime. If the specificity of the Jordanian challenges the 
idea of an Arab Spring indiscriminately sweeping the region, it also spoils popular 
expectations about the subversive potential of refugees and refugee camps. Echoing the 
thoughts of many, a friend in the Camp sustained the popular sentiment beyond the 
demonstration by confirming the point: “This is not like Egypt and Tunisia. We are 
against the Prime Minister, the ministers, and Parliament, but not against the King”. 
Even more surprising was a comment made to me by another friend, who I knew held 
quite a radical opinion against the King and the government. Referring to the “March 
24” sit-in, he commented: “Don’t worry about it… it’s only a group of dawawīn 
[troublemakers] clashing with other dawawīn [referring to the counter-demonstrators 
and police officers]”. 
 
Especially at the beginning of my fieldwork, I was taken aback by refugees’ ambiguous 
and complex stances vis-à-vis political participation. One of the main questions that has 
taunted scholars doing research on the “Palestinian issue” in the Middle East is whether 
camp-dwellers are an integrated community or not (e.g. Hanafi 2008). Should I have 
interpreted the remarks of my friend as a sign of his clear allegiance to the Hashemite 
sovereignty expressed in his refusal to criticize the King, or as a form of political protest 
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tout court, a way of condemning both the authorities and the protesters, depicted 
indiscriminately by them as troublemakers? Understanding the relevance of this 
dilemma in contemporary Jordan requires a consideration of the historic centrality of the 
categories of “refugee” and “refugee camp” to the Palestinian national project and the 
peculiarity of the socio-political condition of Palestinian refugees in the Kingdom.  
 
Palestinian refugees (lāji’ūn) have been popularly depicted by the Western media and 
many academic accounts as inherently political beings, ready to fight and resist all 
attempts to annihilate their nationalist struggles. In a similar fashion, refugee camps 
(mukhayyamāt) have also been represented as the locus of a political agency based on 
the ideal of resistance. Designed as transit centres to host and prepare Palestinian 
refugees for local integration, refugee camps in the Middle East became what Julie 
Peteet has recently described as “oppositional spaces appropriated and endowed with 
alternative meanings” (1986, p. 95). In Jordan, there is a widely held collective opinion 
that refugees and camp-dwellers have historically nurtured anti-government sentiments. 
Loyalty to the King, the Hashemite family, and the Government was, by contrast, 
depicted as being associated most clearly with the tribes and Bedouins who are mostly 
comprised of east-bank Jordanians. This claim was based on the fact that Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin were not “sons of the tribes” (abna’ al-asha’ir) and hence not truly 
“Jordanians” (Shryock 1997). These representations were simultaneously sustained by 
historical studies that have documented the rise of Palestinian nationalism in the camps 
and its challenge to Jordan’s sovereignty (e.g. Salibi 1993). The result is that camps 
have been portrayed either as places of political instability or as the crucibles of 
subversive ideas and behaviour (e.g. Al-Khazendar 1997). In addition, Al-Wihdat has 
historically enjoyed a reputation of being a bastion of “Palestinianness”, irreducible 
resistance, and political unrest. In the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, the Palestinian liberation 
movement – mostly members of Fatah and the “Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine” – established its headquarters especially in Al-Wihdat, and the Camp was 
renamed “the Republic” in an overt challenge to the Jordanian monarchy. The heroic 
heydays of the 1960s played, and still retain, a central role in refugees’ self-
consciousness and self-understanding: over the years, demonstrations, protests and even 
allegiance to Al-Wihdat Football Club – which will be discussed in chapter 6 of this 
thesis – remained, for refugees, important acts of identification with Palestinian national 
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struggles (e.g. Al-Hamarneh 2002, Jaber 1996, Tuastad 1995). Finally, a Palestinian 
nationalistic and potentially explosive sentiment has also been constituted negatively by 
experiences of loss and marginality (see Al-Husseini and Bocco 2010, pp. 262-266). 
Over the years, Palestinian refugees have faced informal discrimination in Jordan at the 
legislative level (by having their representation in parliament drastically curtailed to six 
seats out of 120 members of Parliament) and in the field of employment (especially in 
the public sector, which largely excludes Palestinians from military and intelligence 
services) (Abu-Odeh 1999). 
 
On the other hand, while there is truth in depictions of Palestinian refugee camps as 
hubs of political resistance, it is also important to recognise that the situation of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan differs greatly from that of other Palestinians living in 
other Arab host-countries – Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. First, unlike Lebanon and 
Syria, where refugees maintained a legal status as “stateless” persons, Jordan has 
granted full citizenship to Palestinian refugees. The extension of citizenship rights has 
conferred to them, at least in principle, the same rights and duties as any other Jordanian 
native. As Jalal Al-Husseini points out, “this unique double citizen/refugee status has 
placed them within a web of formal and informal balancing mechanisms of 
inclusion/exclusion meant to guarantee their integration within Jordan's society while 
preserving their right of return” (2011, p. 185). Secondly, in Jordan, urban refugee 
camps such as Al-Wihdat are open spaces and commercial areas that more resemble a 
low-income residential neighbourhood of Amman than a space of exception designed 
for control and surveillance (Agamben 2005). The Camp is not a closed space. 
Historically, refugees have developed intricate social relations and drawn complex and 
varying life trajectories by moving outside the Camp, returning to it at a later date, or, 
equally plausibly, never coming back.  Finally, since the ‘70s, refugees’ political 
activism gradually terminated in apathy and indifference (see chapter 4). Once located 
at the very heart of the Palestinian national movement, refugees and refugee camps were 
marginalised in the current political process2. Relegating the status of refugees to the 
final stages of the negotiations, the Oslo Peace Agreements was, for refugees in 
                                                        
2
 It should also be noticed, however, that – although the Oslo Peace Agreements relegated refugees and 
refugee camps to the margins of Palestinian nationalist discourse – the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
has brought them back to the centre of political stage by dissipating any hope of peace (Khalili 2007, p. 
57-58). 
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Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, clear evidence of how the Palestinian Authority (PA) had 
sold off the right of return to secure the construction of a Palestinian state (see Tamari 
1996). The exclusion by the official national project concurred ultimately in nurturing a 
growing fellings of bitterness and frustrations amongst refugees. Along with the 
disappointment with the Peace Process and Oslo Agreements in 1993, the restrictions 
imposed upon political activity in refugee camps by the authorities after Black 
September, the discontent toward Hamas-Fatah rivalry3, and the ineffectiveness of 
political parties that advocated the Palestinian cause in Jordan furthered refugees’ 
“disengagement” of formal politics. At the time of my fieldwork in Al-Wihdat, for 
example, except for the occasional political demonstration or event, neither the recent 
political turmoil in Gaza and West Bank, nor the constant footage of the Palestinian 
issue in the Arab media, aroused refugees out of what they described as being the 
ordinary (‘ādī) of daily life in the Camp. The last episodes of “uprising” that most of my 
informants recollected dated back to 2004 when Jordanian flags were burned in Al-
Wihdat following the assassination  of the historical leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin. 
Interestingly, the issue was eventually solved at an official level by camp leaders 
(makhatir, sing. mukhtār) who put the blame on alleged agitators coming from outside 
the Camp (Al-Dustour 2004). 
 
LIVING AN “ORDINARY LIFE” 
 
In light of the complexities of refugee exilic experience, how should we understand the 
great discomfort of refugees toward political elites and political parties? What forms 
does Palestinian nationalism take in the context of protracted displacement and life in a 
country that has granted refugees full citizenship rights? Most importantly, how do 
refugees living in Al-Wihdat deal with the pressure of living in spaces endowed with 
such “thick” political meanings and respond to the expectation of acting as a living 
embodiment of political resistance?  
 
It would be tempting to answer these questions by stating that refugees have two 
alternatives: either they comply with these authoritative discourses by resisting the 
                                                        
3
 In 2006, the frictions between the two main Palestinian parties – Hamas and Fatah – resulted in the 
creation of two separate governments: the Hamas Government in Gaza and the Fatah ruled Palestinian 
National Authority in the West Bank.  
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attempts of assimilation, or dismiss these by becoming assimilated into the host country. 
In this thesis, I argue instead that camp-dwellers in Al-Wihdat genuinely did subscribe 
to Palestinian nationalism, but – contrary to common assumptions – they have done so 
by accommodating this discursive regime to their determination to live an ordinary life 
in Jordan.  
 
To understand how camp-dwellers living in Al-Wihdat handle the call to commitment 
to Palestinian nationalism in the context of their protracted exile in Jordan, we need to 
go beyond an understanding of refugee agency framed solely in the terms of political 
resistance. If we take the “will to resist” (or the lack of this) as the ultimate value around 
which refugee’s everyday life was declined, we risk dehumanizing refugees and missing 
the complexity of their lives. My engagement with camp-dwellers showed me that 
refugees’ remaking of their social world was not carried out through spectacular acts in 
the realm of the political, but rather by striving to be ordinary.  
 
Under the impulse of French Poststructuralism, anthropologists and scholars from 
various disciplines have documented the importance of the ordinary and its analogues, 
the everyday and the mundane, in the reproduction of society (e.g. Bourdieu 1979, 
Butler 1999, Giddens 1984, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Williams 1958). A compelling 
body of work on political activity and processes has shed light on the ways through 
which everyday life and ordinary practices are shaped by the emergence and 
development of socio-political systems (Elias 2000, Lefebvre 1991); other works, in 
contrast, have shown how “the ordinary” provides the space and the opportunity to 
resist and transform hegemonic order (Aretxaga 1997, Certeau 1984, Goffman 1990, 
Scott 1985).  
 
The ordinary has also circulated in scholarly discourse specialising in the study of 
nationalism. This body of litterature has generally privileged an approach informed by 
Foucault’s emphasis on the body as a site of inscription of dominant (nationalist) 
representations and ideologies over de Certeau’s investigation of the transformative 
social power inherent everyday practices of ordinary actors (Alonso 1994, Bhabha 
1990, Billig 1995; see Jean-Klein 2001, pp. 87-89, for a criticism).  
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In an insightful article (2001), Jean-Klein has criticized this body of work for using the 
“ordinary” merely as the locus of nationalistic processes forged by political centres 
imposed upon ordinary people, and showing little concern on how nationalistic 
practices are fashioned by ordinary people through distinctive narratives and actions 
woven into everyday practices. My thesis is greatly indebted to Jean-Klein’s 
investigation of the implication of the “ordinary” in the production and articulation of 
national subjectivities among Palestinians. However, for Jean-Klein, it is actually the 
suspension of the everyday, and not its normal reproduction, at stake. It is Palestinians’ 
will to refrain from engaging in acts of ordinary life such as paying social visits or 
going to weddings that ultimately fashions Palestinian nationalism. Things were quite 
different in Al-Wihdat; here, the daily lives of people reflected the conscious attempt to 
both mitigate the pervasive effects of politics and immerse into an “ordinariness” 
punctuated by such events as weddings, religious feasts, and other life-cycle events.  
 
Camp-dwellers’ conscious attempt to mitigate or escape political pressures recall to a 
certain extent Miller and Woodward’s analysis of the significance of wearing blue jeans 
in a North London neighbourhood. In their book, the authors observe how 
 
“[m]ost migrants, and especially younger migrants, feel that if anything, the pressure is on them 
to represent some kind of identity (in contrast to the rest of the population), while wearing blue 
jeans represents some sort of escape from such question. […] Returning to the default mode of 
putting on everyday jeans or being content to be an ordinary person is inevitably reported as a 
means of opting out of all such pressures rather than conforming to them. For all these reason 
the ordinary stands against the normative” (2011, p. 135).  
 
For camp-dwellers too, the ordinary stands against the normative. While for Miller and 
Woodward’s migrants, the normative is represented by the pressures to conform with 
some specific ethnic or national identity, for refugees, this pressure is defined by the 
urge to act politically: to be a political embodiment of the Palestinian nationalist 
predicament. My friends perceived the ordinary as substantially non-political and 
largely encompassed within the prospect of full socio-economic integration in Jordan. 
In the Camp, people’s daily life was hence articulated around the determination to 
accomplish an ordinary life and become fully integrated in Jordan, with all this might 
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entail – owning a flat, getting married, and gaining a decent professional status, but also 
being able to fulfil other desires, especially such as having fun or being free to choose a 
specific dress code.  
 
I would go further, however. Whereas in Miller and Woodward’s case, the ordinary is a 
project animated mostly by escapist desires, “being ordinary” in Al-Wihdat is the very 
way through which the normative system is reproduced. In other words, the Palestinian 
political cause and its symbols, the right of return, and the recognition of Palestinian 
suffering, heroic resistance, and steadfastness (sumūd) are genuinely embraced by 
virtually everybody in Wihdat, and re-enacted in the context of their protracted 
displacement. Engaging with the stream of ordinary life is crucial to achieving this goal. 
By infusing Palestinian nationalism with mundane interests and needs, refugees breathe 
new life into the meanings, values, and promises of Palestinian nationalism. It was the 
non-political “ordinariness” of watching football, going to the mosque, looking for a 
job, or loitering around that ultimately mitigated or contained the “saturation” of the 
political in refugees’ daily lives. But it was also the very engagement with these 
activities that, as I show throughout the thesis, allowed refugees to reproduce the 
authoritative messages of Palestinian nationalism in the Camp. By stripping its 
ideological contents of political militancy and weaving these into acts of daily life, 
refugees in Al-Wihdat subscribed to a discourse centred on the ideal of resistance and 
adapted it to their wish to live a “normal” life. 
 
As I will show, however, this process was not always marked by harmony and 
coherence. At times, it produced considerable anxieties and unsettled problems amongst 
refugees, which were called upon to confront the inconsistencies of daily life. By failing 
to grasp this aspect, there is a risk of missing the contradictory, ambiguous and 
conflicting nature of everyday experience. The ordinary and the political were certainly 
intertwined, and yet often, being ordinary was infused with hopes and anxieties related 
to their national predicament – “shall I find a real Palestinian woman from the Camp?” 
“Is really worth spending money for an iPhone when my fellows in Gaza are broke?”. If 
we are to understand how refugees have accommodate Palestinian nationalism with the 
desire of living an “ordinary life” in jordan, we need also to give significant attention to 
the inconsistencies that these project might have also generated; for instance, when the 
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pursuing of “ordinariness” was not seen as desirable but rather perceived as the 
capitulation of Palestinian political identity and the loss of national values, or when 
failing to be “ordinary” heightened the lived perception of discrimination amongst 
refugees.  
 
AIMS AND GOALS 
 
This thesis has three major and interrelated goals.  
 
First, my account of camp dwellers’ daily engagement with ordinary life wants to 
contribute to a large body of scholarship that has investigated the fragmented experience 
of Palestinian people and the multiplicity of resources employed by them in the 
constitution and reproduction of Palestinian nationalism.  
 
Over the past years, a remarkable range of studies has focused on gender and the body 
as possible sites of political mobilization and empowerment (Allen 2009, Hart 2008, 
Jean-Klein 2000, Moors 1995, Peteet 1991, 1994, Sa'ar and Yahia-Younis 2008, Sayigh 
1981). Comparable enquiries have been carried out on refugees (Bisharat 1997, Farah 
2006, Feldman 2008, Khalili 2005, Peteet 2005, Rosenfeld 2002, Sayigh 1979), 
prisoners (Khalili 2008, Nashif 2008, Rosenfeld 2004), and migrants (Davis 2011, 
Dorai 2003, Matar 2005). Also, memory has grown into a major research topic (Allen 
2006, Collins 2004, Davis 2011, Matar 2005, 2011, Robinson 2006, Sa’di and Abu-
Lughod 2007, Slyomovics 1998, Swedenburg 1991). This body of ethnography 
addressed a number of themes that stretched from popular culture and poetry (Bishara 
2008, Furani 2008, Makdisi and Silverstein 2006, Muhawi and Kanaana 1989, Peteet 
1996), to humanitarian aid (Fassin 2008, Feldman 2007, Hart 2002). And especially 
after the outbreak of the 2nd intifada in the Occupied Territories, the spectacularity of 
violence and suffering have lured the attention of a growing number of scholars (e.g. 
Bucaille 2004, Collins 2004, Hage 2003, Kelly 2006, Rabbani 2001). Embedded in a 
broader political context, violence, memory, gender, popular culture and many other 
domains of investigations have become privileged sites for understanding the unfolding 
of Palestinians’ nationalist struggle and their irreducible will to resist Israel’s attempts 
to silence their predicament. 
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This thesis draws substantially on this body of studies by documenting the significance 
of the ordinary and mundane in sustaining a Palestinian political identity and an 
attachment to the homeland. At the same time, however, it intends to add to it by 
problematising certain assumptions implicitly and explicitly reproduced in some 
academic and journalistic writing on Palestinians today. These traditionally convey the 
idea of Palestinians’ life as “locked in a bind between repression and resistance, 
ubiquitously struggling for national sovereignty” (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011, p. 484). 
As I will show, camp-dwellers’ apparently contradictory desire of pursuing full socio-
economic integration in Jordan and upholding their nationalist struggles foregrounds the 
existence of zones of agency that cannot be accounted by universal schemata of 
domination/resistance. My aim here is not, therefore, to belittle the substantial 
achievements of Palestinian studies. Rather, I wish to further the discussion developed 
by those works forward, pushing towards a better appreciation of refugees’ everyday 
lives, and creating a more nuanced understanding of the place of “the political” in a 
refugee camp. 
 
Secondly, my account is focused on life in Al-Wihdat, but it raises questions that bear 
on broader debates in anthropology and the social sciences. Social scientists are now 
seeking to readdress some limitations inherent post-structuralist accounts of “the 
political” (e.g. Candea 2011, Spencer 2007). Recent scholarship has produced highly 
sophisticated theoretical analyses that have sought to go beyond the sharp division 
between resistance and power (e.g. Laidlaw 2010, Mahmood 2005, Yurchak 2006, 
2008). My study of refugees' attempts to live an ordinary life in Jordan moves in this 
direction. In this thesis, I claim that one of the forms of political agency that enables 
refugees to continue to uphold their nationalist ideals is located precisely in the context 
of their progressive integration in Jordan, at the heart of state sovereignty. In other 
words, within the very power of the state, refugees draw their capacity to escape the 
state's attempt of total control by fashioning their subjectivity as both Jordanian and 
Palestinian.  
 
Finally, the material presented here is all the more striking because the research on 
which this thesis is based was conducted in a refugee camp, a place that in the 
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Agambanian and Foucauldian tradition is popularly depicted as a space where the 
state’s total control is most effective. This leads me to the final goal of this thesis: 
callenging the idea that Palestinian refugee camps might somehow fit into the 
dichotomy that has cast them either as spaces for passive victims (e.g. Agier 2002) or, 
conversely, as sites of radicalism and irreducible resistance (e.g. Malkki 1995). My 
focus on the place that the ordinary plays in the constitution of political subjectivity and 
agency allows a reconsideration of the space of the Camp beyond such overly 
determinist modes of analysis. 
 
I explore the significance of these three goals, and the relevant litterature, in what 
follows. 
 
Resistance and refugee studies 
 
In the study of Palestinian societies, a heterogeneous body of scholarship has 
emphasized the significance of resistance to Palestinian identity and life. Scholars 
working in this vein have tended to document the conceptual and practical resources 
that refugees have deployed to resist or subvert domination. Rosemary Sayigh’s ground-
breaking series of studies amongst camp-dwellers in Lebanon shed light on the 
importance of collective memory and national commemorations in mobilizing both 
coping and resistance strategies. The transmission and refashioning of specific forms of 
identity from one generation to the next would lead to acts of resistance against the 
adversities of living in exile, poverty, and discrimination (Sayigh 1994). In a series of 
articles, Julie Peteet (1994, 1996) and Iris Jean-Klein (2007) provide insights into some 
of the ways in which refugees have used gender and their bodies as sites and resources 
of resistance against Israeli occupation. Peteet, for example, explores the significance of 
imprisonment and torture at the hands of Israeli soldiers during the first intifada as a 
ritual of passage to manhood amongst Palestinian young males. She points out how the 
body of the tortured is not only a locus for the inscription of the dominant power but 
also the site for the refashioning of a subversive subjectivity (Peteet 1994).  
 
By taking into consideration differences of class, gender, generation, and religious 
activism, another body of ethnographic work on Palestinian refugees has investigated 
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the heterogeneity of Palestinian refugee experience in Jordan. According to Elia Zureik, 
this complexity “is what characterizes the subaltern nature of the [Palestinian 
nationalist] discourse—a discourse of resistance that is fragmented and lacks unity” 
(2003, p. 157). In Jordan, Randa Farah documents the role of popular memory and 
resisting permanent resettlement among refugees living in Baq’a Refugee Camp in the 
context of radical shift in nationalist politics. Other authors have also explored the ways 
in which refugees have challenged the attempt to be silenced and resettled by 
manipulating the bureaucratic system (Latte Abdallah 2004), through the performance 
of particular styles of masculinity (Hart 2008), or by re-appropriating the space of the 
camp (Destremau 1994, Jaber 1996). 
 
In a widely cited article, Sherry Ortner criticises resistance studies for not containing 
enough politics and being too “thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on 
the cultural richness of those groups, thin on the subjectivity-the intentions, desires, 
fears, projects-of the actors engaged in these dramas” (1995, p. 190; see Jean-Klein, 
2001, for a critique). Although much ethnographic research carried out on Palestinian 
refugees in and outside Jordan emphasizes the fragmentation of refugee community and 
experience and thereby portray refugees’ lives in a far richer and more complex frame 
than Ortner’s suggests (e.g. Farah 1999, Hart 2002, Jean-Klein 2000, 2001, Latte-
Abdallah 2009, Peteet 1991, Swedenburg 1991), some of these studies do, nevertheless, 
share a narrow understanding of political agency –  understood as the capacity of the 
subject to assert him/herself against the constraints of larger structures such as cultures 
or ideologies. This conception produces, as Laidlaw argues (2010), a set of interrelated 
problems. First, agency is assumed to be the authentic expression of an individual 
intentionality: a force that would derive from a supposedly a priory self of the 
individual (p. 144, see also Keane, 2003). A further interrelated problem with this 
notion of agency is entailed in the unspoken presumption of what a person’s actual or 
ultimate goal is. By taking for granted the universality of a desire to act and assuming 
that this may be inspired only by a genuine yearning for freedom and equality, this 
approach recognises as effective only those actions that are conducive toward this end 
(Laidlaw 2010, p. 144). This is well exemplified, for example, in the Manichean divide 
between power and resistance, typical of a certain strand of resistance studies (e.g. Guha 
1982; see Spencer, 2007, for a criticism) and feminist studies (Boddy 1989; see 
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Mahmood, 2005, for a criticism). In the former, the state is an inimical entity that never 
emerges as a resource but always as an externality and a source of coercion. The 
dominant and the subordinate appear as two bounded and political homogenous entities, 
the actions of one of which (the dominant) produce a mechanical re-action from the 
other (the resisters)4. In making this assumption, however, such an approach denies 
“dimensions of human action whose ethical and political status does not map onto the 
logic of repression and resistance” (Mahmood 2005, p. 14). 
 
In the field of Palestinian studies, I agree with those authors who have underlined the 
capacity of refugees to be active agents in the making of their history (see Sayigh 1998, 
among others). Giving more emphasis to an agentive capacity of resisting domination 
was (and still is) a necessary step to challenge an image of Palestinian refugees as 
passive victims of an international drama. This specific understanding of refugees' 
political agency also provided an important corrective to popular accounts that had 
portrayed refugees as submissive in the face of overarching forces (Malkki 1995). But 
focusing only on that side of agency will preclude us any understanding of forms of 
political agency that do not fit within the frame of “resistance”. Furthermore, although 
“resistance” – as an ideal and form of action – is surely paramount in Palestinian 
nationalism, its centrality has led some scholars to overemphasize the significance of 
this dimension of refugee political agency (e.g. Al-Khazendar 1997, Rougier 2007). To 
reduce the complexities of people’s joys, sorrows, dreams, and struggles only in terms 
of the will to resist5 would not be very useful in answering the question posed by this 
thesis. An analysis of this kind requires an analytical shift away from the classic 
                                                        
4
 For a more recent account of this approach in the Middle East, see for example Lisa Wedeen’s study of 
the authoritative rule in President Asad’s Syria (1999). For a criticism, see Gal (1995), Oushakine (2001), 
and Yurchak (2007) amongst others. 
5
 Here I deliberately choose the broadest possible meaning for resistance as being the capacity to assert 
the Palestinian national predicament – and not the more politically and historically connoted term of 
muqawama (resistance). In her book “Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine” (2007), Laleh Khalili individuates 
successive but overlapping transnational discourses appropriated and adapted by various strands of the 
Palestinian national movement since the 1960s. With great approximation, we can identify four discursive 
“schisms” in Palestinian nationalism: the nation-statist discourse, liberationist discourse, the Islamist 
discourse, and the humanitarian discourse. The centrality of “resistance” in Palestinian nationalism is 
remarkable in the persistence that this motif has in each of these authoritative discourses under the guise 
of narratives of heroic resistance, sumūd [steadfastness], and suffering. As Khalili writes, these narratives 
“have all been broadly effective in achieving a great many of their goals: keeping the Palestinian conflict 
and the predicament of Palestinian refugees at the forefront of the international stage (even if in the last 
instance, remedies to the problems are difficult to find) and ensuring that the voice of the refugees would 
not be ignored at their leadership’s negotiating tables” (p. 225). 
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parameters of so-called resistance studies to more complex understanding of “political 
agency” and the category of the “political”.  
 
One way forward is advocated by a growing number of studies that have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the limitations of this conception of agency and urged scholars to 
problematise the idea of agency as the capacity of a free agent to translate his values 
into actions (Keane 2003, Laidlaw 2002, 2010, Mahmood 2001, Yurchak 2006). These 
authors have warned against romanticising resistance by misattributing it to forms of 
agency that cannot be reduced only to conscious or unconscious moments of opposition 
to domination.  
 
By exploring the way in which resistance is rooted in relations of power, this 
scholarship has drawn on and furthered Foucault and Butler’s work on 
“subjectification”. Foucault conceives power as a force that permeates life and produce 
desire, objects, relations, and discourse. In this context, the subject does not precede 
power but is produced by the very forces that form the condition of its possibility 
(Foucault 1980). This is what Butler calls the “paradox of subjectivities” (Mahmood 
2005): the process through which the subject is produced as a self-conscious identity by 
the same forces that lead to his/her subordination. Such an understanding allows us to 
locate “agency” within structures power; so that, when the subject actively fashions 
itself, it does that through practices that are imposed upon him/her by the society and 
social groups in which he/she lives. In doing so, Foucault does not deny the capacity of 
the subject to act freely, but situates this capacity within historically produced structures 
of power.  
 
Combining these insights with Derrida’s reading of Austin’s theory of performance, 
Butler locates the possibility of resistance within the structure itself. According to her, if 
the subject is constituted within a structure of power and more precisely through the 
reiterative performance of its norms, it is in the very act of reproducing the structure in 
which we can find “the possibility of its undoing” (Mahmood 2005, p. 20). In a critical 
reading of Butler’s theory, Sabah Mahmood (2001, 2005) adds to this approach to 
“agency” by challenging the former for failing to appreciate how far agency may be 
entailed not only in resisting but also in inhabiting norms:  
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“if the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific 
(both in terms of what constitutes “change” and the capacity by which it is effected), then its 
meaning and sense cannot be fixed a priori […] In this sense, agentive capacity is entailed not 
only in those acts that result in (progressive) change but also those that aim toward continuity, 
stasis, and stability” (2001, p. 212). 
 
I find that Mahmood’s work is important to understand camp-dwellers’ political identity 
and agency. If we recognise that the desire that motivates people to act may be other 
than the desire for subversion and freedom, it is therefore also important to investigate 
the conditions under which different forms of desire emerge. In my analysis of political 
life in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, I build on this sophisticated body of 
theoretical work to explore refugees’ complex and apparently contradictory allegiance 
to the values and ideals of Palestinian nationalism. In doing so, however, I do not intend 
to suggest that historical yearning for autonomy and freedom in Al-Wihdat needs to be 
replaced by a new desire for subjection; but Mahmood’s argument is revealing 
inasmuch it urges us to abandon a “Westernised” notion of agency and begin an inquiry 
into the meanings that specific forms of agencies take in other contexts. In other words, 
this would lead us to recognise political agency as existing in a space beyond the mere 
“will of resisting”, and locating it, rather, in existing structures of power that constitute 
the subject. After 60 years in a country whose naturalisation policy has de facto enabled 
their gradual absorption into the job market and their partial participation in the national 
politics (Al-Husseini and Bocco 2010), many refugees have come to terms with the 
realities of living in Jordan to the extent that a large part of them, if asked, would not 
leave Jordan for Palestine6. A friend – whose words are worth quoting at length – 
expressed this point clearly during an interview with one of my fellow researchers7: 
 
“if you ask anyone if they would return [to Palestine], they would say they go back. But to be 
honest, I don't think so: we have never been there, we don't know how it is to live there, could I 
find my house, and maybe someone else lives there now, I would kill him. Would they [Israeli 
                                                        
6
 A survey carried out in 2003 in Jordan among Palestinian refugees seems to confirm these findings. 
Despite the fact that virtually all refugees demand the recognition of the “right of return”, only 5 per cent 
of them would actually be eager to implement it. See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html, last visited 20 February 2012). 
7
 Interview carried out by Judith Van Raalten (August 2010). 
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Jews] leave [the house]? I cannot see this and that is why I would not go back. [In addition] my 
nationality does not help me […]. I am Jordanian; this is where I am from. My father and my 
mother are both Jordanians - does that make me a pure Jordanians? I am Jordanian and am 
Palestinian of origin!”. 
 
During my time in Al-Wihdat, I met numerous people who made similar remarks. 
While these observations initially fuelled my growing interest in what at the time I 
perceived as a further demonstration of refugees’ lack of political involvement, I 
eventually became aware of the complex shape taken by refugees’ political agency.  
 
This “complexity”, however, introduces a further dimension of refugees’ political life 
that I want to shed light on. If we are to understand agency in the terms outlined by 
Mahmood and Butler, then we have to ground it in everyday experience and 
aknowledge the existence of different and, sometimes, conflicting forces; but doing so 
leads us also to encounter aspects of people’s desires that are shaped by values and 
ideas that are not only informed by commitment to Palestinian cause. More than 
Mahmood, other scholars have given more attention to the ways in which diverse 
authoritative discourses may coexist, overlap, and clash, sometimes producing profound 
contradictions within the same subject (Marsden 2005, Osella and Osella 2008, Simon 
2009, Soares and Osella 2009). Their studies have highlighted the inherent dangers on 
focusing exclusively on the inner dynamics of a single discourse to the expense of other 
values and discourses. For example, Samuli Schielke’s research gives a glimpse of the 
uneasy coexistence of religious morality and daily life in a northern Egyptian village, 
taking football matches during Ramadan as an analytical frame. Here, the author 
documents how for young Egyptian men Ramadan football is an ambivalent exercise 
that “mix[es] ascetic discipline with fun and entertainment” (2009). 
 
In my study of refugees’ political life, I also account for the various normative and 
affective registers, ideologies, and everyday practices present in camp-dwellers’ daily 
lives that do not produce coherent models of political action or belief but often stand in 
strong juxtaposition to each other. Refugees’ attempts to both pursue full socio-political 
integration in the Kingdom and express their allegiance to Palestinian nationalistic 
ideals do not reflect the strategies of a community of “actors” that publicly seek full 
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recognition while secretly embracing subversive stances (e.g. Wedeen 1999). Nor is it a 
sign, however, of their passivity and political apathy. It is, I suggest, rather part and 
parcel of a range of forms of actions provided by living a life as Palestinian refugees 
and Jordanian citizens. This process of accommodation, however, is neither 
homogeneously accomplished in the Camp nor devoid of inconsistencies and tensions. 
The desire to live “normal” lives is fraught with ambivalence and anxieties, and the 
desired integration bristled sometimes against inescapable invocations of allegiance to 
Palestinian nationalistic ideals and values. 
 
Spaces of the “non-political” 
 
In light of this ambivalent mixture of profound discomfort and irresistible fascination 
for “politics” and the “political”, is it still possible to speak of the “political agency”? 
What language is required to capture the “process of accommodation” that, I argued, is 
central to refugees’ experience of displacement in Jordan?  
 
A large part of refugee daily life was hence oriented toward more “ordinary” desires and 
goals such as settling down, getting married, making money, and having fun. The 
formal domains of politics, instead, for many, were pointless, deadly boring, or, even, a 
dirty matter. Above I argued that if we are to understand refugees’ agency we need to 
frame it as the desire of living an ordinary and integrated life in Jordan. I will now show 
how their capacity to re-enact the Palestinian nationalist predicament is ultimately 
located within this desire. 
 
One of the specific projects of political anthropology since the ’70s has been to open up 
the category of the political to include fields that were not traditionally considered 
political (Vincent 2002). As a result, a wide range of politics was progressively 
discovered in such sites as: the body (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987), knowledge 
(Marcus and Fischer 1999), suffering (Das 1997), food (Appadurai 1981), space 
(Bisharat 1997), language (Desjarlais 1997), and so on. A growing body of scholarship 
has more recently documented the generative capacity of social life and political 
behaviour in studies of borders (Pelkmans 2006, Walker 1999) and people’s affective 
relationships to these (Svašek 2002). Others have explored the political significance of 
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music (Hansen 2006, Marsden 2007, Qureshi 2000), and football (Armstrong and 
Giulianotti 1997, Fozooni 2004). This body of work has also contributed to the 
increasingly complex ways in which the domain of the political is framed in the study of 
Palestinians. For example, Laleh Khalili (2007) has investigated the role of 
commemorative practices such as ceremonies, rituals, memorials, and history-telling in 
forging a sense of nationhood. Lori Allen, instead, documents how memory and the 
memorialisation of violence during the second intifada respectively constitute “an 
idiom” and a “set of practices” through which individual pain becomes collective and 
political (2007). The dramatic proliferation of martyr funerals and posters during the 
second intifada “created a public sphere in which participants and observers were hailed 
as national subjects, while simultaneously generating a forum in which public political 
debated occurred” (p. 107). I build on this body of studies in my thesis to explore the 
lively work of politics in Al-Wihdat.  
 
We need to note that the aversion to the “political” in the Camp did not necessarily 
signify a complete disinterest in political life (see also Hansen 1999, Spencer 2007). On 
the contrary, political rumours and the most daring conspiracy theories circulated quite 
lavishly; people held quite specific views about the most disparate topics of national and 
international politics, and refugees frequently spoke about the necessity for Palestinians 
to be led by “good politicians” (syāsīn muhtaramīn). Furthermore, whereas political 
parties and groups lost their appeal, an observer could not help but remark how the 
“political” emerged within other domains. In Al-Wihdat, for example, soccer 
allegiances for local and international football clubs took on particular significance in 
the daily life of refugees. Football was an important vehicle through which the political 
was instantiated. On the occasion of the 2001 African Cup of Nations, for instance, a 
friend asked me: “Tomorrow Egypt and Mozambique play, which do you support?” 
“Egypt!” I replied. The man commented resoundingly “You are wati!” Wati, in 
reference to a human being, is someone contemptible or “low”. The reason beyond this 
insult had to do with the fact that Egypt at that time was constructing a huge metal wall 
along its border with the Gaza Strip. My friends were obviously not sympathetic with 
this attempt to further isolate Palestinians. The national team as an emanation of the 
nation-state, and hence its policy, was not immune to their contempt. Although wati was 
uttered mainly jokingly, it spoke much about the complex relationship between the 
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political and different spaces of everyday life in the Camp. With time, hence, I came to 
ascertain that the political was not underrepresented in Al-Wihdat, but rather that I had 
been deploying a narrow conception of it both during my pre-fieldwork year, and during 
the first weeks of my fieldwork. The fact that nothing that I was observing was an overt 
“political activity” did not mean there was an absence of the political.  
 
Something, however, remains problematic. If political agency of a certain sort is 
expressed within these domains, how can we make sense of refugees’ eagerness to 
distance themselves from the corrupted word of the political? And how can we avoid 
reproducing essentialising depiction of refugees’ daily life as being inherently political? 
These questions might remain unanswered if this analysis rested on what a recent 
scholarship has defined as the scantily ethnographic nature of the concept of “the 
political” in anthropology (Candea 2011, Spencer 2007, Yurchak 2006).  
 
Anthropologists have indeed been particularly dubious about any ethnographic 
definition that might pin down and curtail the theoretical openness of the category. 
However, such “reticence” to define the “political” would produces a set of problems in 
my analysis of refugee political life. First, it assumes an ontological priority of the 
political over other domains of life. The ubiquity of the concept has de facto made 
impossible or dangerous to seek a definition for it, an attempt that would inevitably lead 
to also defining the “non-political”, and hence exposing scholars to accusations of de-
politicisation (Candea 2011)8. Furthermore, leaving the category intentionally open-
ended imposes an understanding of it that does not necessarily match the category 
employed by the very people whose “political life” is the object of our study. In other 
words, politics might be everywhere, and it is the specific task of the anthropologists to 
find out where, and whether or not the informants share the same understanding is 
irrelevant.  
 
Both flaws emerge as the direct consequence of the expansion of the political and have 
a number of undesired outcomes in approaching Palestinian political life. The risk 
would be to misunderstand or even ignore local categories of the political that do not 
                                                        
8These are dangers felt with particular intensity, especially in the field of Palestinian studies, where the 
main goal of the last generation of anthropologists was to “question Israel’s effort to repress Palestinian 
nationalism and to normalise its own colonial and racial character (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011, p. 481). 
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neatly conform to ours, for most of the people in Al-Wihdat would not normally 
consider “hanging out” in a games room or watching a football match as political 
activities. Another problematic weakness of such an analytical endeavour is 
representing people’s lives as being excessively austere. Politics certainly shapes many 
aspects of refugees’ everyday life. But to reduce everything their lives are about to this 
would contribute to reproducing one-sided depictions of Palestinian refugees living in 
camps – popularly conveyed, for example, in the stereotype of refugees as irreducible 
dissidents (e.g. Al-Khazendar 1997). Finally, such a reading would prevent us from 
understanding a crucial dimension of my analysis: the role of the non-political in 
fashioning new forms of political participation. 
 
In order to understand how “the political” may at times be painstakingly avoided by 
camp-dwellers, while other times emerging with force in their life (for example, in 
occasion of a football match), I build on a recent article by Matei Candea (2011) and 
earlier works by Jonathan Spencer (2007, 1997) . If Spencer warns anthropologists of 
the necessity to ground empirically a definition of political (ibid.), Candea goes a step 
farther by recognizing how the performative and reiterative interplay of the political and 
the non-political within an ethnographic context produce those very categories (2011).  
 
To explain this, Candea draws on Jameson’s “suspension of the political”. The 
“suspension of the political” has been a useful analytical tool employed by recent 
anthropological literature to grasp political change in regimes that are experienced as 
totalitarian and immutable. Alexei Yurchak (Yurchak 2006, 2008), for example, shows 
how the members of an artistic movement during late Soviet socialism in Russia 
undermined the power of a seemingly totalitarian state by constituting a space of 
subjectivity and agency through the suspension of the political. For the members of 
these groups “anything political was profoundly uninteresting […] and that neither 
support of nor opposition to the Soviet system was relevant” (…). Instead of acting in 
oppositional terms, Yurchak points out, “these groups experimented with a kind of self 
that was neither pro- nor not-Soviet but beyond Soviet personhood as such” (2009, p. 
732).  
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In this thesis, I draw an analogy between the “ordinary” in Al-Wihdat and Jameson’s 
“suspension of the political” as the refusal to play the game of politics (Yurchak 2008, 
p. 213). My case diverges from Yurchak’s insofar as the suspension of the political was 
not an attempt to subvert the control exerted by the regime over the camps or destabilise 
Palestinian nationalism with its symbols and values. But it dovetails his argument as 
refugees’ descent into what they perceived to be a non-political ordinariness was deeply 
transformative of the political context in which refugees’ lives were enmeshed. 
Overwhelmed by the ineffective and pervasive presence of political leaders and parties 
that have not led to any radical change to their condition of refugees after more than 60 
years, people in Wihdat found in ordinary activities an unexpected alternative to politics 
and the political. By actively pursuing a non-political ordinariness, refugees fulfilled the 
regime’s requirements of non-politicisation of the camps in exchange for integration. At 
the same time, the suspension of the political opened up a new “zone of subjectivity and 
agency” (Boyer in Yurchak 2008) that enabled them to re-enact their nationalist ideals. 
The ordinary and the mundane were highly attractive aspects of life in Al-Wihdat, 
appealing especially strongly to “the youth”. But they were also more than merely 
attractive. Their capacity to infuse Palestinian nationalism with non-political meanings 
and aspirations was crucial for making these viable to a life in exile. As I will show in 
greater detail in chapter 6, it was the very non-political nature of football that allowed 
the political (i.e. Palestiniania nationalism) to emerge.  
 
“Spaces of inclusion” or “spaces of exception”? 
 
Finally, I want to go beyond an understanding of Palestinian refugee camps as liminal 
places of ethno-national radicalism or, conversely, boundless spaces with an on-going 
process of assimilation in the urban fabric inherently closed or open spaces (see, for 
example, Hanafi 2008). Instead, in this thesis, I look at the socio-political closeness and 
openness of camps as aspects ultimately interconnected, and the reflection of refugees’ 
complex perceptions of the Camp (Marsden 2008, Pelkmans 2006). 
 
The discourse on refugee camps has traditionally cast the camps as spaces of exception 
where “bare humanity” was settled, controlled, disciplined, and visualised through 
humanitarian categories (e.g. Daniel and Knudsen 1995, Harrell-Bond 1999, Hyndman 
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2000, Long 1993, Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2002, Malkki 1995, 1997, Soguk 1999). 
The territorialisation of people inside its homogeneous space is a practical device used 
both in the governmental and humanitarian action and in the common sense 
assumptions to preserve the link among culture, identity, nation and territory, and to 
control this “surplus of humanity” (Malkki 1995). For example, writing with reference 
to Hutu refugee camps in Tanzania, Malkki explores the disciplinary role of this space 
in the construction of a “refugee identity” (1995). She conceptualizes the “refugee 
camp” as a vital device of power that enables the spatial concentration and ordering of 
the refugees.  
 
The influential genealogy of this scholarly discourse on refugee camps can be traced 
back to Hannah Arendt’s earlier theorisation of the “refugee” as an anomaly, a liminal 
being that does not fit into the nation- state/citizen canon. Arendt writes in this regard: 
“[m]ankind, for so long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had 
reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organised 
closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether […] 
the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger” (in 
Malkki 2002, p. 32).  
 
Academic work on refugees and refugee camps is also greatly indebted to Foucault’s 
notion of disciplinary space and practice. Foucault’s attempts to theorise space, and how 
it relates to governance and control, has been crucial to much academic work on the 
practices of governance implemented by powerful actors in the spatial regime of refugee 
camps (see, for example, Latte Abdallah 2004 for a regional variant).  
 
However, it is perhaps the work of Giorgio Agamben, more than that of Foucault, which 
provides insights into the specific status of the refugee and the extraordinary dimension 
of the camp as a “space of exception”. While Foucault’s unit of analysis rest in the 
workplace, school, family, hospital, or spaces of everyday life, refugee camps become 
the central site of Agamben’s analysis of the working of modern power and sovereignty 
(1998, 2005). But the greatest difference with Agamben’s analysis lies elsewhere. 
Drawing extensively on Schmitt, the Italian philosopher reassesses Foucault’s claim that 
modern state power is primarily based on the disciplining and control of free and 
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conscious citizens; for Agamben, the power of the state is instead predicated upon the 
transgressive taking of what he defines as “bare life” – i.e. individuals excluded from 
the political community, simple biological life stripped of their political status and 
rights. As the sovereign is the one who can set the limits of the law while going beyond 
them, “sovereign power” is the capacity to exert power by suspending the rule of law as 
a consequence of a “necessity”, such as a threat towards the very existence of the 
political order (1998). The “state of exception” is the condition in which the sovereign 
power consigns those who are reduced to “bare life” in order to preserve political 
stability (ibid.). In this framework, the refugee camp appears as the physical 
manifestation of the state of exception that comes into being when the premises upon 
which the nation-state rest are threatened: “[t]he camp is the space that is opened when 
the state of exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception, 
which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual 
state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such 
nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (ibid., pp. 168-169).   
 
Arendt, Foucault, and, more recently, Agamben have been crucial to influencing a large 
body of scholarship that has sought to grasp the inner and fundamental nature of “the 
camp” as a critical device in the control and disciplining of refugees. At first glance, the 
idea of the Camp as an exceptional space where a disenfranchised mass of people is 
emplaced in order to guarantee the political stability of the nation-state may find its 
application in Al-Wihdat. Indeed, although refugee camps in Jordan were established to 
host only who could not find an alternative accommodation, they soon became a useful 
device in the ordering and controlling of refugees. 
 
However, while this analysis has shown how spatial tactics have contributed to the 
maintenance and reproduction of power through the surveillance, control, and 
emplacement of the naked body in the space of the camp, it has been less informative on 
refugees’ response to this control9. The recent scholarly turn to space and spatiality 
might provide crucial insights to readdress this lacuna (see Casey 1996, Harvey 1989, 
Keith and Pile 1993, Lefebvre 1991, Massey 1992, Soja 1989, Yaeger 1996, among 
                                                        
9
 In Foucault’s case, this is true if referred to early works such as Discipline and Punish (1980), but not in 
terms of “late Foucault”, and especially the writings on “bio-power” and the “technologies of the self” 
(see, for example, Foucault 1980). 
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others). By exploring how place is constantly in the making, shaped by a dynamic 
interplay of external forces, structural constraints, and human agency, a compelling 
body of scholarship has challenged an Euclidean conception of space as an empty and 
inert container (e.g. Casey 1996), and generated detailed analyses about how space is re-
imagined and re-appropriated by the secondary productions of users (Certeau 1984).  
 
Drawing on de Certeau, scholars of Middle East cities have explored the practices of 
everyday life through which popular action resists spatial domination (e.g. Brown 1989, 
Lowy 1979). A body of ethnography on Palestinian studies has investigated how 
refugees have coped with the disciplining power of the state and the humanitarian 
organisations active in the camps by paying crucial attention to spatial forms of 
resistance in refugee camps (e.g. Bisharat 1997, Feldman 2008, Knudsen and Hanafi 
2011, Peteet 2005, Rosenfeld 2002). These studies have documented how refugee 
camps, for their inhabitants, constitute the primary reference upon which they 
reconstruct their identity, their sense of history, social, cultural and political views. In 
the West-Bank, Bisharat (1997), for example, shows how refugees’ strategies in their 
daily lives have gone beyond bureaucratic and humanitarian labels and they have re-
written the camp space, reproducing the Palestinian culture and land inside the symbolic 
and physical camp boundaries: opening illegal commercial activities in the houses, 
squatting in governmental buildings for political ends and turning the UN-issued 
refugee identity documents into symbols of political resistance against the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine. Other studies have also demonstrated how the space of the 
camp ceases to be associated with negative images – helpless people, passive victims, 
raw humanity, and so on – to become instead a potent symbol of the national struggle, a 
visible reminder of their commitment to return to their homes and land in Palestine (see 
Farah 1999 for Jordan).  
 
What I find most useful about the whole theoretical debate beyond refugee camps is the 
recognition of how the camp space has played a crucial role in enabling transformations 
of politics and subjectivity. However, by emphasising the liminality and exceptionality 
of refugee camps, such research has been less informative about their “normality”10. 
                                                        
10Aihwa Ong warns against the tendency of a scholarship in anthropology to adopt a similar dichotomy in 
which refugees are seen as inherently opposed to citizens and the State. She argues that “this focus on the 
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This has produced a set of connected problems. To begin with, camps have been often 
juxtaposed to the city. Whereas the latter has come to represent normality, the camp has 
been portrayed as the site of hardened national identities and political ideologies (e.g. 
Malkki 2002) or, conversely, a place of confinement for speechless victims (e.g. Agier 
2002). In the field of Palestinian studies, these approaches have at time resulted in 
missing the shifting and complex nature of Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle 
East. In few cases, the blunt application of Foucault and Agamben’s theories to the 
specificity of Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East have minimised individual 
participation in the process of self-fashioning and maintained unchanged the biased 
representation of refugees as an external element. This is particularly evident in Bernard 
Rougier’s analysis of refugee camps in Lebanon as laboratories for the proliferation of 
radical Islamic movements and conservative religious forces (2007; see Khalili 2007 for 
a criticism). My reservations about some of these readings are that they continue to hold 
on to a notion of refugee camps as liminal spaces, often clothed in a negative 
significance. Most importantly, as Magnus Marsden put it, the emphasis on the 
liminality of these spaces has led many social scientists to envisage only two 
alternatives for refugees: “ [refugees] must either fashion ‘nation-like’ identities in order 
to forge for themselves a space in the ‘national order of things’, or they must subvert it 
by emphasizing their ‘liminality’” (2008, p. 228). Such an approach does not adequately 
capture the complex and ambiguous nature of Al-Wihdat: a space that is still temporary 
almost 60 years after its establishment, but which is almost indistinguishable from the 
rest of the city, inhabited by people who are still refugees after four generations, but 
who enjoy full citizenship rights.  
 
I intend to specify futher the ongoing debate on refugee camps by building on a recent 
anthropological work on border and borderlands (Marsden 2008, Pelkmans 2006, 
Reeves 2011, Walker 1999). Such body of litterature will allow me to grasp the 
ambiguities and contradictions endowed in the process of political-self construction in a 
space that carries the weight of Palestinian history and struggles. If we want to 
understand the multidimensionality of the refugee political experience, we should pay 
more attention to the complex and interweaving process through which camp-dwellers 
                                                                                                                                                                  
nation and its others tends to eclipse the actual complex, ambiguous, and interweaving processes that 
transforms refugees back into citizens” (2003, pp. 78-79).   
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may display open-ended subjectivities at times, or, instead, imagine the camps as a 
bounded moral community. The Camp is an open space, fully integrated in the urban 
fabric of the city. The physical structure of Al-Wihdat, like every other Palestinian 
refugee camp inside or outside Jordan, recalls more the intricate maze of alleys and 
paths of an Arab souk (market) than the modular structure of a “total institution” where 
bodies are subject to the normalising effects of a disciplinary regime. During my 
fieldwork in Jordan, I came to ascertain how refugees living in Al-Wihdat have 
maintained a sense of connection with the Camp, a distinct sense of cultural, and 
sometimes class, identity that sets them apart from Palestinians outside, people with 
whom they share material conditions of ethnic discrimination. At the same time, the 
process of re-appropriation of the camp space has fostered the socio-economic 
integration of the Camp in Amman. Historically, camp-dwellers have developed 
intricate social relations with the “world” outside the camps. The boom of commerce 
and services and the development of a real estate market in the Camp have drastically 
changed the impersonal and aseptic space that characterised Al-Wihdat at the time of its 
establishment in 1955. Through their daily concerns and life trajectories, refugees have 
radically transformed the physical and socio-economic space of a camp that still 
remains paramount in their nationalist struggles; so that, at the time of my research, Al-
Wihdat was simultaneously home of Palestinianess in exile and a low-income 
residential area well connected with the expanding neighbourhoods of Amman. 
 
IN THE FIELD 
 
After conducting preliminary research in the Palestinian refugee camps of Jordan from 
May to December 2004, field research for this dissertation was carried out in the Al-
Wihdat refugee camp from July 2009 to September 2010. In Jordan, there are ten 
official Palestine refugee camps, plus three camps recognised only by the Jordanian 
authorities. According to the UNRWA11 and the Government, camp populations and 
refugees residing in their proximity live under similar socio-economic conditions. 
However, there are visible economic, visual and symbolic differences amongst the 
                                                        
11
 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is a 
relief and human development agency established in December 1949. The Agency provides today 
education, health care, social services and emergency aid to approximately 5 million Palestinian refugees. 
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camps, depending on factors such as the proximity to urban centres, the place of origins 
of their inhabitants, and the year of establishment.  
 
This thesis is almost exclusively about Al-Wihdat camp. The other refugee camps 
appear more as contrastive cases that helped me in the course of my research to either 
have a better grasp of the specificity of Al-Wihdat or, in contrast, appreciate shared 
features12. I decided that fieldwork based mainly on a single camp would best suit my 
analytical approach. In so doing, I privileged depth at the cost of a broader analysis on 
refugee camps in Jordan. But while analysis of the latter kind are welcome, the specific 
focus of my thesis required an “immersion” into the stream of ordinary life that could be 
achieved only through intensive research within a given context.  
 
Furthermore, the choice of Al-Wihdat was also largely motivated by its relevance with 
my research interests. For its location and history, Al-Wihdat best exemplifies the 
ambiguous nature of refugee camps in Jordan between “exception” and “integration”. 
Now surrounded by residential areas as a result of growth in the Amman population and 
the subsequent development of the capital, the Camp has developed into an urban-like 
quarter, though it still conserves a certain “family likeness” with the other camps. In the 
‘60s, Al-Wihdat became a symbol of Palestinian nationalist struggles, when it hosted 
the headquarters of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  
Today, the Camp is known for being the birthplace of the homonymous farīq al-wihdat 
(Al-Wihdat Team): a very popular football Club in the region, almost entirely composed 
of Palestinian players, which has become an important symbol of identification for 
Palestinian refugees in and outside Jordan.  
 
The choice of the location was also based on more pragmatic considerations. When I 
arrived in Jordan, I spent the first weeks at Institut Français du Proche-Orient (IFPO), a 
French research centre that has a hostel in Jabal Amman13, located near to the historic 
centre of the capital. The proximity of the Camp to the neighbourhood in Amman where 
I first moved at the beginning of my research certainly played a role in this decision. 
                                                        
12I conducted some research and paid occasional visits to friends in other camps, most notably in Souf 
Camp and Hussein Camp. 
13
 One of the seven hills that originally made up the capital of Jordan. 
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Located within walking distance from Al-Wihdat, living in Jabal Amman was a 
practical solution until I was able to find a permanent accommodation in the Camp.  
 
I took also into consideration additional factors associated to the existing regime of 
control in Jordan. Fieldwork in the refugee camps carries some risks for the 
ethnographer. As the goal of my project involved an ethnographic consideration of 
political, identity and religious registers, my research was potentially sensitive to local 
authorities. Although I was granted a permit to carry out research in Al-Wihdat by the 
government body in charge of the camps in the Hashemite Kingdom (DPA – 
Department of Palestinian Affairs), the authorities remain generally suspicious toward 
“professional intruders” into camps such as anthropologists (Geertz 1972). Every time I 
approached camp branches of the DPA, I was warmly recommended by its employees 
that it would be best to be escorted by a police officer for security reasons, allegedly 
related to my safety. Since conducting research with the constant presence of an officer 
would not have helped me to accomplish the goal of my research for obvious reasons, I 
have hence soon discarded the possibility of moving into small isolated camps where I 
was unlikely to pass unnoticed.  
 
Dairat al-Mukhābarāt al-Ammah (the Jordanian Intelligent Service) is well known for 
its extensive activity in the country and throughout the Middle East. Although the 
presence of the secret police is less oppressive than in other countries, such as Syria and 
Lebanon, it is not less pervasive. People whose voices and opinions present in this 
thesis contrast with the Regime’s rhetoric, appear either anonymously or not with their 
real names. For the same reasons, during my field reseach, I considered the possibility 
of informing people gradually and partially about the exact nature of my research. 
Inevitably, I did not manage to completely escape the suspicions and stereotypes that 
inevitably accompany foreigners (ajaneb) during their stay in the camps. However, not I 
never faced any open hostility, but the very large majority of people I encountered in the 
camp welcomed my presence warmly there and was eager to demonstrate their 
hospitality. The experience of being a guest was ceaselessly reproduced in diverse 
settings and occasions: weddings, private visits, funerals, official occasions, and 
graduation celebration. One of the most pleasing memories of my fieldwork was the 
lunches consumed in the house of my friends. At times, people also confided a desire to 
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dispel what they believed were the negative stereotypes circulating in the Western world 
about the Muslim Arab world and Palestinians more specifically. As a Western 
researcher, I was called to report refugees’ hospitality and generosity to a broader 
community that I was supposed to embody. 
 
To explore refugees' daily life in Al-Wihdat, I have employed the ethnographic method 
of participant observation. I began the research by simply going to the Camp, hanging 
around, and occasionally interviewing the different organisations and actors involved in 
camp life. Upon the advice of a friend, I decided to visit Nadi Al-Wihdat. The Nadi al 
Wihdat was established by the UNRWA and the international community in 1956. 
According to its original mandate, it was founded to help people in the Camp and to 
give them a place where they can meet together and spend time. At the time of its 
institution the Nadi operated in two main domains: education and social activities. 
Although it is now the most important “sphere of action” of the Nadi, “sport” was added 
only later on, in1976. Originally called “markez shabab al-wihdat” (Wihdat Youth 
Center), it became the Nadi al Wihdat, twenty years after its establishment. The word 
Nadi (club), which is mainly associated with sport, underlines a paradigmatic shift in 
the agenda of the Club, from social and humanitarian activities to sport. 
 
My visit to the Nadi turned out to be a turning point in my fieldwork. Here I was very 
fortunate to make the acquaintance of Mohammed and Abu Omar. The two were 
respectively running a local branch of an international NGO and a cultural program for 
young men (burnāmej al-shabāb) under the auspice of the Nadi. In order to raise the 
number of the visits to the camp, I first started working as an English teacher in the 
NGO and then volunteering in various capacities in the program that was held weekly 
every Friday. I soon made the acquaintance of the young men and adolescents who were 
collaborating in the “Friday program”. As such, a couple of times I was invited to watch 
football matches at the TV in a house located at the eastern periphery of the Camp.  
 
Informally called “al-markez” (the Centre), the place was a sort of self-run youth club 
used as an alternative leisure and cultural centre from some of the shabāb (young 
men/adolescents) orbiting in the sphere of the Nadi. The coordinator of the “Friday 
programme”, Abu Omar, would supervise and cope with the expenses. At that time, I 
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was still struggling to move into Al-Wihdat. I was often told that there were no places 
available: camps are overcrowded, and often a whole family lives in the same room. 
Eventually, Abu Omar found a solution by very generously offering me the possibility 
of living in the Centre. The first part of my fieldwork was hence split almost evenly 
between the Nadi and the markez. It was here, and with the shabāb of the Nadi, that I 
learned something about living a life in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan. With 
time, I eventually managed to widen my group of interlocutors and include people from 
outside the sphere of the Club within my network of friends and acquaintances.  
 
I pursued what scholars define “polymorphous engagement” (Viroli 1992), a technique 
that implies the use of various and different methods. To find my informants, I adopted 
what in social science is called the “snowball method”. I hence began to meet people 
who attended or worked in the Nadi to extend afterward my contacts among their 
acquaintances, friends, and relatives. My research in a youth club has inevitably 
narrowed down my focus to the young males of the Camp. I attended weddings, cultural 
events and religious ceremonies, and in generally accompanied refugees in the ordinary 
activities of daily life. Regular visits to households were an important part of my 
research. Besides providing me with a deeper understanding of how youths manage 
their livelihood, it furthered my insertion in the camp. I addition, I visited other 
institutions and organisations in the camp such youth clubs, local NGOs, UN and DPA 
offices, Zakat committees14, and the Camp Service Committee as well as markets, 
shops, small restaurants, cafes, game rooms, and barber shops.  
 
Though participant-observation remained the most important part of my research and 
field notes my main primary source, I also devoted some time analysing refugee texts, 
textbooks, documents sources calendars, posters, graffiti, newspapers, internet sites, and 
blogs texts and other published material, including statistics of the Jordanian 
government and UNRWA on the condition of camp-dwellers. I have also conducted a 
number of semi-structured interviews with UNRWA staff, DPA officers, and members 
of the Camp Service Committee. With the exception of these formal meetings, I soon 
abandoned the possibility of carrying a tape recorder and learned to avoid taking notes 
                                                        
14
 Voluntary organisations established with the task of collecting and distributing zakat funds. Zakat is a 
small percentage annual savings given by Muslim as alms. Zakat is one one of the five pillars of Islamic 
beliefs and practices. 
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in front of people. It was clear that the employment of a more formal way of enquiry 
hindered a more spontaneous flow of speech and involved the omittance and silence of 
my informant on many issues. When I present excerpts of conversations held with 
refugees, it is a reconstruction of a dialogue based on the notes I took afterward.  
 
I was initially engaged in the study of political life, and more specifically the 
significance of Palestinian nationalism in Al-Wihdat refugee camp. Before engaging my 
ethnography, I had formulated some initial assumptions about the role of the 
spectacularity or uniqueness of specific events (e.g. the outbreaks of the two Intifadas) 
on the political consciousness of Palestinians living in the refugee camps set up in 
Jordan. However, during my field research, I became aware of the significance that 
living an ordinary life had among many in the Camp. The discontent and the frustration 
for the Palestinian political situation (al-wade‘) were such that many of my friends 
ignored it or, more likely, deliberately avoid talking about it. Simultaneously, I was 
increasingly intrigued by the high number of unemployed youths who spent their time 
idling in the streets of the Camp or in other spaces such as, for example, coffee shops 
and game rooms. A fascinating aspect of recent work on youth across the world is 
scholars’ tendency to focus on the anxieties that many young men experience in times 
of social and economic uncertainties. A large part of this literature has ascribed these 
anxieties to the gap between the fantasies and aspirations of youth and the realities of 
living in neo-liberal economies (e.g. Hart 2008, Mains 2007, Masquelier 2005, Weiss 
2009). The breach between the actual and the desirable also resonated in my findings. 
Yet, in Al-Wihdat, youth’s anxieties were not communicated simply by the 
impossibility of many young men to translate globally celebrated ideals and values of 
economic success into their concrete lives; much of the frustrations of young men were 
communicated by the conflict between the desire to live an idealised ordinary life in 
Jordan as Jordanian citizens and a binding allegiance to the Palestinian nationalist 
struggle. The everyday was the site where this tension was consumed and navigated. 
The fieldwork was gradually shifting my focus from a direct political analysis to the 
exploration of young men’s engagement with spaces of every daily life and their 
attempts to live ordinary lives.  
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Immersed in the daily life of my informants, I was eventually seduced by the idea that 
political subjectivity in the Camp could be encompassed largely by the cycle of 
everyday life. The symbolic significance of commemorating the Nakba, the memory of 
the militarisation of the Camp in the '60s, of Black September, and of the two Intifadas, 
and in general the “political thickness” of being Palestinian refugees, all seemed to be 
swallowed up within the stream of everyday life. Soon it became clear that 
“ordinariness”, the dominant theme of my investigations, was the most appropriate 
organising concept for analysing refugee political agency and subjectivity. “Ordinary” 
seemed to infuse every aspect of life.  
 
While my stay in a male youth centre and my acquaintance with the people working in 
the Nadi Al-Wihdat defined the focus of my thesis, it also afforded me with the unique 
possibility to deepen such an analysis. I was in the privileged position of being able to 
spend a large part of the day with a multitude of young men and adolescents aging from 
their late teens to early thirties.  
 
This research, however, has a major limitation. My field trajectory has led me to adopt a 
privileged focus on young men and adolescents of the camp to the detriment of other 
categories. Whereas I sought to compensate this by meeting and interviewing members 
of older generations, I was not as successful in doing this with women. I am aware of 
the risk of biasing my research by an over-representation of male perspectives. When 
the occasion arose, I spoke with women in the camps too. However, due to the patterns 
of gender segregation and standards of modesty, as male researcher I experienced 
difficulty in carrying out an investigation of this kind. For example, engaging in 
discussion with women was widely considered shameful (‘ayb). I was not even able to 
sit and converse with the female relatives of my friends. During my frequent visits to 
their houses, I usually had to wait outside before entering, leaving the women of the 
household time to change room and possibly avoid any contact with a male stranger. As 
such, this thesis is almost exclusively about men. 
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Figure 1: Al-Wihdat official map (source: UNRWA) 
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Figure 2: Al-Wihdat today, aerial view (source: Google Earth) 
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Figure 3: Al-Wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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CHAPTER 2: IT FEELS LIKE HOME 
 
INTRODUCTION: SCENES OF ARRIVAL 
 
I asked a taxi driver whether he knew where Al-Wihdat Camp was. The driver nodded, 
signalling for me to take a seat in his car. The Camp was not far from where I lived in 
Jabal Amman, approximately a 15 minute drive away. From the balad (town centre), 
there was a road that led uphill towards the Camp; Al-Wihdat, once separated from 
Amman, is now been completely incorporated into the city through urban expansion. As 
we travelled from Wihdat to Jabal Amman, the landscape changed visibly. The nice 
villas and buildings in white stones of this well-off neighbourhood gave way to poorer 
constructions, dilapidated houses and shabby buildings. The ubiquitous pollution of 
Amman was thicker here than in the residential area I stayed in, most likely due to the 
heavier car emissions and traffic jams that engulf one of the main streets that borders 
the Western side of the Camp, Shāra‘ Madaba.  
 
When we arrived, the taxi stopped at the Camp’s “borders” and did not enter through 
Shāraʿ Al-Nadi – a large street which departs from the main road of Shāraʿ Madaba and 
leads up to the economic and physical core of the Camp: the souk al-wihdat (Wihdat 
market)15. There were no fences, walls, or barbed wire separating Al-Wihdat from the 
rest of the city, only a large police station located at the crossroads between the town 
and the entry to the Camp. If the taxi driver had not stopped at its outer limits, I would 
have never guessed where and what actually constituted “the Camp”. What prevented 
my driver from entering Al-Wihdat was, rather, a multitude of stands and people who 
gathered from early morning to late evening, sometimes even very late into the night. 
My first impression of the Camp only slightly coincided with the image of the refugee 
camp as a place where a mass of dispossessed, poor people is confined and isolated as 
threats toward “the national order of things”. 
 
Despite the fact that there were no stark boundaries between the Camp and the rest of 
Amman and its economic integration into the city16, refugee camps and their inhabitants 
                                                        
15
 See “figure 3”. 
16
 Compare “figure 1” with “figure 2”. 
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were often perceived as a distinct community by non-camp dwellers in Jordan, 
including Palestinian refugees living outside the camps. Also camp-dwellers 
distinguished “us”, living in camps, from those living outside by referring to themselves 
with the general term “mukhayyamji” – a word that can be roughly translated as “being 
from the camp” (see also Hart 2008). The term, however, means much more than just 
living in the camp: it entails affinity, emotional attachment, and personal relationship 
with this space17. Furthermore, like all other refugee camps, Al-Wihdat was generally 
said to be afflicted by a number of social plights, especially violence, crime, and 
poverty. It was also widely believed that the Camp was a big Palestinian enclave, 
distinct from the rest of the city, and still not fully assimilated in Jordan: a space of 
Palestinian national belonging and strong social cohesion. But despite my expectations, 
nobody heralded my arrival with threatening or inquiring glances. The feeling that I 
would be an intruder in a dangerous and unruly zone of urban life rapidly vanished. 
Gauging from the flow of people coming back and forth, the space did not strike me as 
being ghetto-like or, indeed, much different in character from the areas surrounding it 
and with which I was familiar.  
 
Relieved that I had passed unnoticed in my first day in the Camp, I hence decided to 
explore it further, following the Shāraʿ Al-Nadi. Here, both women and men were 
crowding the street. In the small alleys that branched in every direction, many people 
were standing, sitting and talking. These streets, indeed, appeared to be an extension of 
the private space (Abu-Lughod 1987) occupied by men who were engaged in activities 
such as chatting, smoking shisha (water-pipe), or sipping coffee.  
 
Al-Wihdat presented itself to me not as an impenetrable community that was hostile to 
outsiders, but, rather, as an open space and a thriving economic area. Indeed, the first 
thing that struck me about Wihdat was the centrality of market life to its daily rhythms 
and dynamics. Almost all of the entire northern section of the Camp appeared to be a 
big market. There was a lot of bustling and economic activity. The market was 
expansive and its food sector bigger than the equivalent market in the downtown area of 
the city. In some part of the market, the asphalt of streets was covered with a thick 
                                                        
17
 Living in Wihdat did not necessarily imply being a mukhayyamji. An exploration of what means and 
entails being “mukhayyamji”, especially in relation to the performance of masculinity, is central to the 
concerns of chapter 5. 
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stratum of dirt that over the years piled up and took the semblance of soil. There was 
also a lot of noise, and the smell of rotten food, which filled the nose alongside the 
perfume of the hot falafel that shopkeepers were frying in thick black oil. A multitude of 
peddlers, stands, and small shops were selling their merchandise alongside one another. 
Together, these stores formed a huge market that extended from the centre of the Camp 
almost until its (administrative) outskirts. Although there was a supermarket and a few 
other large scale business activities, the souk (bazaar) was made up mostly of stands and 
shops managed by single individuals or, less frequently, a handful of paid employees. 
As I came to know, almost all of these businesses were family based. But, on my first 
walk around the Camp, it also became clear to me that Al-Wihdat was the site of many 
other activities than those associated with refugee conviviality. There were carpenters, 
butchers, barber shops, tailors, peddlers, coffee sellers, and falafel makers with their 
stands. The market, moreover, served not only the needs of the Camp’s inhabitants but 
also of a much wider spectrum of people. Men in the Camp took pride in saying how 
not only nās min al-mukhayyam (folks from the Camp) but also people from the 
surrounding areas and even from the richer zones of Amman frequented their souk, 
attracted by abundant goods and competitive prices. Months after my first visit, in the 
early spring, when more fruits and vegetables were available, I also noted that the souk 
al-khudra (vegetable market) was frequented by many Filipinos who worked as 
domestic maids in the city, and were sent to do the shopping by rich Jordanian families 
living in the richer neighbourhoods of Abdoun, Shmeissani, and Jabal Amman. 
 
As a whole, Al-Wihdat is an integral part of Amman. There are distinguishing features 
as well. The main road where the taxi driver dropped me – Shāraʿ Madaba – is a large 
one, with two lanes in each directions, divided by a traffic island; this street separates 
the western border of the Camp from the surrounding neighbourhoods. Another big yet 
slighter narrower road delimits the northern border of Wihdat. At the entrance of the 
large street – Shāraʿ Al-Nadi – that I had crossed to get to the market, a police station is 
located. It is notable because it was a three storey fortress with a large poster of the 
King hanging on its façade. If the two roads encircle a part of the Camp separating it 
from the rest of the city, the police station draws the attention of a visitor to a slightly 
different visual pattern – a set of non-distinctive features that, taken together, bestows a 
specific and peculiar dimension to the Camp. Aside from the main streets, Al-Wihdat is 
57 
 
 
a maze of narrow passageways and twisting alleys that give the Camp the feeling of a 
labyrinth18. The shabbiness of the shelters (ma’wa/malja’) – often protected only with 
zinc roofs anchored by pieces of debris and heavy stones19 – and their height (rarely 
exceeding a second floor) are other defining marks of the Camp that help to distinguish 
it from the rest of the city. Seasoned visitors, then, can also quite easily spott the UN 
flags that marked out the offices, schools and other facilities of the UNRWA in the 
Camp. Furthermore, those who know the organisation of space in Amman can better 
pick out other markers of aesthetic difference that distinguished Al-Wihdat from other 
comparable areas of the city. According to the words of a Palestinian refugee previously 
employed in the UN compound in the Camp, Al-Wihdat possesses a familiar air: “for 
those who never stepped a foot into it, it is difficult to distinguish the Camp from any 
other poor neighbourhood. But for us who have lived and worked in the Camp, it is 
simple. You can distinguish the Camp for its vegetable market (souk al-khudra), for the 
women who dress traditionally, for the accent (lahje) of the people and the way they 
shout when they sell their products”20.  
 
                                                        
18
 See “figure 5”. 
19
 See “figure 4”. 
20
 See “figure 6”. 
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Figure 4: shelters with zinc roof (source: Jihad Nijem)
 
Figure 5: narrow alley (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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Figure 6: women in the market (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
So, in the eyes of the camp-dwellers, Al-Wihdat was neither the bounded space known 
to outsiders, nor a place like any other neighbourhood in Jordan. In this chapter, I 
combine two bodies of literature to explore the seemingly paradoxical status of Al-
Wihdat: an arena for fashioning nationalist ideals and subjectivity, and as a site for the 
progressive integration of refugees into the broader Jordanian society. On the one hand, 
I build on a well established scholarship that has demonstrated how refugee camps have 
had a profound impact on camp-dwellers’ self-perception and Palestinian national 
consciousness in general (e.g. Bisharat 1997, Farah 1999, Peteet 2005). On the other, I 
intend to dwell on recent studies that have investigated how (camp) space and borders 
might be sites that simultaneously connect and separate (Marsden 2008, Pelkmans 2006, 
Walker 1999). 
 
I will hence begin with a preliminary examination of the relationship between the 
Jordan state and Palestinian refugees. The material that I present in the first two sections 
of this chapter will serve to highlight an important theme of this chapter: how state and 
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UN policies in the Camp have contributed to creating and strengthening the ambiguities 
and contradictions inherent refugees’ political subjectivity. As I will show, refugees’ 
experience of exile was deeply influenced by the policies of the Jordanian state. By first 
promoting the creation of a hybrid identity encompassing both Transjordanian21 and 
Palestinian elements, and then pursuing an ambiguous policy of integration and 
discrimination of Palestinian refugees, the Jordanian state contributed to problematising 
refugees’ feeling of national self-identification. The dilemma concerning refugees’ dual 
status as both Palestinian and Jordanian was further aggravated by the evolution of the 
UNRWA and the Jordanian state’s management of camps’ physical and housing 
infrastructure: camps are still administered as temporary spaces, although these are 
being gradually included into the surrounding municipalities’ services.  
 
I will then document how refugees, through their daily spatial practices, seek to 
navigate the dilemma pertaining to their status in Jordan by making themselves at home 
in Al-Wihdat. As we will see, especially over the last years, refugees have increasingly 
sought to pursue social and economic integration in Jordan. Many camps have become 
thriving urban spaces connected to their surrounding neighbourhoods. Al-Wihdat has 
constantly reshaped and reorganised its spaces within the urban fabric of Amman. An 
inside view will dissipate stereotypical depictions of the Camp as an homogenous place 
and reveal the existence of several sub-neighbourhoods (harat), some of which differ 
from others in terms of the Palestinian origins of their inhabitants, their reputations, and, 
sometimes, in terms of the forms of wealth and power they are thought to have amassed. 
I will show that the success of refugees in accommodating the need to live an ordinary 
life with the burden of “extraordinary existences” is also grounded in their ability to 
reproduce the Camp’s distinctive sense of place as being a Palestinian place, while also 
seeking to challenge the socio-economic marginality that seems to plague refugee 
camps. The material presented here will serve to highlight the second dominant theme 
of this chapter: the historical shift in Palestinian political subjectivity and agency. If 
camp dwellers once thought to maintain the Camp’s spaces as liminal places, today they 
                                                        
21The term “Transjordanian” has been used in the relevant literature to indicate the population that 
became citizens of the State of Transjordan, and successively citizens of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, by virtue of the nationality laws of 1928 of the Emirate of Jordan (see, for example, Abu-Odeh 
1999, Massad 2001). There was not an exact equivalent of “Transjordanians” in the Camp. In daily usage, 
refugees would refer to Transjordanians either with the general term of ‘urdunīn (which literally means 
“Jordanians”) or with the word badawī (Bedouins).  
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welcome the Camp’s spatial and economic integration inside the territory as a form of 
agency and creativity that demonstrates their allegiance to Palestinian nationalism.  
 
PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
 
The annexation 
 
When the first Palestinian refugees arrived in 194822, Jordan had only been recently 
recognized as a distinct territorial unity. Before Britain and France became the dominant 
imperialist powers in the area, the country was part of Wilayat Dimashq (the Province 
of Damascus). The end of World War I signalled the victory of the Allied Forces. 
Ruling what was formerly the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and France introduced 
two regional systems into the eastern Mediterranean Arab region. The first was the 
nation-state system; the second was a new international regime that gave the Allies a 
mandate permitting them to administer the former Ottoman territories until they became 
full-fledged nation-states (Abu-Odeh 1999). In the Eastern parts of the region, Arab and 
Kurdish populations were combined into the new Mesopotamian country called Iraq, 
supposedly independent, but a de facto British protectorate. Meanwhile, Syria and a 
greatly enlarged Lebanon were governed by France. In September 1922, the Council of 
the League of Nations recognised part of the territories east of the Jordan River as a 
state under the British Mandate.  
 
The creation of Jordan defined the features of new political and ethnic identities. 
However, with the introduction of the new nation-state system in the region, traditional 
loyalties to a tribe, a region, a village, a town, or a district did not disappear but rather 
merged into a new complex political system (Bocco 1995, Shryock 1995). Territorial 
integrity and territorial sovereignty provided the basis for grounding the utopian 
coincidence between ethnic identity and national territory. To legitimise the new order, 
a number of strategies were implemented, along with the crucial role played by political 
                                                        
22
 Besides Palestinian refugees and the native Arab Bedouins and villagers, the population of Jordan 
includes Circassians, Chechens, Lebanese Shias, as well as a substantial number of traders, migrant-
workers from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Some of them arrived in the region even 
before the establishment of the country in the early twenties.  Whereas the large majority of Palestinians 
living in Jordan were refugees who fled the territory of mandate Palestine following the Arab-Israeli war, 
a minority of Palestinians in Jordan moved to the country before this date (Massad 2001). 
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elites and intellectuals in the process of national imagination (Anderson 1983, 
Chatterjee 1993, Gellner 2006). Recent studies carried out in Jordan have demonstrated 
how several institutions have had a relevant role in this process: the law and military 
(Massad 2001), the Emir (Abu-Odeh 1999)23, the educational system (Anderson 2002), 
the census (De Bel-Air 2003) and the museum (Maffi 2009) have all served the interests 
of the ruling powers – the British before and the Hashemite Kingdom after – in the 
production of a national identity.  
 
The establishment of Israel in 1948 provided an opportunity for the ambitious King 
Abdullah of Jordan to fulfil his expansionist goals. This project was so systematically 
pursued that in 1950, the Prime Minister of Jordan announced that “on the occasion of 
the lifting of barriers between the East and the West Banks of the Hashemite Jordanian 
Kingdom, there is no longer a reason to consider the country [al-bilad] located in the 
West Bank a foreign country […] the two countries located in said two Banks are 
considered one unity [wihdah wahidah]” (quoted in Massad 2001, p. 230). In the 
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war, the monarch annexed the territory which, from the 
West bank of the Jordan River, comprised the cities of Jerusalem (the East part), 
Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Hebron, and the surrounding areas. This territory became 
known as the West Bank of Jordan. The annexation was legitimised by the signing of an 
addendum to the 1928 Law of Nationality, which stated that “all those who are habitual 
residents, at the time of the application of this law, of Transjordan or the Western 
Territory administered by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and who hold Palestinian 
nationality, are considered as having already acquired Jordanian nationality and to enjoy 
all the rights and obligations that Jordanians have” (article 2, in Massad 2001, p. 39). 
Along with a set of laws containing regulations relating nationality, the addendum of 
1928 – then amended in 1954 by the Law of Jordanian Nationality – granted citizenship 
rights to Palestinian refugees and their descendants who were “habitually residents in 
February 1954 in Jordan” (which included the West Bank). As a result, between 1954 
and 1967, Palestinian refugees who fled to territory administered by the Hashemites and 
Palestinians and who were born in the West Bank achieved legal equality to any other 
citizen of the Jordanian state. 
                                                        
23
 On April 1921, Abdullah I bin al-Hussein, born in Mecca during the Ottoman Empire, was appointed 
Governor of the newly formed Emirate of Transjordan by the British Government. In 1949, when the 
Emirate became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Emir was recognised as King of Transjordan. 
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If in territorial terms, the annexation of the West Bank signified the addition of a large 
chunk of land, the seizure of the territory meant also the inclusion of Palestinians to the 
Jordanian national population. As a matter of fact, the massive demographic 
amplification played a crucial role in redefining several dimensions of social life in the 
recently created Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Abu-Odeh 1999). The nature of this 
change drastically affected the urban environment of the East Bank: before the 
annexation, Amman was still a village-like town with less than 70,000 residents, in the 
aftermath, its population doubled, and then further increased to almost 250,000 people 
in the early ‘60s. But this was not to be the only transformation in country. The exodus 
of Palestinian refugees and the inclusion of the West Bank raised the population from 
375,000 people to one of 1,270,000 people, transforming de facto the Transjordanian 
population into a minority within their kingdom (Massad 2001).  
 
Refugees accepted the energetic policy of integration pursued by the government. A 
large number of refugees found employment in the army and governmental services 
(Sayigh 2007). As Joseph Massad put it, “with the exception of the early opposition to 
annexation by many Palestinians, most Palestinians came to accept their new status as 
a fait accompli that they did not wish to challenge” (2001, p. 235). However, 
Palestinians and the native Transjordanians differed noticeably in terms of their social 
and economic backgrounds. Palestinians in general enjoyed better education, higher 
standards of health and medical care, and lower rate of child mortality. Many were well-
off, and most were better accustomed to an urban style of life and more experienced in 
terms of political participation than their Jordanian counterparts. If the cultural and 
economic capital Palestinians brought with them helped the development of the country, 
it also fuelled tensions with the native population. The Transjordanian upper-class 
particularly felt slighted by what it perceived as being a Palestinian “nation-class 
narrative of superiority” (p. 234).  Remarkably, these differences have played a critical 
role in fostering a sense of belonging amongst refugees in the newly formed country. I 
frequently heard people in Al-Wihdat, for example, claiming with pride to have earned 
the right to stay in Jordan and being genuinely Jordanian on the basis of the fact that 
their fathers’ literally built the country and provided the necessary expertise for its 
development. This claim was also confirmed by Avi Plascov, for whom the 
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“development of the East Bank was carried out mainly by Palestinians, who, having 
little option, put their knowledge, skill, and talents at the disposal of the regime. 
Amman, the kingdom’s backward capital, was to become a flourishing town thus 
shifting the centre of economic gravity” (1981, p. 37). 
 
In addition to the implementation of the above mentioned legal and political measures, 
the acquisition of the West Bank required the adoption of a strong rhetoric that would 
have legitimised replacing the word “Palestine” with that of “the West Bank”. This took 
form through the idea of creating a national identity that would encompass every citizen 
of the Kingdom. According to Laurie Brand, “[c]ontrary to the perception of many 
Palestinians […], the evidence suggests that the state's goal was less to impose a 
Transjordanian identity than to create a hybrid Jordanian identity for both 
communities”. The project – pursued both by King Abdullah and, later, by his grandson, 
King Hussein – was based  upon four fundamental premises: the recognition of the 
Hashemite monarchy as the symbol of Jordan, commitment to pan-Arab ideals, the 
recognition of the Palestinian plight and “right of return” (haq al-‘awda), and the unity 
of the two Banks (Brand 1995, pp. 50-52).  
 
Interestingly, the position of the regime toward the Palestinian population did not 
change after the severe amputation of a large chunk of territory – the West Bank – in the 
aftermath of the “Six-Day War” in 1967.  
 
In 1967, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan suffered a severe defeat by the state of Israel. 
Doubtful of his Egyptian adversary and sceptical of the possibility to defeat Israel, the 
late King Hussein was reluctant to start a new war with Israel. Despite his 
unwillingness, however, King Hussein of Jordan was drawn into war by a spiral of 
events and the dominant role played by Egypt in the political scenario (Abu-Odeh 
1999). The president of Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser, enjoyed immense popularity as a 
champion of the Palestinian nationalist predicament, simultaneously challenging the 
legitimacy of King Hussein as the sole representative of the Palestinian issue.  After a 
period of high tension, the war began when Israel launched a surprise air strike against 
Egyptian air bases on the morning of June 5. The result was a rapid and crucial victory 
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for Israel that “was destined to change not only the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
but also the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century” (ibid. p. 132). 
 
On a rhetorical level, however, the government reasserted the territorial and 
demographic unity of the East and West Bank. On July 1968, Prime Minister Juma 
made this point clearly during a parliamentary meeting:  
 
“Jordan’s policy was, is still and will continue to be predicated on the following: The 
Palestinian cause is an all-Arab cause. No Arab State has the right to solve that question/ The 
Jordanian entity of the two banks is sacred. We believe in it as much as we believe in God and 
in our religion. We will never at any time relinquish this sacred unity/ The West Bankers should 
realize that their lives, souls and future are all rightly and sacredly bound to this bank. That 
bond will never be broken under the leadership of King Hussein” (quoted in Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 
140).  
 
In keeping with this agenda, a number of policies were adopted – most notably, the 
“open-bridge” policy that allowed the free movement of people and goods through the 
bridges that connected the two banks of the Jordan River (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 139). 
Furthermore, the government continued to pay the salaries of civil employees in the 
West Bank in order to maintain its claim on the territory (ibid.).  
 
Black September 
 
The defeat of 1967, however, resulted in the emergence of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO); this was a crucial factor that in the following years would lead to a 
drastic change of policies and attitudes of the regime toward the Palestinian population 
(Fruchter-Ronen 2008). But even before that would happen, the relationship between 
Transjordanians and Palestinians was not entirely without problems. The decision to 
annex the West Bank sparked much animosity, especially within the Palestinian 
community of the kingdom. The malcontent culminated with the assassination of King 
Abdallah I in 1951, shot by a Palestinian gunman while attending Friday prayers at the 
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Tensions among Palestinians were also stirred by the 
unequal development of the two Banks of the Kingdom. The economic and 
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demographic growth of Amman and the surrounding areas was pursued to the detriment 
of the Western territory of the Jordan River. Faced with a more advanced West Bank, 
the government concentrated its efforts in the East Bank by greatly developing the 
economy of the territory and strengthening its transportation system (Massad 2001). 
These differences fuelled more tensions. Whereas Palestinians were angered by what 
they perceived to be a clear favouritism of the Hashemite regime toward the “native” 
community, Transjordanians felt humiliated by a “discourse of superiority” engaged by 
the Palestinian upper-class. Moreover, rich landowners were infuriated by expropriation 
of their land by the government, who then used it to base refugee camps upon (ibid.).  
 
To further exacerbate the political situation in the kingdom, rivalry between the 
Hashemites and the PLO over the exclusive rights to represent the Palestinian national 
predicament and rights also grew in significance and volatility. After the disastrous 
defeat of the Arab forces during the “Six-Day War”, Palestinian fidāʾīyyn (guerrilla 
fighters) established their headquarters in the territory of Jordan, now reduced to the 
East Bank, from where they launched their attack on Israel. The relationship between 
the PLO and the Jordanian government deteriorated progressively. On the one hand, the 
regime sought to exploit the internal divisions amongst the ranks of the PLO in order to 
challenge its ideological and military power (Abu-Odeh 1999). At that time, the unity of 
the PLO was threatened by the different leadership under which the organisation was 
becoming fragmented (most notably Fatah and PFLP). In addition, the last years of the 
‘60s saw the group alienating the sympathy of a large share of the population in the East 
Bank as a consequence of the abuses perpetrated by armed bands of fidā’īyyn (guerrilla 
fighters) – often in the form of requests for pecuniary “donations” but sometimes 
involving the kidnapping, torturing, and even murdering of those suspected of 
collaborating with Israel.  
 
On the other hand, the Jordanian government failed to pursue a coherent agenda that 
was in line with its demographic, legal, and rhetoric unity. The cleavage between the 
Transjordanian population and the Palestinian community was further exacerbated by 
the regime’s political and economic discrimination against the latter. A clear example of 
that discrimination was the retaliation implemented by the Jordanian army which 
shelled two refugee camps after the attack perpetrated on King Hussein’s motorcade on 
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June 9, 1970. As Adnan Abu Odeh points out, “[t]he choice of two refugee camps as the 
target of the army’s anger implied that the army looked on all Palestinians as an 
extension of the fedayeen, and vice versa” (1999, p. 177).  
 
This spiral of tension triggered a series of events that eventually culminated in the tragic 
civil war of 1970 known as “Black September”. It must be noticed, however, that the 
bloody confrontation between the Palestinian guerrilla fighters (fidāʾīyyn) and the 
Jordanian army did not see the juxtaposition of two ethnically distinct groups. Not only 
did most Palestinian-Jordanians partake in the civil strife, but a sizable minority of 
Transjordanians joined the rebels in their fight against the monarchy (Sayigh 1997).  
 
The conflict started the 17th of September 1970 and lasted until July 1971. Already in 
the first two-weeks following the outbreak of the conflict, the Jordanian army 
conquered vast areas of Amman and Zarqa where the guerrilla forces were 
concentrated. By September 23rd, the army held the whole of the Al-Hussein camp and a 
large part of Al-Wihdat, and over the next two days it attained total control of the 
remaining part of the Camp. Large sectors of Amman, the other northern cities of the 
kingdom, and the refugee camps that served as headquarters for Fatah and PFLP were 
severely damaged in the early phase of the battle. In the aftermath of the civil war, half 
of Al-Wihdat was destroyed by army bombardment. The conflict inflicted heavy losses, 
especially among Palestinians. There is no consensus around the death tool and the 
nature of the violence. If for the regime, the number of casualties ranged from 
1,500/2,000, largely imputed to self-defence needs, for the guerrillas these are between 
7,000 and even 20,000 and must be ascribed to the intention of pursuing a systematic 
cleansing campaign and general slaughter of the Palestinians in the kingdom24. The 
showdown in Al-Wihdat terminated with the destruction of a large part of the Camp 
and, as elsewhere in the country, the eviction of the fidāʾīyyn from the Kingdom 
(Massad 2001, Sayigh 1997).  
 
                                                        
24
 For an analysis of the impact of Black September on the formation of a Jordanian national identity and 
the politics of de-Palestinisation implemented by the regime in government departments and public 
institutions after the civil war, see among others Fruchter-Ronen (2009). 
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Black September and the events that followed were gradually precipitating a discourse 
of unity toward a guest/host relationship, that in Jordan was expressed in the terms of 
muhājirīn (emigrants) – the Palestinians – and ansār (supporters) – the Transjordanians. 
Muhājirīn and ansār refer respectively to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions – 
who fled to Medina to escape their persecutors – and the people of Medina – who 
welcomed the Prophet. In the Islamic tradition, the two terms stand to signify the 
establishment of the first Islamic state. The reference to these two concepts of the 
Islamic tradition was made for the first time by King Hussein in the wake of the civil 
war. If the King’s intention was to invoke this distinction in order to reinforce national 
unity, Transjordanian nationalists reinterpreted these concepts to suggest the temporary 
presence of Palestinians in the Kingdom (Abu-Odeh 1999, pp. 211-212).  
 
It should also be noticed that, while the Hashemites never really ceased to rhetorically 
uphold the discourse of unity between Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin (i.e. refugees and displaced from the 1948 and 1967 wars), the regime pursued an 
ambiguous policy at times. By generally supporting the manifestation of Transjordanian 
chauvinism, the government also exploited intercommunal tension in order to achieve 
specific goals – such as the prevention of horizontal solidarities between Palestinians 
and Transjordanians or the strengthening of the PLO’s authority over the territory 
(Brand 1995).  
 
In the years after Black September, however, the Hashemite’s agenda took a clear trend 
toward privileging the non-Palestinian aspects of the state’s national identity (Abu-
Odeh 1999, Massad 2001, Nanes 2008). The civil strife between the Palestinian militias 
and the Jordanian regime may have been the first major turning point, but further 
domestic and regional events fostered the weakening of regime’s inclusive policies. One 
of these events was the “Rabat Summit”. In 1974, the leaders of twenty Arab states met 
in Rabat to unanimously acknowledge the PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of 
Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated” (quoted in Abu-Odeh 
1999, p. 210). However, it was only with the outbreak of the first intifada in the 
Occupied Territories in 1988 that the regime formally announced their disengagement 
from the West Bank, and “genuinely abandon[ed] its claim to speak for Palestinians” 
(Nanes 2008, p. 91).  
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If the disengagement signified a radical change of orientation, from the ‘80s onwards, 
Israeli has claimed that Jordan is the proper homeland for Palestinians (al-watan al-
badil), which served to further entrench the new tendency to treat Palestinian territory 
and people as different to the Jordanians.  
 
Jordanian nationalism  
 
Under the pressures of Transjordanian nationalists to distinguish Jordan from Palestine, 
the construction of a national identity began to be spelled out almost exclusively 
through those attributes that celebrated its “Transjordanian nature” (Abu-Odeh 1999, 
Alon 2007, Fruchter-Ronen 2008, Massad 2001, Mishal 1978, Salibi 1993). As a matter 
of fact, Transjordanian nationalism emerged strengthened by the events of the ’70s. Its 
main concerns revolved around two intertwined issues: the Palestinian issue and the 
question of national identity in Jordan. It is important to note, however, that not only 
there were “native” Jordanians opposing anti-Palestinian stances, but that the very 
Transjordanian nationalism comprised a variety of groups with diverse and sometimes 
conflicting agendas. The Palestinian-Jordanian statesman and historian Abu-Odeh 
identifies three main clusters of Transjordanian nationalism – the pragmatic group, the 
clan/tribe-based group, and the radical group –that stretch from a moderate stance to an 
extremist position (1999, p. 241). However, notwithstanding the obvious differences 
that characterise these forms of nationalism, these positions converged into a broad 
idea: the primacy of a national identity predicated upon the exclusion of the Palestinian 
“element”.  
 
A widely (but not universally) shared feature of Transjordanian nationalistic discourse 
was the emphasis on the tribe (‘ashyra). According to Al-Abbadi, one of the main 
advocates of this position, “Jordan is our father and the tribes are our mother” (quoted 
in Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 244). The raising of “tribalism” was also fostered by King 
Hussein since the ‘70s in an effort to first integrate the Bedouins within the national 
body politic and, after Black September, to promote the creation of a national identity 
(and a shared history) that laid its foundation upon a “genuine” (Trans)Jordanian basis. 
Although the goal of the monarchy might have not been explicitly linked to this 
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purpose25, the inclusion of the tribal component in a nationalist discourse of authenticity 
was deployed to exclude or marginalise the Palestinian community from the national 
base: the nomadic traditions of “native” Jordanians were to be juxtaposed onto the 
urban and peasant heritage of Palestinians. And, as Christine Jungen points out, “the 
terms ‘ashā’arī (tribal), watanī (patriotic) and ’urdunī (Jordanian) have progressively 
acquired an equivalence between them” (Jungen 2002, p. 201)26. 
 
The rise of Transjordanian nationalist discourse and the outbreak of the civil war had 
profound repercussions at different levels of Jordanian society. In the public sector, the 
increasing discriminatory practices of the regime resulted in blocking Palestinian 
advancement and a massive purge of Jordanian-Palestinians from the status apparatus. 
Whereas Jordanians of Palestinian origins used to enjoy a good representation in the 
government, the proportion of Palestinians was drastically curbed to a quarter of the 
total seats in the cabinet. Palestinians were also excluded from attaining the highest 
positions of executive power. Furthermore, a near hegemony of Transjordanian 
elements came to control the army and, in general, the whole state security apparatus, 
including the police forces and the intelligence agency (al-mukhābarāt)27. But it is 
perhaps in education that the regime’s discriminatory stance is most evident. Prior to the 
war, the university was largely dominated by a highly educated quota of Jordanian-
Palestinians, but the new forms of exclusion practiced by the regime dramatically 
inverted these demographics (Abu-Odeh 1999).  
 
The process of depalestinisation of the national identity of the Jordanian state was also 
evident at a cultural level. The promotion of Transjordanianness was implemented 
through the institution of a number of cultural clubs (Massad 2001, p. 250). On the 
societal level, efforts to assert this novel identity led to the adoption of new symbols and 
identity markers. A case in point was the red-and-white hatta (scarf/head-gear). Since 
the ‘70s, King Hussein started to wear the scarf with increased frequency, especially 
                                                        
25
 The emphasis on tribes and tribalism as an index of being genuinely Jordanian was also deployed by a 
segment of Transjordanian nationalists to question the very legitimacy of the Hashemite elite, whose 
origins are not to be found in Jordan but in the Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia (see Shryock 1997). 
26
 For an analysis of how the monarchy encouraged the promotion of tribal components in the process of 
national construction, see Bocco (1995) and Massad (2001); for the role of the tribes in the Hashemite 
regimes, see Layne (1994); on the reformulation of tribalism in Transjordanian nationalist settings, see 
Jungen (2007) and Shryrock (1997). 
27
 On Jordanian national identity and security forces, see Vatikiotis (1998). 
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when meeting with tribal leaders (ibid.). Following the example of the King, a new 
generation of urban male youths began to use the scarf in order to mark their ethnic 
identity as Transjordanians. The hatta soon became a marker of the political inclination 
of Jordanian-Palestinians, allegedly distinguishing those who sought integration – and 
wore the red-and-white garment – from those who asserted their Palestinianess by 
donning a black-and-white scarf. But the battle over national identity was not confined 
only to the hatta and involved other dimensions of daily life such the language, football, 
and even food (see Massad 2001).  
 
Yet, many Transjordanian nationalists have nurtured the feeling that the regime has 
done little to downsize the economic and political role of Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin (Abu-Odeh 1999). On February 5th this year, for example, 36 representatives of 
the main Bedouin tribes – Bani Sakhr, Abadi, Shobaki and Manaseer – issued a petition 
publicly questioning King Abdullah II’s wife, Queen Rania. Among the other things, 
the petitioners attacked her Palestinian background and accused her of seeking to 
empower Jordanians of Palestinian origin by supporting the right of women to pass on 
their citizenship onto their children, which would have inevitably further shifted the 
demographic balance in favour of Jordanian-Palestinians (Reuters 2011).  
 
The Hashemite regime, on the other hand, has constantly rejected any attempt to 
undermine national unity. After Black September and the events that followed, King 
Hussein I and King Abdullah II have carried out an inclusivist national identity that 
emphasised, at least rhetorically, the integration of Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
provided that the latter avoided explicit invocation of a Palestinian identity and 
refrained from political activity against the regime. Since the 2002, the Jordanian 
authorities have hence sought to counter these “divisive” stances by developing a 
unifying agenda, first under the cry of “Jordan first” (al-’urdun awalan) and more 
recently under the slogan “We are all Jordan” (kulluna al-’urdun). In this context, camp 
refugees’ status as fully-fledged citizens has been repeatedly confirmed through public 
statements stressing their status as “part and parcel of the Jordanian people with the 
same rights and duties as any other Jordanians”; or, also, as “a dear part of Jordan […] 
that should be given the same attention and services as other parts of the country such as 
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the countryside and the semi-desert areas”28. But despite what the government 
advocated and more or less successfully sought to accomplish, a large part of the 
refugee population in the country fears that the regime has ultimately surrendered to a 
Transjordanian exclusivist discourse (Massad 2001, see also Ryan 2008). In Al-Wihdat, 
for example, many of my friends were extremely sceptical of the rallying crusade of the 
government. In particular, the slogan “Jordan first” was interpreted in the terms of 
“(Trans)Jordanian first” and “Palestinian last”: the clear confirmation that the 
government preferred “native Jordanians” before them.  
 
THE INSTITUTION OF TEMPORARINESS 
 
Refugee camps in Jordan 
 
The first Palestinian refugee camps were set up in the Hashemite Kingdom in the late 
‘40s following the establishment of Israel29. When the Jewish Agency in Tel-Aviv 
announced the institution of the Provisional Government of Israel on May 14, 1948, the 
war that followed resulted in the destruction and mass evacuation of most Palestinian 
villages. Palestinians, who left their land and abandoned their houses to flee the mass 
persecution and atrocities perpetrated by the Haganah and other Jewish forces, were 
hence prevented by the newly born state of Israel to return to their homes and lands 
(Morris 1987, pp. 130-131)30. The end of the war saw the territory of the Mandate 
Palestine divided between the Zionist colonies and the Arab forces that intervened on 
the behalf of the Palestinian side. Whereas the former took control of a large part of the 
territory designated by the British Mandate of Palestine, Egypt and Jordan respectively 
annexed Gaza and the West Bank. Three-quarters of a million people, many injured 
during the violent Jewish-Arab conflict, were suddenly transformed into a humanitarian 
problem: the Palestinian issue. Palestinians from southern parts of the Palestine 
                                                        
28
 Respectively, Abdel-Karim Abul Heija (Director of the Jordanian Department of Palestinian Affairs in 
Arab al-Yawm) and Ma’rouf Bakhit (ex-Prime Minister), in Al-Husseini (Al-Husseini 2011, p. 191). 
29
 I will not refer to Palestinians as a diasporic group, though their exodus presents many characteristics 
typical of such groups (Clifford 1994). For geographic, temporal, semantic and political reasons specific 
to the Palestinian case, the employment of the concept of diaspora would mask more than unveil the 
political issues beyond their flight (see Peteet 2007). 
30
 Both Israeli (e.g. Kimmerling and Migdal 1993, Morris 1987) and Palestinian (e.g. Khalidi 1997) 
historians have criticised official Israeli claims that Palestinians left their houses and land following their 
own decision or the order of Arab leaders. In contrast, these authors have pointed out how the attacks and 
raids perpetrated by Zionist forces were at the core and origin of this exodus. 
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Mandate fled to the Gaza Strip; those from the centre dispersed to the West Bank; and 
those from the north spread out into southern Lebanon and Syria (Kimmerling and 
Migdal 2003). According to the Red Cross, about 320,000 Palestinian refugees stayed in 
the West Bank; 210,000 went to the Gaza Strip and 180,000 to other Arab countries. 
Around 100,000 Palestinian refugees found refuge in Jordan (Zureik 1996).  
 
With some relevant exceptions, the newcomers were all granted with citizenship rights 
– as part of King Abdullah I’s plan to annex the West Bank and legitimise his power. At 
the beginning of 1949, refugees in Jordan were concentrated around the capital and in 
the small urban centres around it: 20,000 in Amman and 11,000 in the surrounding 
villages, 8,000 in Salt, 7,000 in the city of Irbid and 27,000 in its neighbourhoods, 5,000 
in Zarqa and in the nearby city of Ruseifa. In the cities and in the villages, Palestinians 
found shelter in the homes of their relatives, in religious institutions and in tents. Only a 
small percentage of refugees, 21,000 people, lived in the two camps settled by the 
international community in the country: Karameh in the Jordan Valley (1949) and Zarqa 
camp (1949) in the north (Al-Hamarneh 2002). However, the refugees’ desperate food, 
shelter, sanitation, and health care needs convinced the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), in charge of the 
care of the Palestinians, of the need to raise the number of camps in the area: two were 
built in Amman – the Amman New camp, called “Al-Wihdat” by its inhabitants (1955), 
and Hussein camp (1952) – and one in Irbid (1951).  
 
The second major exodus of Palestinians occurred in 1967, after the Israeli occupation 
of West Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The date is commemorated as the 
“Naksa” (the “setback”) and coincides with the catastrophic defeat of Arab armies at the 
hand of Israel in the conflict known as the “Six-Day War”. A new wave of refugees 
expelled by the victorious state of Israel crossed the east bank of the Jordan River, 
raising thus the number of Palestinians living in Jordan to approximately 60% (Massad 
2001). Since most refugees received Jordanian nationality after the unification of the 
East and West Banks in 1951, they were thus naturalised citizens of Jordan. To deal 
with this mass of displaced people, new refugee camps were set up in the country. They 
found a place in the areas of Amman and Zarqa and six new camps were organised 
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under the UNRWA’s control: al-Baq’a, Hettin, al-Talbieh, Jarash, Suf and al-Huson 
(Al-Hamarneh, 2002).  
 
Finally, the number of Palestinian refugees living in Jordan increased considerably 
following the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990. Approximately 300,000 Palestinians of 
Jordanian citizenship were forced to leave Kuwait following Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion and occupation of the country. Although the majority of these Palestinians 
never lived in Jordan before, they acquired Jordanian citizenship through the unification 
of the East and West Banks in 1951 (Zureik 1996). The first waves of migrants were 
single men who left in the late ‘40s and early ‘50s in search of job opportunities in the 
expanding market of the Gulf. Palestinian found an employment either as highly 
qualified labourers or as unskilled ones respectively in the oil and construction sectors. 
With their remittances, they supported their families still living in Gaza, the kingdom of 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. A decade later, a second wave of Palestinians followed; but 
this time as a result of the elimination of visa requirements for Arab citizens, the new 
migrants brought their families with them (Troquer and al-Oudat 1999). However, in 
1990-91, the bulk of Palestinians living in Kuwait left the country as part of the mass 
exodus of the civilian population at the time of the Iraqi invasion. When the conflict 
ended, the Palestinian population was prevented from coming back to their houses and 
jobs in Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities explained this exclusion as being a result of Arafat’s 
partisanism with the occupier as well as the unfavourable conditions of the Kuwaiti 
economy (ibid.). The so-called “returnees” – an appellative these people gained for 
being the descendants of Palestinian refugees who resided for some time in Jordan– 
settled in the major economic centres of the kingdom: Amman and Zarqa, and to a 
lesser extent, Irbid (ibid.). Although a minority of them found a place in the 
overcrowded camps of the country, many built houses near these camps, contributing 
substantially to the expansion of camps like Al-Wihdat and their amalgamation with the 
city.   
 
Today, there are approximately 5 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, 
of whom almost 2 million are living in Jordan. According to UNRWA, “Palestine 
refugees are people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 
and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 
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1948 Arab-Israeli conflict”31. Among them, more than 346,000 registered Palestinian 
refugees live in the ten Palestinian refugee camps mentioned above, six of which are 
situated in the AMA (Amman Metropolitan Area) (UNRWA 2012)32.  
                                                        
31
 See http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=86. It must be noticed that this was simply an operational 
definition employed by the UNRWA to establish the parameters for determining who was entitled to 
receive its services. As Palestinian refugees fell under the general assistance mandate of UNRWA when 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established, they were not included 
into the official definition of refugee. This has had important consequences. First, Palestinian refugees are 
not entitled to those fundamental rights that enjoy those who meet the criteria set by the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees – i.e. repatriation, permanent resettlement in country of residence, or 
resettlement in a third country. Secondly, unlike the UNHCR, UNRWA does not provide protection of 
refugees, and its mandate is limited to basic services. 
32
 See “figure 7” 
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Figure 7: refugee camps in Jordan (source: UNRWA) 
 
UNRWA and the politicisation of camps 
 
The refugees’ stay in the camps was meant to be temporary, until the UNRWA’s 
working programs would help them to become economically independent. Even though 
the host states – Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria – and the large network of humanitarian 
organisations involved in the care of Palestinian refugees had different and even 
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contradictory mandates, organisational cultures, and interests, all converged on a similar 
methodology around the Palestinian issue in Jordan: resettlement (Latte Abdallah 2004). 
Two major premises under-laid the functioning and determined the objectives of this 
regime in Jordan (ibid). Palestinian refugees were a transitory phenomena of crisis and 
disorder, and thus only temporarily relevant; human nature was best served in a 
sedentary setting. In this context, refugee camps soon became a practical device 
designed to accommodate Palestinian refugees. Planned as emergency and thus 
temporary solutions to the “refugee problem”, camps were the most suitable solution for 
the management of those refugees – mainly dispossessed labourers and farmers33 – who 
could not find an alternative accommodation elsewhere. The camps were not intended 
to separate their inhabitants from the rest of the population, but rather to foster their 
integration within the local and regional market.  
 
On 8 December 1949, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Relief 
and Work Agency for the Near and Middle East (UNRWA) as an operational, non-
political agency in order to take care of the humanitarian aspects of this project within 
Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. According to the December 1949 
resolution 302 (IV) of the UN General Assembly, the Agency (UNRWA) had to work 
“in collaboration with local governments (on) the direct relief and works programmes 
[…] [and] consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures 
to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and 
works projects is no longer available” (UNRWA 1949). This project was expected to be 
carried out first in the refugee camps “through the gradual replacement of relief 
assistance (food rations, medical care and primary education) by a program of public 
works involving terracing, afforestation, irrigation schemes and road construction” (Al-
Husseini 2011, p. 184)34.  
 
                                                        
33
 These people made up about three quarters of the refugee population in Jordan (Al-Husseini and Bocco 
2010). 
34
 In the absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly 
renewed UNRWA's mandate. This was most recently extended until 30 June 2011. Given the 
exceptionally high percentage of Palestinian refugees employed in the ranks of the UNRWA, the history 
of the UNRWA has been strictly intertwined with the vicissitudes of Palestinian refugees in the Middle 
East (see Schiff 1995, cf. Ashkenasi 1990). 
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In April 1950, humanitarian assistance passed completely under the control of the 
UNRWA. In 1951, an agreement between the UNRWA and the Jordanian Government 
defined the responsibilities of both: camp organisation and assistance-distribution were 
run by the UNRWA35, while the government’s role was limited to enforcing the law and 
supporting the Agency in carrying out its humanitarian mission. Under the imperative of 
preserving the temporariness of camps, the Jordanian government and the UNRWA 
issued specific norms for the regulation of the use of land plots and shelters in the 
Camp. 
 
Al-Wihdat refugee camp was set up in the south-east of Amman, near the capital city36, 
on an area of 0.48 square kilometres, owned by private citizens but “temporarily” leased 
out to the government37. Here, the authorities gave each person 100 square metres of 
land, called a “unit” or “wihda”38  in Arabic, on which they built a concrete room of 12-
20 square metres. The unit, designed for refugees and their children, was assigned on 
nominal basis. As refugees were not entitled to ownership rights over the plot of land, 
the block was not divisible or transferable. To limit the horizontal growth of the camps, 
the building of new units was forbidden. The height of the shelters was limited at three 
meters to avoid the vertical growth of the Camp. The residents were not allowed to rent, 
buy or sell their habitation units. From the beginning, life in the camps seemed to be 
disciplined by the absolute prohibition to use the space of the Camp for any activity, 
except for dwelling (Destremau 1994, Jaber 1996). Furthermore, Al-Wihdat – like the 
other refugee camps in the territory – was left outside national and municipal’s policies 
of urban development. Again, at the core of this decision was the determination to 
reproduce camps’ temporary character. This choice was not opposed by refugees, who 
feared that any infrastructural improvement could have led them to being classified as 
“settled” and jeopardise their return to Palestine. Unlike other refugee camps, however, 
Al-Wihdat was set up not with tents, but with more durable shelters made of concrete, 
                                                        
35
 For the terms of cooperation between the UNRWA and the Jordanian government, see: 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/3/33/00005646.pdf. Othe political dimension of UNRWA’s mandate 
and its relationships with the PLO, see Al-Husseini (Al-Hamarneh 2002); on the evolution of UNRWA 
programmatic agenda, see Shiff (1995). 
36
 This choice was largely motivated by the circulation of goods and services (2001, p. 252-253). 
37
 The land – rented for a period of 99 years – is expected to be returned to the original owners once a 
solution to the Palestinian issue is found. 
38
 Wihdat, which literally means “units”, takes its name from the 100 square meters assigned as housing 
unit to each familial group with a registration number that certified its refugee status. Wihdat is the 
colloquial name; the official name is Amman New Camp. 
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zinc, stone, and asbestos. It was not until the mid-1960s that the expanding municipality 
of Amman integrated the urban camp areas within its public service system (with water, 
telephone lines, and electricity)39.  
 
Several factors, including the weak absorption capacities of the host countries and the 
absence of a political solution for the refugee issue, contributed to endangering the 
permanent resettlement of refugees into Jordanian territory. But, more than anything 
else, it was refugees’ opposition – also by means of violent demonstrations – to any 
solution that could threaten the “right of return” that eventually put an end to the 
UNRWA’s plans for a collective reintegration in the late 1950s (UNRWA 1955). While 
the notion of resettlement/naturalisation (tawtīn) was interpreted as a clear sign of the 
collaboration with Israel, camps become soon political symbols of Palestinian struggles 
for the right of return. This process is most visible in the politicisation of the UNRWA 
and its services (see Al-Husseini 2000). Despite its explicitly non-political mandate, the 
UNRWA has progressively acquired a clear political connotation, often associated with 
the space of the Camp. A case in point was the UNRWA ID card (al-wathīqa). The 
large majority of Palestinian refugees in Jordan hold a Jordanian passport and an 
UNRWA registration card. Whereas the former identifies them as citizens of the 
Hashemite Kingdom, the UNRWA card indicates their temporary status as refugees. 
These cards provide refugees with access to a number of social and economic benefits 
such as food or medical supplies, but they also stand as potent symbols of refugees’ 
steadfastness to return to their homes and lands in Palestine. As Al-Husseini writes, 
“UNRWA's services were instrumental in ensuring the very existence of the camps, 
which became bastions of Palestinian nationalism as of the late 1960s and 
simultaneously the focus of the PLO's implantation and its main recruiting ground” 
(ibid. p. 54). In this respect, the fact that the vast majority of the Agency’s staff is 
recruited within the Palestinian community has surely reinforced the Agency’s 
identification with the refugee cause. This is even more remarkable in the camps, the 
only place where UNRWA services are available in their totality40 – elementary and 
                                                        
39
 See Destremau (1994) and Husseini (2011). 
40
 In 2004-2005 for example, only 36% of the children living outside the camps went to the UNRWA’s 
primary schools, while 85% of children living in the camps attended it. The practical implications of the 
Agency’s management inside the camps extend also to tasks that are managed by municipalities outside 
the camp such as garbage collection and shelter maintenance and rehabilitation (Husseini, 2010).  
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preparatory schools, health clinics, relief distribution and social centres41. Over the 
years, refugees living in the camps have become more dependent from UNRWA 
services than refugees outside, and the Agency has become identified with the 
Palestinian plight. 
 
 
Figure 8: UNRWA field office in Al-Wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
                                                        
41
 See, for example, “figure 8” and “figure 9”. 
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Figure 9: UNRWA schools (source: jihad Nijem) 
 
 
The evolution of assistance 
 
During my research in the camp, the UNRWA was a steady but marginal presence in 
the life of my friends in the Camp.  
 
Since the ‘70s, UNRWA’s influence in the camps began to decline. A diverse range of 
factors have contributed to the Agency’s decrease of control over camp issues. The 
main reason seems to be a severe lack of financial resources, which has progressively 
forced the UNRWA to reduce its services and expenditures for all of its facilities – i.e. 
schools and health centres (Shiff, 1995). UNRWA’s loss of authority was accompanied 
by a greater participation of the Jordanian authorities in the management of the camps. 
Since 1975, the government has taken over numerous tasks previously endorsed by the 
UNRWA, such as the enforcement of regulations surrounding spatial constriction, and 
the maintenance and rehabilitation of shelters and camps’ infrastructure (Husseini, 
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2010). To accomplish these and other duties, immediately after the Jordanian 
disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, the government established the 
Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA), a national organism in charge of the 
Palestinian refugee issue in Jordan under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. However, the influence of the government on the camps is not only exerted 
through direct control, but also by means of the “camp services committees”. These are 
formed by 7-13 members (not necessarily refugees living in the camps). The 
committees are quasi-governmental bodies under the economic, operational and 
membership control of the DPA. These offices are in charge of implementing 
community projects and representing refugees’ requests and concerns. Refugees have 
often lamented the lack of autonomy of the committee and called for the independent 
election of its members; a request that has so far been ignored (ibid.). The DPA has also 
exerted indirect control through the supervision of the numerous NGOs, the diverse 
range of “community based organisations” (CBOs) – such as “Women”s Program 
Centres” and “Community Rehabilitation Centres for the Disabled” – and the zakāt 
committees operating in the camps in the medical, relief and social sectors. 
 
After Black September the Jordanian government and the UNRWA implemented 
several projects to ameliorate the living conditions of people in the camp. The 
progressive involvement of the DPA and the government in the camps has certainly led, 
on the one hand, to major control of the former over these spaces and, on the other hand, 
to boost the process of the spatial, economic, and, in part, administrative integration of 
the camps into the municipality of Amman. This process of integration rested on a new 
strategy of spatial governmentality implemented by the government in the aftermath of 
Black September, when the status of refugees in exile seemed to be more and more 
destined to be a permanent resettlement into the host country. In Al-Wihdat, these 
strategies of governmentality were visible in a number of measures the government 
undertook in the year following the civil war. In 1986, for example, the Nadi Al-Wihdat 
passed under the control of the Ministry of Youth and Sport. Originally set up and 
supervised by the UNRWA, the club grew into a major sports club and a place of 
political activism in the ‘70s. A decade later, the government widened Shāraʿ Sumaiyya, 
a small alley that crossed the Camp from north-west to south-east, turning it into a large 
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two-lane road42. A few years after, on the occasion of the outbreak of the II intifada, the 
government also visibly enlarged the police station located on the outskirts of the Camp.  
 
 
Figure 10: Shāra‘ Sumaiyya (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
The different interpretations people from the Camp gave me on these changes are 
remarkable. For some, for example, while the expansion of Shāraʿ Sumaiyya was 
carried out to improve bad circulation within the Camp, the extension and refurbishment 
of the police station was explained by the unification of the station of Al-Wihdat with 
that of Ashrafiyya. For others, instead, they were both part of a plan to strengthen state 
control over the Camp and its population, as symbols of the regime’s power and through 
precautionary measures following unrests pro-Palestine held in the Camp. Either way, 
these interpretations shed light on the same rationale: if the insertion of Al-Wihdat into 
the municipality of Amman has become more visible, so was the control of the “state” 
over these spaces. The increasing presence of the Jordanian authorities in the Camp and 
the gradual integration of the latter into the municipality of Amman have eventually 
afforded the Jordanian state with an opportunity to strengthen its control on Al-Wihdat 
and its inhabitants43. 
 
This process of control and normalisation of the camp-dwellers through the spatial 
regulation of Al-Wihdat and the other refugee camps has been even more evident in 
recent years. In 1994, the signing of the Wadi Araba Treaty between Jordan and Israel 
                                                        
42
 See “figure 10”. 
43
 I am building here on Ismail’s argument that neo-liberal practices and principles of governmentality are 
also possible in authoritarian states and in contexts where the Western conception of state is absent 
(2007). 
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marked further involvement of the Hashemite Kingdom in matters of the camps44. 
Following its signature, the government planned and developed the “Economic and 
Social productivity Program” (ESPP), a national development program aimed at 
improving living conditions in impoverished areas, including refugee camps. Two sub-
programs, the Community Infrastructure Program (CIP) and the Housing Projects for 
the Poor (HPP) have specifically tackled the infrastructure situation in refugee camps. 
The first one is intended to upgrade the physical infrastructure of the camps; the second 
seeks to rehabilitate the most deteriorated shelters. The novelty of these interventions 
resides in the fact that, for the first time, Al Wihdat and other refugee camps have been 
included in a large-scale development scheme that has, at least rhetorically, radically 
tackled camps’ infrastructure.  
 
It is also important to remark on refugees’ responses to the ESPP. Whereas in the past, 
any upgrading of the camps’ infrastructure was firmly rejected by the refugee 
community as an attempt to resettle Palestinians in Jordan, this time, the camp-dwellers 
displayed a positive reaction toward this upgrade. This has been explained by same 
authors as the consequence of the widespread feelings of disappointment and bitterness 
generated by the agreements of Oslo and the signing of the Wadi Araba Treaty (see, for 
example, Al-Husseini and Bocco 2010). In Al-Wihdat, the signing of these treaties 
ultimately persuaded many camp-dwellers that Jordan was their permanent place of 
residence (Al-Hamarneh 2002). Critics of inclusion of refugee camps into the ESPP 
have indeed pointed out how these kinds of interventions are likely to lead to the “the 
refugees’ permanent resettlement in Jordan” and to the “gradual disappearance of the 
camps through their transformation into poor housing neighbourhoods”45. Government 
authorities, however, have been adamant about claiming that the Camp’s status has 
remained untouched, and that the only actions undertaken by the ESPP programs were 
the rehabilitation of single rooms of the shelters (Al-Husseini and Bocco 2010).  
 
                                                        
44
 On October 26, 1994, one year after the signature of the “Oslo agreements”, Jordan and Israel signed a 
peace treaty at Wadi Araba that laid the foundation for bilateral cooperation between the two countries 
and set the basis for the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan (see Al-Husseini and 
Bocco 2009).  
45
 Headline of the Islamist weekly newspaper al-Sabil, 24 December 2000in Jalal al-Husseini (2011) 
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AL-WIHDAT: BETWEEN INCLUSION AND EXCEPTION 
 
The Camp as a Palestinian space 
 
Although refugees camps were established in Jordan with the very operational and 
practical objective of gathering in one place those refugees who could not afford 
alternative accommodations, UNRWA’s administrative practices had a profound impact 
on Palestinian refugees’ lives (see among others Latte-Abdallah 2004). In the camps, 
modern techniques of “bio-power” were implemented for the discipline and control of 
refugees’ bodies. The Agency adopted a number of interventions to inscribe 
Palestinians with a new status and to fashion their subjectivity. Julie Peteet notes how 
“rations [were] aimed at the subjective transformation of the displaced from angry, 
potentially volatile refugees to docile recipients of food aid” (2007, p. 76)46. However, 
the perpetual screening of refugees through their classification and enumeration, the 
rationing and the medical system had unexpected reverberations on camp-dwellers’ 
subjectivity. If the main purpose of the UNRWA and the government was to generate 
the image of a social unitary group – the “refugees” – without social, historical and 
political links with the past or the present, this aim failed: a culture of political 
resistance came out of the camps.   
 
Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East feature a long political history of national 
mobilisation and resistance (Peteet 2007). In Jordan, this was most evident during the 
heyday of Al-Wihdat, when the Camp attained an almost complete political autonomy 
from state central power. During this decade – from the rise of the PLO in the 1960s 
until its expulsion by the Jordanian army after Black September in the early 1970 – 
Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan became a focal point for Palestinian nationalist 
activity. Even after the disintegration of the armed bands of fidāʾīyyn (popularly called 
the “sons of the camps”), camps continued to retain their cultural and political 
distinctiveness as sites of Palestinian resistance. At the time of my research, along with 
other elements generally associated with peasant life such as the orange and olive trees, 
the tabun bread, the traditional embroidered dresses, wild thyme (za’tar), also symbols 
                                                        
46
 For a comparative case, see among others Harell-Bond 1999; for an excellent investigation of the 
UNRWA and its techniques of biopolitics in Jordan, see Latte-Abdallah 2004 
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associated to refugeeness – such as the zinc-plate roofs, ration cards, and the UN flag – 
acquired an intensely political meaning in refugees’ nationalist rhetoric. Ration cards, 
for example, became potent field in which refugees could still remind the international 
community of the lack of a political solution to their plight and evoke a shared 
sentiment of national unity. Not merely interpreted by refugees as symbols of their 
subjection and dependency to the international community, cards constituted one of the 
few official documentary evidences of their physical link with Palestine (Al-Husseini 
2000).  
 
So, “the camp”, a space that once came to represent the attempt of silencing the political 
predicament of Palestinians under the guise of a humanitarian issue, underwent since 
the sixties a process of profound politicisation. In Al-Wihdat, the re-appropriation and 
politicisation of Al-Wihdat was still visible through the reinscription of the memory of 
the village and the exile into its space (see Farah, 1999). For example, the Camp 
configuration itself was a great measure of the Palestinian experience of displacement. 
In this sense, refugee re-appropriation of Al-Wihdat collides with administrative 
representations. As diverse authors have remarked, the official spatial regulation 
reflected the international community tends to consider refugees and their descendants 
as a compact and abstract block, not only in spatial terms, but also in temporal terms 
(Farah 1999, Jaber 1996, Latte Abdallah 2004). Even though housing units were 
randomly distributed, spontaneous refugee groupings have sought to reproduce 
Palestinian villages both for the name and for inhabitants’ provenance: sabawi and 
ghazawi refer respectively to inhabitants of Bir al-Saba’a and Gaza. As Peteet points out 
“organising and naming camp space by village crafted both a memory scape and a 
practical spatial enactment of the lost homeland” (Peteet 2005, p. 100). Al-Wihdat’s 
spatial re-organisation through kinship and villages of origin was still relevant in many 
areas of Wihdat, so that that the moral features generally ascribed to people from 
specific villages in Palestine were associated to the space of the Camp. For example, I 
was living in a house at the eastern border of Al-Wihdat, in an area inhabited by 
sabawi47. Since sabawi were not generally held in high esteem by the rest of the refugee 
community, the hara is also considered to be “disreputable”. Even street names are 
                                                        
47
 I ignore the origin of this resentment, which is, however, not shared by everybody. Every time I asked 
explanations, people would shrug their shoulders and say: “they are Bedouins”. Sabawi were historically 
Bedouins from the city of Bir al-Saba’a in the Negev desert, now located in Southern Israel. 
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symbols of camp dweller’s collective memory. Some, for example, recall infrastructure 
that has helped to characterise the Camp since its institution: “Shāra‘ al-‘Iyada” 
(chemist), “Shāra‘ al-Madaris”, (schools), “Mu’an Corner” (UNRWA food storage) 
(Jaber 1996). Others evoke individual stories and more personal refugee life trajectories. 
“Shāra‘ al-Liddawi” owes its name to the first wholesale dealer; Shāra‘ al-Nadi is called 
after its famous sportive association (ibid.).  
 
A space of assimilation? 
 
Nonetheless, Al-Wihdat would strike many today as being more a space of negotiation 
with relatively collaborative state officials than a place of overt resistance against an 
alien state.  
 
Embedded in a tight cluster of dwellings, the densely populated space of the Camp 
stretched out without any physical interruption toward the urban areas of Jabal 
Ashrafiyya (hill of Ashrafiyya). The Camp derived much of its energy from the on-
going struggle and adaptation between recent immigrants and its inhabitants, refugees 
and the “State”, peddlers and shop-owners, landlords and tenants, and so on. It was a 
space of cooperation and struggle between people and the State that Bayat calls “quiet 
encroachment or ordinary”: “a silent, patient, protracted, and pervasive advancement of 
ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive hardships and better 
their lives” (Bayat 1997, p. 7). It should also be noticed that the administration of the 
Camp’s infrastructure performed by the DPA has been quite flexible, especially 
regarding the infringement of spatial norms. Now, for example, is it possible to build 
two additional floors (of less than 6 meters in height) on commercial buildings, and 
obtain the authorisation to add one floor to a housing unit (Destremau 1994, p. 97) – 
though the request has to go through a specific official route before being issued. 
Likewise, the Jordanian government has also been relatively tolerant of the renting, 
selling, and buying of housing units in the camps. In the context of the progressive 
control exerted by the state through the DPA over the camps, this might seem at first 
sight contradictory. I suggest, in contrast, that this is perfectly in line with the 
Hashemites’ attempt to assimilate Palestinian refugees in Jordan and leave the 
temporary status of refugee camps unaltered. On the one hand, the DPA’s relatively 
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flexible attitude has sped up the urbanisation of the Camp. On the other hand, the 
informal and temporary character of state’s regulatory practices in the camps was aimed 
at preserving the temporariness of Al-Wihdat (and the other camps), and has ultimately 
served the regime’s interests in a number of ways: avoiding taking on the responsibility 
of being an Arab country that has contributed to liquidating Palestinians’ “right of 
return”, reminding Israel that Jordan should not be perceived as an alternative homeland 
for Palestinians, and for an eventual compensation for the resettlement of refugees 
within its borders (Al-Husseini 2011).  
 
So, faced with a density and rates of overcrowding higher than overpopulated cities like 
Mumbai and Kolkata in India48, inhabitants not only moved outside, but also breached 
camp rules. They split up the “indivisible” units among family components. Over the 
years, houses changed owners; they were also sold and bought. Recently, shelters were 
also rented to Iraqi refugees, Egyptians labourers, and other low-income immigrants 
who can only afford the relatively cheaper rents of the Camp49. After several 
successions, some units have lost any memory of the original owner, and real estate 
speculation has become one of the most tangible marks of refugee re-appropriation 
dynamics. The vertical expansion of buildings also reached unpredictable levels50. 
Fifteen year ago, a second floor on a building was permitted only in special cases. Now 
almost every unit in the Camp has a second floor, and three- and four-floor buildings 
are increasing. Nowadays, the roads having been enlarged and electricity has been 
installed, so refugees clearly inhabit Al-Wihdat not just as a temporary or emergency 
space but as a place for living.  
 
                                                        
48
 In refugee camps like Wihdat, density rates reach to 103 persons/sq. km (Husseini, 2011) 
49
 Generally, the rent for unfurnished accommodation is around 100 JD a month – which is quite 
expensive, especially considering that the average monthly salary for labour in and from the camp is 
slightly more than 200 JD. In 1997, a report of the DPA calculated that around 25% of the housing units 
were rented by their original tenants (DPA 1997).   
50
 See “figure 11”. 
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Figure 11: Al-Wihdat's vertical expansion (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
If it has boosted the economic integration of Wihdat’s camp-dwellers, the physical 
expansion of Wihdat and the opening of unregulated and unlicensed business have also 
had a notable repercussion at an administrative and political level. In this context, it is 
important to note that the state did not monopolise regulatory practices; it was more the 
case of negotiation between different actors – such as the Camp Service Committee, 
UNRWA, refugees, and DPA officials. Camp-dwellers’ life trajectories have forced the 
authorities to change the norms that regulate the interdiction of business activity in the 
camps and reinterpret those that disciplined the physical space of the Camp. 
Simultaneously, in order to tax these activities and discipline refugees’ reappropriation 
of the space, the government has also had to strengthen its control over this space. This 
has ultimately favoured the insertion and participation of the refugee community in the 
wider Jordanian public sphere, since negotiations between the community and state 
bureaucrats revealed the necessity of the state authorities to discipline these activities 
and spaces.  
 
Today, the intensive urbanisation and spatial integration of Al-Wihdat into surrounding 
areas was impressive, especially when compared to other refugee camps. This is 
reflected in the visual heterogeneity of its space. Despite a common aesthetic pattern 
that consists of coarse walls without paint, unfinished buildings with iron cables coming 
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out of the reinforced concrete, many satellite dishes, no windows, iron doors, and 
narrow alleys, there are tangible differences between different areas of the Camp. While 
the northern area of Al-Wihdat has developed into a thriving economic centre with 
three- and even four-floor buildings, the southern quarters resemble slum-like (sha’bi) 
dwelling areas. The staggering price of real estate in certain area stands in sharp contrast 
with other neighbourhoods of the Camp, whose much lower rents make it affordable to 
poor refugee families and newer waves of immigrants. This heterogeneity drew my 
attention, most especially on the occasion of a return visit that I made to Wihdat in the 
winter of 2011.  
 
When I came back in early March, the Nadi Al-Wihdat was negotiating the rent of a two 
floors adjoining building with a Palestinian-Jordanian businessman, whose brother was 
a board member of the Club. The family was rich and had good political connections 
that stretched far beyond the Camp. The man, I was told, made a fortune working in the 
Gulf’s estate market. At the time of my visit, he was planning to use the space to make a 
fast-food restaurant. Eventually an agreement between the Club and the man was set for 
a generous amount of money. The price that the man agreed to secure the tenancy for 15 
years was 250,000 JD (around £215,000) and as much had to be paid for refurbishing 
the entire premise. Half a million dinars seemed a disproportionate price to me, 
especially in comparison to other areas such as Wihdat Tahtwīr (low Wihdat) – an 
extension of the camp one hundred meters from Shāra‘ al-Nadi . With a cost of ten 
thousand dinars per housing unit (£8,600), the area is widely considered one of the 
poorest places in the Camp51. However, as my friends made clear to me, the business 
should be profitable enough to pay back the investment in a few years. 
                                                        
51
 Compare “figure 12” with “figure 13”. 
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Figure 12: Al-Wihdat Tahtwīr (source: Jihad Nijem)
 
Figure 13: Al-Wihdat, Shāra‘Al-Nadi (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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Upholding nationalism through integration 
 
What best exemplifies the twofold nature of Al-Wihdat was its souk (market). Anybody 
who steps into the market for the first time would be bewildered by the amount of 
things and people in the street. Many things draw the attention of passers-by. The 
intense sociality of the souk is striking. In the souk a multitude of people stand, walk, 
sell, buy, play, hang around, shout, argue, and fight. Although all of the camp-dwellers 
come to the souk for shopping, most of the people in the market live outside. Palestinian 
and Iraqi refugees, Transjordanians (’urdunīn), Gypsies (nawari), and even Filipinos 
(filippiniāt) came to the market because of its better prices, apparently taster food, and 
the wider selection of merchandise, staff, and food.  
 
Cross cut by Shāraʿ Al-Nadi, the souk is split into two main sections: the northern part 
with the food and articles from the kitchen (souk al-khudra, i.e. vegetable market), and 
the southern part with the clothing and other items (souk al-malābes, i.e. cloth market). 
Shops, fast foods, stands, and street sellers are distributed across the market, selling 
virtually everything: from potato peelers to bright velvet corduroy pants, from sexy 
lingerie to the Quran and little pictures that frame the most common hadiths of the 
Prophet or the word “Allah”. Most of the vegetables come from Ghor in the Jordan 
Valley, clothes are from China, and goods like oil and flour were rumoured to be waste 
materials shipped from the USA. Men selling a non-descript assortment of objects 
compete to outcry others over the price of their merchandise, while others sat and gaze 
passively. Outside the door of their boutiques – propped against the wall or sitting on a 
plastic chair – shopkeepers would look passively at the stream of people passing by. An 
important area of the food market is covered. Here, amongst stands, hawkers, and small 
shops there is also a modern supermarket. In souk al-malābes, amidst miserable shops 
and wrecked stands, there are fancy boutiques which recall high street shops like H & 
M or Zara. In this noisy and teeming labyrinth, animals such as rabbits, chickens, and 
even lambs and sheet are exhibited for sale. 
 
This great variety of merchandise is a dimension of camp life particularly appreciated 
by camp-dwellers, who would often celebrate the advantages of living in a highly 
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populated area like Wihdat for the reasonable cost of living and the proximity of the 
souk and its services (khadamāt). At the time of my research, refugees took evident 
pride in claiming how the products sold in the souk not only competed with but actually 
outmatched the fanciest and richest zones of Amman. The souk was the symbol both of 
their integration in Jordan and the capacity of Palestinians to struggle against the 
adversities of a life in exile. On the occasion of one of my first visits to Wihdat camp, I 
asked if there were differences between refugee camps and the rest of the city. An 
employee of the UNRWA, a refugee who lived in the Camp, answered: “no, there is no 
difference, the Camp is like the balad!”. By saying so, the man was drawing a link 
between the commercial zone of the Camp and the old city of Amman, which is 
commonly known as balad, and wherein an important open market of the capital city is 
located, a place of business and trade. But in Arabic, the term balad might be translated 
into “village”, “homeland”, and “place of origin”. By stating that Al-Wihdat was only 
another balad, he was also indirectly referring to the fact that the Camp has become an 
alternative city centre in Amman; the centre of a Palestinian space and a symbol of 
Palestine itself. The association of Al-Wihdat with the balad of Amman is an 
expression of the ambiguous nature of the Camp: a space of integration and distinction. 
 
In conclusion, while Al-Wihdat was a socio-economic and spatially integrated space, it 
was also a site endowed with an alternative imagination of belonging to Palestinians. 
Camp-dwellers’ self-representation as Palestinians and the very “right of return” were 
grounded in the space of the camp. It comes as no surprise that refugees sought to 
preserve this space by challenging its socio-economic marginality and fostering its 
integration into the territory – especially after the Oslo Peace Process. In this context, 
the recent upgrading of camps’ living conditions was not interpreted as an attempt to 
dissolve their political rights through resettlement (tawtīn) but as socio-economic 
rehabilitation, waiting for a definitive political solution (ta'hīl) (Al-Husseini 2006). But 
refugees not only welcomed the improvement of living conditions in Al-Wihdat; they 
saw these as necessary for upholding their nationalist ideals and struggles for the 
implementation of their “right of return”. Far from interpreting the physical 
precariousness of Al-Wihdat as a token of their temporary stay in Jordan, many of the 
people I spoke with in Al-Wihdat perceived the Camp’s deteriorating infrastructure and 
its low standards of environmental health as an attempt to liquidate the Palestinian issue 
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and sink refugees into despair and oblivion. As we will see in chapters 3 and 5, poverty 
and the lack of decent infrastructure were held by camp-dwellers as the main sources of 
social problems and immorality among the youth, inherently negative situations that 
ultimately endanger refugees’ commitment to Palestinian nationalist struggles. As a 
friend once told me, pointing to a bunch of children playing amidst a pile of garbage 
and debris tossed in the middle of a narrow alley:   
 
“I am afraid for the future! If you live in a bad environment, you grow wild; and if you 
are poor, you don’t eat and if you don’t eat, you cannot sleep. So what you do? You 
think, and you get angry, more and more, until... until something bad will happen. It’s 
not still the worse, but we are close to it. Once people will get the bottom, they will start 
making trouble, maybe kill each other… This is what they [Israel and the USA] want! 
They want us to kill each other!” 
 
Marginalised by the “Oslo Agreements” for the sake of the national project and faced 
with the gradual decay of the living conditions, camp-dwellers saw the socio-economic 
rehabilitation and physical upgrading of Al-Wihdat – a symbol of Palestinian 
nationalism – as a way forward to preserve their nationalist ideals in the context of a 
progressive assimilation.  
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Figure 14: shops in the souk al-wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem)
 
Figure 15: stands in the souk al-wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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Figure 16: souk al-wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Al-Wihdat is today part of the Al-‘Awda quarter of the Al-Yarmouk district. “Al-
‘Awda” means “the return” – a name that might sound surprising for one of Jordan’s 
most economically integrated camps, but that well reflects the contradictory feelings 
associated to this space (Al-Hamarneh 2002). Over the years, new comers and the 
demographic growth have radically altered the Camp’s visual profile, which has 
increasingly melted with the surrounding neighbourhoods. If the physical reinscription 
has certainly favoured a process of integration of Al-Wihdat into the urban fabric of 
Amman, it has also evoked ambivalent feelings of hominess and fears of resettlement 
among camp residents. In recent years, however, many camp-dwellers seemed to have 
overcome this dilemma by publicly embracing the inclusion of the Camp into the 
national development programs as a positive upgrading of its infrastructure that does 
not endanger refugees’ allegiance to the “right of return”. Most importantly, I have 
demonstrated that the progressive spatial and socio-economic integration of Al-Wihdat 
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– which refugees have initially rejected and, then, progressively embraced – has been 
central to refugees’ efforts to sustain and reproduce the ideals and messages of 
Palestinian nationalism in the face of their growing feeling of marginalisation at the 
aftermath of the Peace Process.  
 
In so doing, I have started my analysis by showing how historical events have 
profoundly affected the way the Jordanian regime imagined the national identity. After 
Black September and other turning point events such as the loss of the West Bank, the 
“disengagement”, and the rise of Transjordanian nationalism, the body of the nation has 
lost a great deal of its original elasticity. The Hashemites’ efforts to develop a hybrid 
identity encompassing both Palestinian and Transjordanian elements has given away to 
a project of social engineering aimed at fashioning a national identity that is genuinely 
Jordanian, essentially meaning “East Banker” (Massad 2001, p. 262). This change has 
eventually strengthened the determination of the regime to accelerate the process of 
normalisation of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. In the governmental rhetoric, refugees – 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin – were included as long as they renounced to any 
manifestation of “Palestinianness”. “Jordan First” and the other rallying slogans of the 
regime have sought to reinforce this process of inclusion and integration.  
 
The events following Black September – along with the loss of control of the UNRWA 
over Camp issues – had similar repercussions at the level of Al-Wihdat’s refugee 
management. In the decade following its establishment, the politicisation of UNRWA 
services contributed to transforming Al-Wihdat and Palestinian refugee camps all over 
the Middle East into “oppositional spaces endowed with alternative meanings” (Peteet 
2005, p. 95). However, the civil war, the declining influence of the UNRWA, and the 
progressive role played by the regime through the DPA in the camps ushered in a new 
trend on the management of their social and physical infrastructure. In Al-Wihdat, the 
Jordanian government has deployed an array of practices aimed at strengthening the 
control of its population: enlarging the police station, supervising historical sites of 
political activism such as the Nadi, as well as integrating the Camp into nation-wide 
development policies such as the ESPP. However, as the Jordanian authorities have 
repeatedly put it, these projects were not formally meant to a permanent inclusion of 
camps into the municipality’s urban planning. Al-Wihdat’s temporary insertion into 
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large scale schemes of urban planning must instead be understood as a technique of 
control and management, through which the regime has sought to maintain unaltered the 
symbolic status of refugee camps, while reinforcing the Jordanisation of its inhabitants.   
 
Refugees display varying attitudes and response to this process of normalization that 
has taken place in the camps in the last years. Although their life practices and the long-
standing facts of their exile inevitably lead to a profound transformation of the space of 
the Camp, historically refugees have fiercely opposed any infrastructural change in the 
Camp aimed to alter the “temporariness” of this space, interpreted as the stronghold to 
their “right of return”. The Oslo Agreement in 1993 and the Wadi Araba Treaty in 1994, 
however, introduced a new trend. Undermining the basis upon which lied their hope of 
return, they trigged among refugees a profound rethinking of their status in Jordan 
(Abu-Odeh 1999). After that, for the first time, camp-dwellers positively responded to 
the programs implemented by the government in recent years to upgrading the physical 
infrastructure of Al-Wihdat. But in this process of integration refugees have also drawn 
the energy to uphold their nationalist predicament. By pursuing physical upgrading and 
spatial integration of the Camp within the surrounding urban neighbourhoods, camp-
dwellers have sought to challenge the marginality of this space and, ultimately, preserve 
the political dimension and significance of Al-Wihdat.  
 
In what follows, I will continue my exploration of the ways through which refugees 
have infused nationalistic values with daily concerns and practices from the specific 
angle of the refugee political-economy. 
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CHAPTER 3: IMPERATIVES OF WORK 
 
INTRODUCTION: WEDDINGS 
 
I was once invited by Muhannath to his brother’s wedding. The luxury of the location 
was at odds with every marriage party (hafle zafaf) that I attended in the Camp. Unlike 
Al-Wihdat, the marriage was not held in a tent set in the middle of narrow alleys: it was, 
rather, celebrated in the splendour of the Landmark Hotel, a five star hotel located 
between Jabal Amman and Abdoun52. There were no signs of the plastic chairs and 
glasses used at such occasions in Al-Wihdat. In the vast open atrium of the hotel, 
located around a swimming pool with floating decorations, a magnificent party was 
hosted and enjoyed: eight people sat at each table, and there were approximately 250 
invitees. All sat at tables with embroidered tablecloths, fine glasses, and expensive 
cutlery. 
 
It was a spectacular break with more “traditional” forms of this celebration, a break that 
says much about the world inhabited and created by the rich Palestinian bourgeoisie in 
Amman. We did not eat mansaf or other traditional dishes53; the meal was characterised 
by a fine selection of lighter and more delicate courses, especially designed for 
international tastes. The unrolling of the dinner in the pleasant coolness of a summer 
                                                        
52
 Originally the name of the hotel was the “Radisson”. It presumably changed the name after the terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by the notorious Zarqawi a few years ago discouraged the influx of tourists. 
53
 Mansaf deserves a better investigation. The dish is a Jordanian specialty made of lamb or, alternatively, 
chicken, and served with a layer of flatbread (markūk) and rice. It is, then, topped with almonds and pine 
nuts, parsley and a sauce made with dried fermented yogurt called jamīd (lit. “hardened”). The 
preparation of the mansaf for the wedding meal requires a great sacrifice in economic terms for the host. 
People in Al-Wihdat often run into debt to cover the costs of a marriage, and the mansaf was perhaps the 
most expensive item. As the price for a single lamb was around 200-250 dinars (around 15/20 of young 
sheep are necessary), the main course alone could be not less than 3000 dinars, and most likely ran up to 
5000 dinars. The rental of the venue (saleh) and other arrangements would increase the cost of additional 
1000/1500 dinars. At the time of my research, mansaf was universally recognised as the national dish, 
often associated with Bedouin hospitality and tradition. Although Palestinian refugees had their national 
favourites such as musakhan – roast chicken served with local pizza bread and topped with onions and 
pine nuts – mansaf was highly appreciated and even preferred as a main dish at important celebrations 
and special occasions such as weddings. In his study of the production of national identity and national 
culture within Jordan, Joseph Massad is very poignant in this respect: “The fact […] that since 
1970, mansaf, Jordan’s invented national dish, is cooked equally by urban Palestinians (who, unlike 
southern rural and Bedouin Palestinians, did not know it before), as it is by Transjordanians, and is served 
on certain occasions (weddings and funerals) as it is in the Transjordanian community […], all attest to 
the conclusion that these aspects of state-sponsored Jordanian national identity are not repudiated, but 
rather adopted and internalised as they are not taken as substitutes for or competitive with Palestinian 
national identity, but rather as complementary” (2001, p. 263). 
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evening of the Landmark did not remind me of my time spent in the sultry (or 
alternatively very cold) and smoky Bedouin tents jammed in the narrow alleys of 
Wihdat, where wedding parties are normally held. The Camp and the hotel were two 
different settings which marked as many visual and social differences. In Wihdat, the 
tents looked like natural outgrowths of the street that reinforced the visual link between 
the people and the urban environment. The pleasant conversations taking place during 
the wedding party at the Landmark instead was flowing on the elegant terrace of the 
hotel. The place was a reminder of people’s social status and their insertion into the 
mainstream Jordanian society.  
 
Nevertheless, this was still a Palestinian wedding; the guests were called to witness the 
bond of the host family with Palestine. From a legal and cultural point of view, many 
things were binding the rich Jordanian-Palestinian upper-class with the refugees in the 
camps. Mainly, they shared the same origins – for they were all also “refugees”. The 
host, for instance, like most of the refugees in Wihdat, was the grandson of people 
“whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who 
lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
conflict”54. They all had left “something” in Palestine: houses, lands, jobs, or relatives 
and memories. At the wedding parties in the Camp, it was quite common to have 
cousins, uncles, brothers and sisters coming from the West Bank. Likewise, this 
wedding party was called to strengthen further the relationship between two households 
– one in Ramallah, and the other in Amman – already linked by kinship.  
 
The bond of the upper-class with Palestine was not cut off by their economic integration 
into Jordan (or potential links with the ruling class), and was reproduced in the 
performance of the celebration and in the stagecraft of the karam (hospitality)55. During 
the wedding, zaffa players escorted the married couple to the centre of the stage with 
their chants and dancing. They loudly announced the imminent arrival of the wedding 
party with a musical procession in which the village of origin (in Palestine) of both the 
                                                        
54http://www.unrwa.org/. 
55
 On the marriage arrangements and wedding celebrations as a site of political activism among 
Palestinians, see Penny Johnson, Lamis Abu Nahleh, and Annelies Moors (2009). 
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bride and the groom are mentioned56. The players were also chanting about Palestinian 
dignity (karāme) and steadfastness (sumūd), and encouraging the resistance in Gaza and 
the West Bank. In the same way as they do in the Camp, the old women at the party 
accompanied the song with their traditional shrieks. Nevertheless, an economic, social, 
and political chasm set the rich Jordanian-Palestinian upper-class apart from camp-
dwellers. Whereas in Al-Wihdat, the common pattern of gender segregation was 
reinforced during these events, on the terrace of the Landmark Hotel women and men 
were mixed. Unlike the Camp, moreover, here tracksuits and football t-shirts were 
replaced by expensive suits. Very few women were wearing Islamic clothing such as the 
hijab or the niqāb57 – and those who did it were also sporting elegant and flowing outer 
garments, which for many of my friends in Wihdat, would clash with their 
understanding of “proper” female modesty (al-ihtishām). Their voices were soft, more 
accustomed to the educated intonations of the capital (madanī), than the self-defined 
heavier accents of the mukhayyamji (camp-dweller), perceived as being closer to 
“peasant” ways of speaking (fellāhī)58.  
 
Furthermore, the life trajectories of these people diverged very much from those of the 
camp-dwellers. Most of the guests were bilingual, switching naturally from Arabic to 
English, and vice versa, during informal chats. Their fluency in English was the result 
of their undergraduate and postgraduate studies carried out in the most prestigious 
universities in America and the United Kingdom. These studies would boost their 
careers in expanding and richer job markets across the world as high-flying white-collar 
workers, managers, directors, architects, or lawyers. Not surprisingly, many of the 
guests were at ease much more with the cosmopolitan class of expatriates (some of 
them present at the wedding) that crowds the fancy and expensive pubs, restaurants, and 
clubs of the fancy areas of Amman such as Jabal Amman and Abdoun than with their 
fellows in the refugee camps – a setting most of the Palestinians gathered at the 
wedding had never seen.  
 
                                                        
56Zaffa – which in the Camp is played in the street long before the beginning of the wedding – is a 
musical procession that loudly announces that the wedding party is about to begin. 
57
 Unlike the hijab, the niqab not only covers a woman’s head, neck, and ears, but also their face.  
58
 See (Spencer 1997). 
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The brief digression above about two diverse wedding settings is poignant because it 
allows me to remark one more time on the importance of living an ordinary life for 
camp-dwellers and Palestinian refugees in Jordan. But this ethnographic vignette is also 
intended to bring to light how distinctions in wealth and status have played a role in the 
making of camp-dwellers’ political subjectivity. Whereas Palestinian refugees (lāji’ūn) 
in Jordan claimed unanimously to belong to the same group, socio economic differences 
between those living in camps (min al-mukhayyamāt) and the rich Jordanian-
Palestinians from “outside” (min barra) often set them apart, affecting their self-
perception of being irremediably different. It was a common opinion that Palestinian 
refugee camps were places for “the poor” (faqīr). Outsiders – mostly Jordanians and 
Palestinian-Jordanians living outside the camps – never pointed at borders or fences, 
inexistent barriers in Palestinian refugee camps of Jordan, to comment on the 
particularistic reputation of Al-Wihdat and other refugee camps. Camp-dwellers were, 
rather, represented as a close group of miserable and low status people (masākīn), often 
related to each other by common origins and a strict endogamy, aspects of their social 
identities that also marked them out as being from “rural” backgrounds. This was 
explained to me as being a feature of the camp population; but it was not the only one. It 
was also said that an ethno-national form of identity was strengthened by the socio-
economic marginalisation faced within the camps. In other words, it was a widespread 
belief that lāji’ūn min al-mukhayyamāt were somehow more genuinely Palestinian, 
either because they preserved the original “humbleness” of their ancestors, or because 
the enduring low standards of living had jeopardised their full integration in Jordan59.  
 
There was certainly some truth in the popular belief that refugee camps were closed and 
homogeneous spaces defined by specific forms of socio-economic and political 
differences. Yet, while a shared sense of poverty is an important aspect of the ways in 
which camp-dwellers inhabit their collective identities, this should not conceal the 
important forms of differentiation that define camp life. Economic disparities did not 
                                                        
59
 This assumption reflected in part a scholarly debate that dates back to the 1960s over the potential of 
the “poor” of being a destabilizing force to the existing social order (Huntington 1996, Nelson 1970). 
Such preoccupation informed a theoretical approach to the politics of the poor that frames agency solely 
in the binary terms of revolutionary/passivity (see Bayat 2010, for a critic). The distinct perspectives 
ensuing from this debate are all located within the poles of this dichotomy by sharing an essentialist 
reading of subaltern groups' political agency as inexistent (Lewis 1959), as manifested in collective action 
and urban movements (e.g. Castells 1983, Friedmann 1992), or as consciously aimed at resisting the 
ubiquity of power (e.g. Scott 1985). 
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only contribute to determine the relationships between the rich Jordanian-Palestinian 
upper-class and Palestinian refugees from the Camp, they also defined the interactions 
among camp dwellers. Al-Wihdat was not only the homogenous and exclusivist space 
depicted by outsiders. A perspective from within the Camp also reveals the existence of 
a socio-economic fragmentation and of areas and sub-neighbourhoods (hara) that 
differed from one another in terms of the wealth and power, collectively and 
individually, of their inhabitants, as well as of their place of origin in Palestine. This 
fragmentation was in large part the result of the diverse ways through which refugees 
cope with the obligations of kinship and the need of securing a living in the settings of 
the Camp. In addition, diverse working trajectories and interactions with other people 
and political economies have contributed to this “heterogeneity” by influencing the 
ways in which camp-dwellers forged shifting and contradictory modes of identification 
and political allegiances. 
 
The chapter will explore this heterogeneity and the ways camp-dwellers reflect upon it. 
More specifically, it sheds light on the ambiguous and contested ways in which moral 
and political selfhood connect to the quandaries of everyday life. By unveiling the 
implication of the Camp’s political economy for the tenor of refugees’ self-
understanding as Palestinians, I document how camp-dwellers negotiate the need of 
living ordinary lives and pursue a livelihood with the simultaneous emphasis on not 
giving up a national identity predicated upon a discourse of loss and poverty.  
 
The ethnography here presented will hence be structured around the investigation of the 
following themes: the corrosive power of wealth and the moral superiority of imagined 
frugal and rural roots in the context of camp-dwellers search for socio-economic 
integration; the fracturing and disgregating consequences of camp dwellers’ mobility; 
and the ambivalent effects of new waves of immigrants on Palestinian refugees’ 
collective identity. 
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LIVING IN THE CAMP 
 
Working 
 
Wedding parties were just one among the endless number of munāsabāt (celebrations) – 
such as births, graduations, funerals, and engagement parties, dispute resolutions and 
truces, or religious holidays – whose fulfilment allowed the transition to social 
adulthood of any Jordanian, regardless his or her class and ethnic background. These 
celebrations were an important part of daily life and required considerable material 
resources to cover their costs. If coping with their expenses was not an easy task for 
anyone in the stagnant Jordanian economy, for camp-dwellers it was even more 
arduous: discrimination and negative attitudes greatly tarnished their livelihood 
strategies. For this “ordinariness” to be assured in a context marked by declining 
economic standards, people in the Camp needed to work hard. 
 
Since their exile, Palestinian refugees have pursued diverse income strategies to secure 
varying forms of employment within and beyond Wihdat and other camps. Historically, 
Palestinian refugee camps have constituted a pool of labour in Jordan and, via Jordan, to 
other destinations, most notably the Gulf countries. Studies in Jordan have documented 
the significance of camp-dwellers’ on regional economies in the Middle East (e.g. 
Khawaja 2003, Plascov 1981). The first generation of Palestinians arriving in the 
refugee camps that were set-up by the international community in Gaza, West Bank, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, were seasonal workers and unskilled labourers from rural 
areas with little if any formal education. Such folks largely constituted the bulk of 
people who came to Wihdat after being forcibly expelled from their villages. In Jordan 
they found work as masons and workers, or, alternatively, in the ranks of the UNRWA.  
 
In the late fifties and early sixties, however, the UNRWA developed a programme for 
technical training that aimed to integrate these refugees into the expanding economies of 
the Gulf. First generation refugees quickly realised that better working opportunities for 
their children depended on them having certificates and educational experience – 
qualifications that could have been obtained in the UNRWA schools. Consequently, in 
the following years, diplomas and other degrees were increasingly exhibited in camp-
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dwellers’ houses as newer generations completed technical training and acquired 
university degrees (Farah 1999). In the mid-seventies, job opportunities in the 
expanding markets of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates provided 
young educated Palestinians with a range of technical and professional occupations 
(mostly teachers and vocational workers). This focus on educational programs greatly 
benefited the socio-economic existences of refugees, which saw in the educational 
programs set by the UNRWA a resource that in part served to compensate for the loss 
of their land and status (see, among others, Schiff 1995). Most importantly, although the 
UNRWA’s employment schemes were intended to ease the refugees’ reliance on its 
services and favour their integration into the host-countries, they eventually came to 
serve Palestinian national interests, as remissions to refugee families from relatives 
working in the Gulf States became a mainstay of the refugee economy (Al-Hamarneh 
2002, Al-Husseini 2011). Such opportunities, however, decreased steadily over the 
years and eventually came to an abrupt termination during the first Gulf War in 1982. In 
the aftermath of the war, more than 350,000 Palestinian “returnees” were expelled from 
Kuwait and other countries (see chapter 2). 
 
At the time of the research on which this thesis is based, much of the employment in Al-
Wihdat available to camp–dwellers gravitated around the local market. Street vendors, 
shop-keepers, and arabanji (porters) constituted the bulk of these jobs. But the 
availability of good job opportunities in the souk was limited to the owners of the 
stands/shops and their extended families. Furthermore, not everybody was interested in 
working within the Camp. Many jobs were quite profitable but demeaning. Working as 
arabanji in the souk, for example, could grant an earning of up to 10-15 JD per day 
(about £9-14), but was held by camp-dwellers as being degrading, and hence was often 
left to new immigrants.  
 
In addition, the UNRWA was not only a provider of services to refugees, but also a 
source of employment. Although much less desirable than in the past due to its on-going 
severe economic situation, many refugees found steady and dependable positions in the 
ranks of the UNRWA. Especially after the Gulf War, this was a meagre alternative to 
the drastic reduction of opportunities in the oil-producing countries.  The majority of 
them worked as nurses, cleaning and maintenance staff, teachers, social, and low and 
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middle cadre administrative staff; very few refugees from Wihdat managed to rise in 
rank to middle management positions and none of them, including any local staff in or 
outside the camps, made it to a top position (see Schiff 1995) 60.  
 
Alternatively, people with business initiative and small capital could invest their money 
in a games room, pool room, or barber-shop. By far the cheapest option was the games 
room: I was told that to establish such a business, it would cost around 2000 Jordanian 
Dinars (about £1,820) – a small amount by local standards for setting up a new business 
activity: a few Play-Stations, as many screens, and one game – Fifa – were enough to 
improvise one of these playrooms in a space carved out from the ground floor of a 
house. Two friends of mine, for example, wanted to open one on the western periphery 
of the Camp. They were bustling around to scrape together the capital for their venture, 
around 800 JD (about £730) to start with. The money should cover the initial expenses 
such as the equipment and the rent.  
 
Furthermore, many households relied on the remittances sent periodically by family 
members who were pursuing their careers abroad (Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002). Although 
labour migration among adults remains quite low – accounting for only 6% of adults 
who ever worked abroad – research indicates that nearly 60% of camp residents have 
relatives abroad (Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002). 
 
Most of camp dwellers in Jordan have found a job in the service and light industry 
(Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002). People worked as nurses, cleaners, and clerks; others were 
employeed educational institutions, especially as teachers and social workers. A number 
of women found a job in hairdressing salons and “beauty parlours”61. Many men 
worked in and outside the camps as technicians, electricians, waiters, clerks and 
mechanics. A very common form of employment amongst shabāb from the Camp was 
to engage in occasional painting and decorating jobs. By any standards, however, the 
                                                        
60
 Although Palestinian refugees constitute approximately 99% of UNRWA staff, less than three percent 
of the employed persons in camps work in the Agency (Khawaja and Tiltness 2002). 
61For a socio-historical analysis of the evolution of the role of Palestinian refugee women living in camps 
in Jordan, see Latte-Abdallah (2009). For a study of the socio-political aspects of gender and migration in 
and outside refugee camps in Jordan, see De Bel-Air (2011). 
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most important source of income came from the private sector, accounting to up to two 
thirds of the employed people – about 70% of men and 55% of women (ibid.).  
 
At the time of my research, many shabāb and young men in Al-Wihdat were not in 
steady employment62; they alternated between seasonal jobs and periods of economic 
inactivity. A large number of people left the Camp early in the morning to work as 
skilled and unskilled workers in the industrial areas of Amman. Many found 
employment in the “madine malik abdallah” – and industrial area located a few 
kilometres away from Wihdat. Many amongst my friends worked in large companies 
and factories there. Wages were usually very low and the possibilities for young men 
without a university education to secure salaries above 250 JD were scarce. Further, 
working conditions were often exhausting and many jobs had triple shifts, which meant 
sometimes working over night. As a result many young men looked at migrating as the 
only viable alternative to boost up their salaries and careers.  
 
Political subjectivity and the ambivalence of poverty 
 
In practice, the social background of the first generations of refugees who settled in the 
camps, the lack of job opportunities, and the spread of poverty within the camps have 
all contributed to strengthen the belief amongst camp residents, as well as within 
Jordanian society more broadly, that refugee camps are places for the “poor”(see also 
Farah 1999, Pérez 2011)63. What is interesting is the ways in which Palestinian 
                                                        
62
 Economic precariousness has had important consequences on camp-dwellers’ cross-gender 
relationships. On the one hand, the first decade of the twenty-first century has assisted to a “feminization 
of camp families” (Latte-Abdallah 2009): male emigration, high divorce rates, and the rise of female 
celibacy have de facto left many women in charge of the daily running of the household. In refugee 
camps like Jabal Hussein and Gaza camp, more than half of camp households’ heads are women. 
Economic insecurity has had an erosive effect on men’s domestic authority. On the other, women’s 
greater independence does not reflect a clear moment of self-empowerment. As Latte-Abdallah writes, 
women’s work is now “associated with need in response to family hardship (rather than personal 
fulfillment) and is therefore less valued (Latte-Abdallah 2009, p. 58). For comparative studies, see Jean-
Klein (2002). 
63This is confirmed by recent studies carried out by using national level data from the 1996 census 
(Arneberg 1997, Hanssen-Bauer 1998, Khawaja 2003, Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002). According to these 
studies, the annual income of a large number of people living in camps is less than 900 JD (around £820) 
– a very small amount by local standards. A similar socioeconomic differentiation has been noted not 
only in Palestinian refugee camps set in other host countries (i.e. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria) but even 
amongst those established in West Bank and Gaza Strip (Lapeyre and Bensaid 2006) 
108 
 
 
themselves reflect on the connections between their economic circumstances and the 
ways these fed into their nationalistic ideals.  
 
To people in Al-Wihdat, much divided the unfortunate ones (masākīn), from the 
wealthy families (aghanīyā’) living in West Amman. However, whereas the camps’ 
material poverty was usually associated by the authorities and some authors with social 
and cultural estrangement and political disloyalty (Al-Khazendar 1997), the negative 
connotation of poverty encompassed in the word “masākīn” acquired a positive 
dimension within the camps64: it indicated ethico-moral qualities such as steadfastness 
(sumūd) and humbleness (twād‘e). These attributes were employed by many refugees to 
illustrate their moral and nationalist superiority over non-camp dwellers65. Interestingly, 
the link between status and emotional disposition was also expanded on by my 
informants to include a further dimension of what it means to be a mukhayyamji (camp-
dweller). The qualities associated with a humble style of life (being mitwād‘e), that 
recalled the modest way of life of the “fathers”, was often held up as being an indication 
of an altogether more pious moral disposition. Thus, a genuine disposition for piety was 
often said to be best embodied by camp-dwellers. On several occasions, my friends 
explained the difference between refugees inside camps and rich Palestinians who lived 
in the affluent areas of Amman in terms of a boundary they drew between refugees from 
the ’48 and those from '67. “Refugees from ’48 are different, they are all well-off people 
who live in places like Jabal Husseini and Shmeissani, or Abdoun”, I was once told by 
Hussein, a friend from Al-Wihdat in his early twenties: 
 
“They don’t care about Palestine, they don’t live in the camps anymore, they have money. They 
are like the ’urdunīn [Transjordanians]; there is no difference even between them and the yahūdi 
[Jew]! Have you seen how their women go out in Jabal Amman?! None of them is veiled!!! […] 
Here in Wihdat, most of the people are refugees from ’67. We are different, more respectful of 
Islam and we still care about Palestine!” 
 
                                                        
64
 On how loss and poverty is exhibited in the Palestinian nationalistic narratives as a specific form of 
strength, see among others Lindholm-Schulz (2003). 
65
 This dimension of their identity is the focus of a large body of scholarship that demonstrates how the 
memory of hardship endured by refugees is a central component of the political identity of Palestinians 
living in Jordan (Farah 1999), other host countries (e.g. Khalili 2007), and the occupied territories (Allen 
2005, Sa’di and Abu-Lughod 2007). For a discussion over narratives of sumūd, see Khalili (2007), 
Lindholm-Schulz (1999), and Shehadeh (1982) 
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Hussein’s comment is striking in many ways. At one level, it draws a link between 
piety, steadfastness, and poverty66. Of more general importance, however, is that he 
wanted to point out a correspondence between political economy, moral dispositions, 
and nationalist identity in order to set an empirical difference between the two 
“communities” of refugees: the refugees from ’48 and those from the ’67. The former 
were those more likely to have found, over the course of almost four generations of life 
in Jordan, a decent job, been able to move out of the camps, and ultimately adopted 
what he terms as being an “immoral” life style. To him, those refugees were no longer 
representative of the Palestinian cause and culture because they lived in comfort and 
luxury (rafāhīye), which made them forget the truthfulness and sobriety of old times, 
their origins, the hardship of a refugee life, and the teachings of their fathers. Piety and 
morality was, instead, deemed to be best embodied by poor fellahīn (peasants) and their 
offspring in the camps rather than by rich Palestinians who lived a “corrupted” and 
immoral life along with Jews in cities like Jerusalem and Jaffa67. In Wihdat, camp-
dwellers often told me that the immorality of the present-day and the concurrent plight 
of Palestinians were the result of people no longer remembering their origins (’āsl), and 
also having lost the frugality of the old times. On another occasion, in the context of a 
visit I made to Souf camp, a young man openly blamed people in Wihdat for having 
sold out the Palestinian cause: “they are not refugees anymore… at all!! Wihdat is not a 
refugee camp, it is a commercial centre now, and they even have the biggest souk in 
Jordan! Here it is much worse […]. We still suffer and we know what it means being 
refugees”. 
 
It remains, however, a crucial ambiguity with regard to poverty in the thinking of many 
of my informants. So, on the one hand, poverty was certainly perceived as being tightly 
intertwined with nationalistic values68. Yet, at the same time, it was also recognised as 
being a condition fraught with deeply ambivalent images and feelings. Rather than 
universally treating poverty as a source of authenticity, many camp-dwellers claimed 
                                                        
66
 This remark is quite singular also because it seems to overlook the fact that Al-Wihdat Camp was 
actually set-up in order to accommodate the first exodus of refugees in Jordan in 1948. 
67
 See Ted Swedenburg (2007) for an important study on how the figure of the “fellah” (paesant) has been 
re-appropriated by the Palestinian national movement for concealing significant differences within 
Palestinian society and the fashioning of Palestinian national identity. 
68
 For this purpose, see Jean-Klein’s analysis of the process of self-nationalisation through self-
deprivation (2001).  
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that the condition of being masākīn (poor/miserable) could lead people to a crooked 
path (inhirāf), especially for young men (for a similar argument, see also Pérez 2011, p. 
133).  
 
If poverty fostered an immoral disposition rather than humbleness and steadfastness, 
this depended on a number of factors ranging from individual attitudes to the family and 
the hara (neighbourhood) where one was raised.  However, youth were believed to be 
more negatively affected by poverty because living in a time where the rustic life of 
their grandfathers – the jīl al-nakba (the Nakba generation) – was only a fading memory 
and the heroic resistance of their fathers (jīl al-thawra – the generation of the 
revolution) was no longer needed. Indeed, the poverty of the older generations was 
interpreted more in the terms of simplicity, and not as a lack of means. They were 
believed to have lived a humble and yet rich life with the products that the fertile land of 
Palestine, I was told, dispensed so lavishly. Similarly, the jīl al-thawra was said to be 
inspired by the heroic ideals of revolution that guided it through life’s adversities and 
economic hardships. But with the backdrop of the declining economic standards in 
Jordan, active militancy and overt forms of resistance were no longer discussed 
strategies to pursue nationalist goals; in fact, they generated suspicion, and often 
disapproval. According to my friends, people no longer had time to waste as they had to 
cope with other more urgent matters such as working to maintain their families69. As a 
friend put it, “now there are no more fidāʾīyyn in Al-Wihdat because they need to find a 
job to live… now, life is more expensive”. Deprived of guidance and ideals, young men 
of the Camp were said to gradually sink into the despair and apathy generated by the 
lack of economic means. 
 
My friends were frequently complaining of the hardship that they had to endure because 
of the living conditions (dhurūf al-ma’īsha) in Al-Wihdat. Refugees who left the Camp 
were those who made money, I was told; those who stayed were poor (masākīn).The 
unbearable cold in winter and suffocating heat in summer amplified by the corrugated 
sheets originally used as roofs for the shelters (numar al-zinco), the mud that swamped 
the narrow alleys of the camps in the winter, and the line of people who queued in order 
                                                        
69
 On changes in understandings of masculinity as people become part of different political economies, 
also see Kelly (2009), Gilsenan (1996) and Jeffrey(2010). 
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to have access to rationed goods all played a critical part in plunging many camp-
dwellers into a state of frustration and anger. The social unease and immoral behaviour 
of present time shabāb was often explained by poverty and unemployment. As a low 
rank UNRWA employee once pointed out to me during the course of an informal chat 
in the UNRWA field offices in Wihdat, “most shabāb want to work but they can’t find a 
job. What can they do? They leave. They go for violence or do wrong things. Amongst 
youth there are lots of problems like drugs and alcohol. Many youths are fed up of their 
situation in the camps, so they cause trouble”. So, although the poor and humble life of 
refugees was romantically seen as being closer to the lifestyle of the ancestors, poverty 
and unemployment were also recognised as the main causes of many of the frustrations, 
anxieties, and conflicts that afflicted camp-dwellers; a true Palestinian and a “proper” 
man was, instead, perceived to be the one that provides for his family rather than 
searching for political legitimacy in the marginality of his condition. 
 
Wāsta 
 
Perhaps one of the most evident ways refugees struggled to root a nationalist identity 
into economic integration and the obligations of adulthood (such as providing for their 
own families and giving children a proper education) – rather than in the reproduction 
of  their own marginality – was their attempt to set up successful working connections 
(wāsta).  
 
When I carried out my research in the Camp, the working careers of many of the 
refugees I knew lacked stability and their economic situations were far from being 
vibrant. Individual skills and hard work, indeed, were rarely enough to secure the type 
of jobs they aspired to. For refugees, things were even worse. The negative stereotypes 
that accompanied camps and refugees hindered even further the hiring of those from the 
camps. Many of my friends admitted to having often lied to their employees about their 
place of residence, claiming to live in the adjoining neighbourhoods of Ashrafiyya or 
Gwesme. This discrimination was particularly visible in the public sector, where the 
hiring of “East Bankers”70 was usually privileged over that of “Palestinians”. A friend, 
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 “East Banker”, along with Transjordanian, is the word used to indicate residents of Jordan before the 
arrival of the first wave of Palestinians in the 1948. 
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for example, was lamenting the discrimination toward those of Palestinian origins in 
Jordan:  
 
“After my graduation at the university, I had to wait four years before finding a place as teacher! 
Do you know how long it takes for Jordanians [urdunīn] to find a place? Nothing, it’s 
straightforward! For us it is like there is a wall [hit], beyond which you can’t go. For example, if 
you work in the police [shurta], you can’t have more than three stars [senior commander]. I had 
to wait four years before getting a place as teacher with a salary barely enough to pay my 
expenses [250 dinars]. […]But if we were in Palestine, it would have been different; there we 
would have had land, a good position, work, wāsta [relationships of patronage]!” 
 
Cut off by more lucrative jobs in the Gulf, most refugees could no longer rely on the 
UN educational system to find a steady job: instead they had to secure network of 
alliances beyond the Camp. The key to success and the different level of achievements 
among camp-dwellers depended much on the use of family connections and 
relationships of patronage (wāsta) that were vital to refugees in their search of jobs, 
credit, and housing. Practices of wāsta underline the importance and primacy of 
personal relationships and their role to meet the needs of everyday life in conditions of 
shortages and state discrimination71. Through informal networks, individuals and groups 
creates more opportunities to find a job, to obtain a visa for migration, to get better 
working hours, and even to find a groom or a bride. Intermediaries often play a 
fundamental role in this process. A common figure is the wassit (intermediary)72. This is 
a person who, by virtue of his connections and reputation, provides services and 
connectivity to prospective employees. Friendship and kinship work well in this 
process. A person might ask his boss to have a better working shift not by virtue of his 
length of service but because of his long-time friendship with his employee; another 
might obtain a visa for moving to the Gulf because of a relative who works in the 
consulate. School teachers, bus drivers, clerks, grocers, workers, and taxi drivers would 
                                                        
71In this sense, the working of wasta might be compared with the practices of guaxi and blat in China and 
Russia: systems of informal networks and personal contacts (Ledeneva 1998, Wank 1996, Yang 1994). 
72Unlike Hansen’s dada (gangsters) in India (2002), however, these people were not suffused with a 
mythical aura. They are not hustlers or community leaders who derive their power from their superior 
knowledge of the urban environment and capacity to set and use alliances. Wassit does not necessarily 
influence big constituencies. Since anybody can be wassit once in his/her life, this figure is more the 
manifestation of the daily importance of informal networks in furthering common or individual interests 
(Singerman 1995). 
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generally find a job through their social connections – often originating through social 
and physical proximities or affinities of kinship and village. 
 
So if wāsta was judged by many camp-dwellers as a form of corruption (fasād) that 
deeply undermined their career perspectives, they necessarily had to deal with it in their 
search for a livelihood. In this sense, working in the Camp speeded up the process, as 
refugees could activate their network of alliances to secure a job. However, job 
opportunities in Al-Wihdat were still limited (even if they were better than in most other 
refugee camps). The most viable alternative available was to build connections that 
might have roots in the Camp, but also extended beyond its borders. But outside the 
camps, refugees were not masters of wāsta; they were rather on its blunt end.  
 
Getting acquainted with the proper intermediary was not an easy task, especially for 
camp-dwellers, whose marginalisation and discrimination left them very few 
opportunities to set up the right connections. Their situation was the result of the 
Vitamin W, as my friends sarcastically referred to wāsta (see also Hart 2008), a 
substance refugees in Jordan severely lacked. In this context, setting up the right 
connections was also a mark of skill and social competence. Establishing social 
connections (rawābit) in the university, for example, was a necessary survival strategy 
for many young men; these friendships would have, indeed, become useful in the future 
in terms of securing a job. To my friends, their Transjordanian fellows at university 
were not inimical others but friends and companions who shared fun, experiences of 
work, and so on with them. Especially in their relationship with Transjordanians, 
shabāb from the Camp would not stress traits of their identity based on exclusive forms 
of identification such as “being from the camp” (mukhayyamji): they would emphasise, 
rather, common denominators of belonging based, for example, on Arabness (urub) or 
being from the Levant (bilad al-sham). These attempts to set up the “right connections” 
did not downplay their identity as Palestinian but did play out other forms of 
identification not necessarily in contrast with their national identity. 
 
In other words, refugees sought to further their economic capacity, and they did that by 
striving to set up wāsta relationships. If refugees’ aspirations to find good jobs, get 
married, live economically independently, and support their families furthered their 
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integration, it has not led them to relinquish their allegiance to Palestinian nationalism 
(cf. Hart 2008). As Kelly put it, “the contrast between self-preserving passivity and 
nationalist activism is probably overdrawn. Personal aspirations, kinship obligations and 
national goals are interwoven […]. In this process sumūd (steadfastness) combines both 
personal and national hopes” (2009, p. 362). 
 
LEAVING THE CAMP 
 
The choice to leave 
 
However, where camp-dwellers’ socio-economic integration served their nationalist 
ideals, it also introduced disruption to their sense of collectivity and a national identity 
predicated upon socio-economic marginality (see Sayigh 1998). In this context, it is 
necessary to move beyond the beneficial consequences of socio-economic integration. 
By exploring refugees’ mobility and working strategies, I now shed light on the 
ambivalent feelings and relations refugees entertained with the affective and political 
space of the camp. In so doing, I will also document how mobility in and outside Al-
Wihdat not only reflected refugees’ ambiguous relationship with this space, but it also 
generated deep fractures within refugees’ self-representation as an “homogeneous 
community”. 
 
Migration tempted many young ambitious refugees with the prospective of a better 
working career. People in Wihdat not only left their homes there to go to unfamiliar 
parts of Amman Metropolitan Area (AMA), but travelled and lived abroad. Economic 
goals certainly did play a role in explaining the high mobility of refugees. For many 
households in Wihdat, this was more of a necessity; domestic survival hinged largely on 
the remittances periodically sent by family members who migrated. Despite the fact that 
job opportunities in the Gulf had diminished substantially in relation to previous years, 
migrating to Kuwait and the Emirates was nevertheless one of the few viable means left 
for camp-dwellers to substantially improve their economic standing and an important 
source of income for those of their relatives who remained in the Camp. Many of those 
who left worked in Saudi Arabia or in the Arab Gulf. Others found employment across 
a range of technical and professional sectors in the United States, Europe, Australia, 
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Canada, or in the growing economies of some Asian countries such as South Korea and 
Thailand.  Some of them settled down permanently in these countries. Most people, 
however, worked abroad for a limited period of time, signing up for fixed-time 
contracts, sending money back to their families, and eventually returning home.  
 
Refugees’ choice to leave the Camp cannot be understood without an appropriate 
recognition of the complex demands of earning a living in a precarious economic 
context. Most of my companions enjoyed a great deal of mobility, not only for their 
careers but also for their studies. In Al-Wihdat, stories about people crossing borders 
were relayed quite frequently during daily conversation: one informant’s brother spent a 
year in the States after winning a scholarship, the cousin of another took a degree in 
medicine in Ukraine. Mohammed – a young man in his early thirties – travelled to 
Yemen to study accountancy. People accurately gauged the consequences of their 
choices, not only before, but also during their stay abroad. Mohammed, for example, 
once told me: “you know I went to Yemen to study accountancy […]. There, the cost of 
university and life are lower than here in Jordan […] I really enjoyed the time I spent 
there, I would even settle down in Sana […] but I came back because I was not learning 
anything. The quality of studying was very bad”. The destinations were chosen 
according to different criteria – better job opportunities, prestigious schools and 
universities, or a cheaper cost of the life, but also for the possibilities opened up to the 
prospective migrants depending on the documents required, the level of control, and 
social networks. These factors influenced the production and regulation of people’s 
mobility, providing refugees with new opportunities and different strategies for re-
enacting scenes of arrival, departure, and return. Refugees’ mobility was not 
continuous, but fragmented. Again, after spending two years in Yemen, Mohammed 
came back to Wihdat. He got married to his maternal cousin. A few months after the 
marriage, his wife went back to Qatar, where she completed her two year course to 
become a registered nurse. Through his wife, a year after, Mohammed managed to 
obtain a working visa for Qatar, where he stayed for few months. When the government 
did not renew the visa, the couple returned back to Wihdat Camp. 
 
However, the desire to move could not simply be reduced to mere self-interest or a cost-
benefit analysis. Migrating has to be understood as the outcome of a complex process of 
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decision-making, in which the choice of leaving amongst camp-dwellers was in large 
part the reflection of migrant’s ambivalence about home (see, among others, Osella and 
Osella 2008). 
 
As I demonstrated in chapter 2, Al-Wihdat – to many camp-dwellers, Al-Wihdat was 
both the iconic space of a lost homeland and a place that evoked strong feelings of 
homeliness. In this context, migrating raised considerable concerns centred on the 
notions of family and parenting – leaving was rarely, if ever, an easy decision to be 
taken in “solitude” (Osella and Osella 2008). Squeezed between the need to make 
money and the uneasiness of bringing up his daughter abroad for an indefinite period of 
time, Abdullah – a young man in his late twenties – was overwhelmed by a dilemma: “if 
I stay at home, my wife will leave me, but if I go abroad [with the whole family] for 
years, who knows how my daughter will grow up in a different place?” A few days 
before leaving the field, I received a call from him in which he told me how his wife left 
him and moved in her parent’s house. The reason was her unwillingness to live with a 
man who could not ensure a decent standard of living. It seems that after a couple of 
months his wife finally decided to come back, though Abdullah never left. The case of 
Abdullah is all the more poignant because points at forms of intense emotional distress 
generated not by the incapacity of moving but, on the contrary, by being able to move; a 
form of agency that Abdullah perceived as imposed upon him. Unlike other refugees, he 
had both the means and the contacts to work in Europe. His reluctance to leave was 
justified by the conviction that children should be brought up in a suitable environment, 
a conviction that the Osellas describe as akin to a folk notion of “habitus”(2009, p. 147). 
As Abdullah put it: “you know, in Europe is normal that girls go out and have sex with 
men before marriage… I’m not against that! But I don’t want my daughter doing this 
[…]. If I travel with my daughter, she will end up behaving like the other girls [banāt] 
in Europe!”   
 
However, while camp-dwellers were not simply free-roaming individuals seeking to 
escape as soon as possible in order to pursue a better economic condition, nor were 
these people supremely moral and political beings animated exclusively by the 
irreducible need to live in the Camp. A case in point was the story of Abu Omar. Unlike 
Abdullah, Abu Omar left the Camp, and he did it for the same reasons that convinced 
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the former to remain. The man, frequently declared his love for the Camp, where he 
lived since the age of three. Here he began and completed his studies in the UNRWA 
schools, worked as a photo-journalist for the local football team and carried out 
voluntary work in an association for orphans and young men. The Camp was also home 
to many of his closest friends, and the place where he spent a large part of his free time 
and eventually got married in. However, after his wedding, he moved out of the Camp 
to settle permanently in a large villa in the adjoining neighbourhood of Gwesme. It was 
not an expensive neighbourhood and was populated largely by a mixed population of 
Palestinians and Jordanians: however, by local standards it was widely said to be a 
better place than Wihdat. Much to my surprise, when I asked Abu Omar why he decided 
to leave the Camp and his people, he replied that Wihdat was not a good place to raise 
his children. This was even more striking to me because, at that time, Omar continued 
to spend most of his time in the Camp working as photographer, volunteering in the 
Nadi al-Wihdat, or simply hanging around. While I was at first taken aback by his 
response, I later came to realise how Camp dwellers held ambiguous ideas of Wihdat as 
a place to live: both moral and frugal, it was also unsuitable for settling down and 
raising children for violence and poor infrastructure may have hindered their health and 
education73. In Abu Omar’s story we can see once again how the types of choices that 
people make about moving and working in heterogeneous social environments were 
highly nuanced and contradictory, exposing the fractures and deep ambiguities in the 
relationships refugees had with the affective space of the Camp.  
 
Being Palestinian and the consequences of leaving 
 
The experirence of im/mobility documented in these stories well captures refugees’ 
ambivalence about the Camp. Equally important, it is how this experience defines the 
relationships among camp dwellers. 
 
Feelings of alienation and distance have inevitably taunted the life of those who left and 
defined the relationship leavers had with their fellows in the camps. Migrants had to 
deal with some forms of resentment from their family and community members in the 
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 I have already explored the infrastructural problems of the Camp such as poor ventilation and 
overpopulation in the previous chapter. I will further investigate refugees’ ambiguous feelings to the 
space of the Camp in chapter 5. 
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Camp.  Migrating did not always lead to success. If those returning had often to cope 
with a loss of status and earnings, migrants abroad felt the weight of their duties toward 
relatives and friends acutely: wives, brothers, and friends nurtured great expectations 
from their spouses, relatives, and companions abroad under the form of remittances, 
reliability, connections and favours (wāsta). At the same time, people who managed to 
leave and pursue a career abroad were sometimes accused of exploiting their relatives in 
the camps as keepers of their mothers, sisters, and fathers. This sometimes was the 
cause of friction between those who left and those who stayed. If the former complained 
about the selfishness of those who migrated, the latter feared their envy and back-biting, 
which was said to poison and weaken the reputation of people in the Camp.  
 
Many factors contributed to fuelling tensions between those who left and those who 
stayed. Some of these tensions between migrants and their friends and relatives in 
Wihdat revolved around the alleged “amnesia” the former were accused of suffering 
after having left the Camp. In addition, disparities of wealth were stamped on what 
many perceived as being a showy display of newly acquired commodities and 
demeanours. On a cold afternoon in March, I visited Abdullah, a man in his late 
twenties who was living with his mother in Wihdat. An expensive and glittering new 
Mercedes SUV was parked next his parents’ house, a metre to the entrance. It turned out 
that it belonged to a guest, a friend who was working in the Gulf. It was not the first 
time I met these guests in Abdullah’s house – young men from Wihdat that managed to 
leave the Camp and pursue a successful career in the Gulf. He was introduced to me as 
an old and dear friend. Apparently, the two shabāb grew up in the same neighbourhood 
(hara) and attended the same school. He and Abdullah were inseparable friends until the 
former left for Dubai, where his uncle was making money through successful 
investments. When I met him in Abdullah’s house, the man, who was wearing designer 
clothes, was toying with his mobile (the latest BlackBerry) and smoking elegant, slim 
cigarettes. Although he spoke in the local slang (‘āmmiyya) with the others, he refused 
to address me in Arabic. As a testimonial of his sophistication and courtesy, he spoke in 
English. He was telling us about how things in the Gulf were not as good as they used to 
be, though salaries over there were still incomparably better than every other place in 
Jordan, let alone refugee camps. When, after endless cups of tea, the guest left, 
Abdullah told me:  
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“I don’t like him... he was my best friend, but I don’t like him anymore! [...] He found a job in 
the Gulf as an estate agent [...] after one year I receive a call, and he tells me ‘Abdullah, my 
friend, you must come here [at that time, Abdullah was not married and wanted to leave]! I’ll 
think of everything. I have already found a job for you... I will call you in a month, when 
everything will be ok’ I waited one month... then two months and nothing. The third month I 
called him and he does not answer. I keep calling him but nothing. When he finally answered he 
said ‘I’m sorry, but I had problem, now there is no the job...’ [...] It is always like that with 
them, they forget about their friends!!”  
 
Despite the relatively high levels of mobility in the life of refugees, my informants were 
rigidly curtailed by visa requirements and other forms of travel documentation74. By 
creating and limiting the possibilities of moving, visa requirements and policies 
contributed to widening further the fissures and fractures among camp-dwellers. A 
friend’s desperate struggle to obtain an American visa, for example, came to no good.  
 
Rafid had big hopes: settling down in the United States. He often used to repeat that, 
and how he did not really care about Palestine. His was a veritable obsession: he always 
kept with him a map of the USA – he had also an electronic version in which the state 
of Texas was renamed after himself: “Rafid”. However, Rafid’s powerful desire to 
travel to the US was rather recent. Ironically, when he was young, he even won a green 
card applying to an on-line lottery. Either due to his unwillingness to leave his elderly 
parents alone, as he claimed, or for fear of moving alone to a new country, as his friends 
more maliciously suggested, Rafid refused the green card. When I met him, the 
approval letter was treasured as the most precious of relics; it partly signified his 
indecision and past fortune, and partly nourished his sense of guilt of not having moved. 
Despite his desperate efforts and several interviews with the visa office in the USA 
Embassy, Rafid never managed to obtain the yearned document. His countless and 
unsuccessful attempts to move to the United States were an object of mockery and 
derision in the Camp. To make things worse, an alleged employer in the States 
convinced Rafid into advancing him three thousand JD for a fake employment contract, 
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 For anthropological and historical literature on the emergence and varying significance of border 
regulation worldwide and more specifically in Asia, see among others Amrith (2011) and McKeown 
(2004).  
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which would have eventually led to the issue of the visa. With great effort, Rafid 
managed to borrow money from his wealthy brother who, to add insult to injury, gained 
enormous success in the United States working as engineer. Rumours said that Rafid 
even suspected his brother of secretly conspiring against him because he needed 
someone in the Camp to care for their elderly mother. However, after having been paid 
the sum, the man disappeared, leaving Rafid in great despair and in debt to his brother. 
A couple of months afterwards, a few weeks before the conclusion of my fieldwork, I 
received a call from Rafid in which he announced to me that he was shortlisted with his 
family for an interview with the consul – he then added, in a whisper: “don’t tell it to 
anybody, but I’ve got the visa! I don’t want people in the Camp know because they are 
all envious”. Yet something went wrong: six months after I came back again to the 
Camp for a short visit, people burst out laughing when I asked information about Rafid. 
Apparently, his wife and daughter were granted a visa, yet his own application was 
rejected due to some obscure irregularities.  
 
In Al-Wihdat, camp-dwellers’ common experience of marginalisation and poverty 
worked strongly to reproduce a collective identity based on solidarity and reciprocity. 
However, closer scrutiny of refugees’ life trajectories reveals a sense of mutuality 
deeply entangled with antagonism. Far from being supportive, kin and social networks 
could be deceiving and envious. Rafid’s story says a great deal about these dynamics: 
not only he did fear the envy of those who stayed, but he even suspected his brother – 
who left – to be complicit in his failure. In other words, camp-dwellers’ experience of 
mobility endangered a shared national identity by exposing it to interpersonal 
resentment and bitterness.  
 
As symbols of Palestinianness in exile, people who left the Camp felt the need to 
reaffirm their bond with it. To do so, sometimes refugees returned on periodical basis, 
stayed in touch with their friends, sent remittances to their relatives, or found a spouse 
from the Camp. A man in his thirties when first I met him, Oraib spent his childhood in 
the Palestinian refugee camps of Baq’a and Wihdat. Status and power had come to him 
and his brothers from setting up a successful car dealership in South Korea. Apparently, 
his wealth derived from his capacity to navigate specific norms regulating the trading of 
cars from Korea to Jordan, and across the borders between Jordan and Syria. Although 
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Oraib was living in Seoul along with his brothers and their families, he still returned on 
a regular basis to Jordan, where he still had family, and occasionally visited to Syria, 
where he had business interests75. Migrants often re-asserted their bonds with the Camp 
by repeating cycles of return and departures and by rhetorically stating the primacy of 
the Camp in their lives. For his elderly father, and to demonstrate his affluence, Oraib 
built a villa in Amman right above the Baq’a Camp. It was in Wihdat, during the course 
of one of his trips back from South Korea, where I met him for the first time. He still 
went to the Camp to see his friends because, as he told me, he still felt himself to be one 
of them. Living in the physical space of the “Camp”, with people coming from the same 
city or village, and having shared the same life and similar socio-economic conditions 
with them, reinforced in Oraib the distinctiveness of being Palestinian and a refugee.  
 
However, Oraib also knew very well that much held them apart too. From his new 
house, he dominated the landscape beneath over the tight clusters of flat-roofed shelters 
that stretched out in the valley where the refugee Camp was established. The house’s 
spacious and richly furnished rooms flaunted luxuries inaccessible to the very large 
majority of people living in Wihdat. This building was a powerful testimony of Oraib’s 
recently acquired economic position. Its superior place marked the social and physical 
distance between him and “his people”. He was quite aware of the significance and 
influence of living in the Camp in strengthening an imagined Palestinian national 
identity. One day, he summarised his life trajectory to me in the specific language that 
characterises many refugee narratives, where football is strictly enmeshed in ethnic and 
political issues: “I was born in Baq’a, I support Wihdat, and I’ll die in Faisaly!”76 In that 
context, it was a funny comment; an irony, however, all the more interesting because 
conveyed also a great deal of cynicism and self-reflection. This short sentence enclosed 
a complex set of assumptions where football, status, political allegiances, and sense of 
belonging are intertwined. By emphasising the trajectory that led him to leave the 
Camp, support Wihdat, and eventually die in Faisaly, Oraib suggested that moving 
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 For studies on the regulation of borders that shed light on the collaboration between state power and 
highly mobile traders, see Andrew Walker (1999). For comparative literature on traders in global words, 
see among other Mark Anthony Falzon (1986). 
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 Farīq al-wihdat (Wihdat Football Team) and farīq al-faisaly (Faisaly Football Team) are the strongest 
football clubs in Jordan, which every year contend the local championship. Whereas the former was 
established in Wihdat refugee camp and counts amongst its supporters mostly Jordanians of Palestinian 
origins, Faisaly is generally associated with the native Bedouins (or Transjordanians/East Bankers). I will 
explore the significance of football in refugees’ daily lives in greater detail in chapter 6. 
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outside the Camp entails a process of socio-economic and cultural integration in Jordan, 
alienation from his own origins, and the weakening of his political identity as 
Palestinian. In other words, money will eventually led Oraib to become someone well-
integrated in Jordan, who has forgotten his origins or, worse, who has sold out the 
Palestinian cause in exchange for integration: in short, someone who even supports a 
notoriously pro-regime football team. 
 
OUTSIDERS INSIDE THE CAMP 
 
Immigrants 
 
As we have seen, refugees’ livelihood strategies and economic trajectories have de facto 
led to the transformation of a humanitarian space into an effervescent space of 
commerce and business in Jordan. While socio-economic integration was believed to be 
compatible with camp-dwellers’ nationalist ideals, the inevitable differences of wealth 
and status have at times endangered refugees’ self-perception as a homogenous 
community.  
 
This section focuses on how the Camp has become a destination point for people other 
than Palestinian refugees. I will document how camp-dwellers have integrated these 
people into their lives, a process that has led them to reflect on their collective identities 
in new ways. What is interesting about recent immigration in Al-Wihdat is that it 
heightened the tensions inherent in the dynamics of integration. The arrival of new 
immigrants – most notably Egyptian workers and Iraqi refugees – pushed even further 
the integration of refugees in Jordan and enhanced their affective relationship with the 
space of the Camp. On the other hand, it also raised anxieties and fears linked to the loss 
of political meaning and the weakening of local solidarities. 
 
At the time of the Camp’s establishment, refugees living in Wihdat were, for the most 
part, Palestinians from Kufur A’n, Safriyeh, Ramla, Dayr Tariff, Abassiyah and other 
villages in the district of Ramla (DPA 2009). Scholars have documented in abundance 
how the memory of the villages of origin has historically played a pivotal role in 
defining social relations and social life amongst refugees in Jordan (e.g. Farah 1999, 
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Hart 2002) and outside (e.g. Sa’di and Abu-Lughod 2007, Slyomovics 1998). This was 
immediately evident in the widespread opinion that camp dwellers were related to each 
other and arranged their marriages according to strict forms of village and family 
endogamy. Other studies have also documented how refugees tended to group by 
village of origin or by extended family when they first moved into camps. Hana Jaber 
(1996) notes how village endogamy was still widely practiced in Wihdat when she 
conducted her fieldwork, explaining this practice as the desire to reproduce a social 
uniformity and conserve the memory of origins. However, if Wihdat, for many of its 
inhabitants, stood for security, domestic order, and homeliness, it simultaneously 
exposed conflicting feelings of insecurity, impurity, and danger. This ambivalence was 
most immediately evident in refugees' relationships to the new waves of immigrants.  
Indeed, despite Wihdat’s reputation of being a bastion of Palestinianness, the Camp was 
not an ethnically homogeneous space. Over the years, Wihdat experienced a noticeable 
diversity in terms of its ethnic composition. Unable to cope with the growing rents in 
west Amman and the strict requirements for legal residency permits, numerous migrants 
– including Egyptian labourers and Iraqi refugees – took up residence within the Camp 
or on its outskirts77.  
 
Camp-dwellers referred to these newcomers either by referring to the nationality of the 
immigrants or with the general term “foreigners/strangers” (ajaneb). Despite these 
generalizations, however, the category of “foreigners” was characterised by 
considerable complexity. The diverse ways of imagining and categorising such social 
diversity by refugees reflected the nature of the interactions that took place between 
camp-dwellers and migrants in Wihdat. During their everyday conversations, camp-
dwellers referred schematically to diverse categories of “strangers”. First, there were 
Arab-speaking refugees and labourers from Iraq, Egypt, and Yemen who settled in 
Wihdat or in its surrounding areas mainly to work in the souk as clerks and cleaners. 
There were also Sri Lankans and Filipinos – generally employed as maids in well-off 
households of western Amman – all referred to using the word “filippiniat” (Filipinos). 
These people did not live in Wihdat but came in almost on a daily basis to buy 
vegetables and meat in the market that was famed for being of especially good value. 
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 Some authors estimate, for example, that over 10.000 Egyptian workers are today living inside Al-
Wihdat camp (Al-Husseini 2011). 
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Finally, the last category is that of ghajarīn/nawari (Gypsies). They were long-term 
residents who were said to live in the Camp and its proximities almost since its 
establishment. Their status in Al-Wihdat was highly ambiguous; although they were not 
called ajaneb (many of them where living in the Camp since its institution), they were 
generally identified as outsiders.  
 
Here I will focus on those groups who lived and settled down inside the camps, namely 
the ghajarīn and the Arab speaking immigrants and refugees. The arrival of these and 
other communities in the Camp influenced the way refugees lived in and identified with 
Wihdat, making this space both the arena of an expanding economy and sociality, and 
the site where an exclusive identity was reproduced78.   
 
Relationships between refugees and immigrants 
 
The immigrants were placed by most refugees in a moral hierarchy, and Gypsies 
occupied the lowest ranks. Ghajarīn were widely considered undesired villains; 
dangerous and immoral strangers who were loosely associated with theft, drug 
smuggling, and prostitution79. The origin of “Gypsies” in Jordan was quite 
controversial. It was said that they were originally from the East (shark) and came to the 
region long ago, before the establishment of Jordan. They currently spoke the Jordanian 
and Palestinian variants of Levantine Arabic and, I was told, also “their own language”. 
Despite people’s reluctance to admit it, however, nawari were also said to be originally 
from Palestine. It is not clear whether they came to Jordan as common migrants or as 
Palestinian refugees. Although they were not segregated in ghettos, many lived in a 
neighbourhood nearby Wihdat, others in specific parts of the Camp such as Shāraʿ 
Liddawi and the alleys that radiated from it. These places were widely thought of as 
being a poisonous environment. “Gypsies” indeed were generally accused of polluting 
the moral environment and thriving in those forms of entertainment that were seen by 
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 In so doing I build on those authors who, warning against the danger of treating cosmopolitanism as the 
celebration of diversity, have investigated the dialectic between exclusive forms of local identity and 
openness to “alterity” (e.g. Abu-Lughod 2007, Bayat 2010, Osella and Osella 2007, Tsing 2005).   
79
 Studies have documented the importance of ideas of pollution that Gypsies hold, and the ways in which 
these form boundaries between themselves and non-Gypsies (see, for example, Okely 1983). 
Interestingly, the stereotypes associated with pollution and immorality have been also deployed against 
so-called service nomads in a variety of settings; see Slezkine (1986, chapter 1). 
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many as immoral or, at least, not pious: encouraging shabāb to smoke hashish and drink 
alcohol, engaging in illicit activities such as thieving and prostitution. Nawari also had a 
longstanding reputation for being loafers; and if males were widely deemed to be 
dawawīn (troublemakers), their women were said to be sharāmīt (prostitutes).  Some of 
my friends even avoided playing football with Gypsies because of their supposedly 
immoral attitudes. And most refugees in the Camp did not count any of their friends 
amongst them. Gypsies also featured predominantly in many narratives of violence. I 
heard many stories of quarrels and brawls that involved Gypsies, and also occasionally 
witnessed to episodes in which they were said to be taking part. In this case, the 
negative epithets occasionally expressed by refugees toward migrants gave way to the 
widespread belief that nawari in general were “disgusting” (beghsu) and ignorant of the 
fundamental principles of the Islam (zinkhīn)80.  
 
Compared to Gypsies, Palestinian refugees perceived Arab speaking migrants from 
Egypt, Iraq, and other Arab countries as much better types of “human beings” (’insān). 
Refugees interacted with and talked about these newcomers in complex and diverse 
ways. These people were not simply treated as unwelcome intruders but as, relatives, 
friends, fellow workers or simply individuals who carried a personal story. The exodus 
of Iraqis in the Camp and its outskirts has a recent history and reflects a broader trend in 
the city. Following a mass refugee migration that began in the early 1990s and boosted 
after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a large number of Iraqis found 
an abode in Jordan (Chatelard 2010). Egyptians and other labour migrants from other 
Arab countries began to arrive in the late 70s (ibid.). Working in Jordan was not the 
favoured choice of most highly mobile Egyptian workers. Given the scant opportunities 
offered by the stagnant Jordanian economy, the possibility of finding positions 
appropriate for one’s degree of study was extremely difficult for Jordanian citizens and 
almost impossible for legal immigrants, let alone those who resided in the country 
illegally. Unable to secure high wages, poor Iraqi refugees and labour migrants moved 
in the much cheaper dwellings of Wihdat and east Amman. Many of them not only 
found residences, but also jobs in the Camp. Mahmud, a young Egyptian man in his 
mid-twenties, was one of them. Since he moved to the Camp, he had been working for a 
Palestinian family that ran a tiny but profitable business in the souk al wihdat. The old 
                                                        
80Literally “foul”, sing. zinekh 
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head of the family carved out of his house a small grocery store in Shāraʿ Al-Nadi; he 
then expanded his business by opening up a stand where cheap goods, mainly imported 
from China, were sold at low prices. When I saw him last, he was sleeping in a 
computer shop, whose owner – a decent person (muhtaram), or so I was told – only 
took in rental what the man could afford to pay. 
 
Mahmud’s story highlights camp-dwellers’ cosmopolitanism and everyday practice of 
coexistence in the Camp. Most Palestinian refugees were on close and friendly terms 
with these immigrants. Daily life in the Camp provided refugees with complex 
opportunities to mingle with these “outsiders”, interaction that went beyond a simple 
working relationship. These were not lowly servants but people who shared the same 
lifestyle with the rest of the refugee community. The latter participated in camp life, and 
were welcome guests at the marriages and funerals of other camp dwellers. Marriages 
between Palestinian refugees and these communities of migrants and refugees were also 
common. Moreover, these migrants were sometimes called to participate in special 
events. Because of the beauty of his voice, for example, Mahmood was invited on a few 
occasions to recite the Quran in the annual recurrence of Palestinian celebrations held in 
the Nadi.  
 
This was also visible in camp-dwellers’ interactions with ghajarīn, though to a much 
lesser degree. Refugees blamed many of the Camp’s “social problems” on Gypsies, 
saying they were responsible for introducing their youth to drugs, prostitution, and 
violence. Ironically, however, it was here where a contact point was established 
between “Palestinians” and Gypsies. For example in the pool rooms, where even the 
more pious youth used to go sometimes, Gypsies mixed with the rest of the camp 
population. Many ghajarīn were also particularly appreciated for their sonic 
performances in nightclubs and in parties held for special occasions in private houses in 
the Camp. Not only daily interactions, but actual forms of fluidity in personal identity 
blurred the boundaries around the category “ghajar” (gypsy). There were, indeed, cases 
of Gypsies being “redeemed. The allegedly demeaning gypsy origins of one of my 
friends were, at least temporary, ignored for his pious commitment – the boy 
volunteered weekly in the Department of Children in the Nadi Al-Wihdat, and his 
127 
 
 
family chose to  not to associate themselves with the other members of the Gypsy 
community in the Camp.  
 
Anxieties and cosmopolitanism 
 
If everyday life was informed by cooperative experiences (Bayat 2010) and “convivial 
cosmopolitanism” (Gilroy 2005), immigration at times reinforced ethnic boundaries. 
Daily interactions, albeit concealed, problematised the image of a morally and 
ethnically pure Palestinian community, generating anxieties and tensions. More than a 
few “strangers” in the Camp harboured rancour against refugees. Over the course of 
private talks, they lamented how Palestinians (filastīnīn) were deceitful in business and 
could be troublemakers. Likewise, grievances toward new immigrants was equally 
vocalised by Palestinian refugees. One day in a small and stylish clothes shop beside the 
Nadi, a clerk was expressing a harsh resentment toward migrants. Visibly annoyed, he 
shrugged his shoulders and said: “they [migrants] are like cockroaches (sarāsīr) who 
take even the humblest jobs without ever spending a penny in the Camp”. When I asked 
him whether they were troublemakers, the clerk replied: “not at all, otherwise we would 
do like that with them”, mimicking the act of putting out a cigarette”. The clerk’s words 
articulated some of the refugees’ anxieties regarding the perceived take-over of Wihdat 
by new migrants. According to many in Wihdat, Iraqis, Egyptians, and other 
immigrants had weakened the sense of solidarity of refugees by mixing with camp 
dwellers. As another man put it:  
 
“The Camp is good… I like Wihdat, but before it was better! […] Before there were not all 
these Egyptians (masrīn) around. There were no Egyptians, Gypsies, and Iraqis! We were all 
Palestinians, the community was much more solid, people were more close to each other. We 
used to help to each other. If you had a problem, your friends and neighbours would help you. 
But now, now it’s not anymore like that! With all these immigrants people do not care anymore 
[…] But this is not all, especially Egyptians come here they take every job but then they do not 
spend their money. They take everything home, in their countries”.  
 
In fact, many refugees claimed that contemporary disorder was associated with 
immigrants. A large part of Wihdat's problems – such as the weakening of cooperation 
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and the loss of meaningful relationships – were rooted in the fact that new migrants do 
not feel any emotional attachment to the Camp and its inhabitants.  
 
However meaningful refugees’ grievances over the lack of a sense of home on the part 
of recent migrants may be for the assertion of a domesticity in Wihdat, it also conceals 
the fact that to be mukhayyamji and to feel at home in the Camp was not straightforward 
for Palestinian refugees either. In a recent article on the relationship Karachiites 
entertain with their city, Oskar Verkaaik reports the grievances of some urban planners 
who lament the lack of sense of home articulated by new migrants from rural areas. This 
allows the author to observe that “the manageable Karachi is slipping out of 
everybody’s hands as the dominant notion of what it entails to be a Karachiite is rooted 
in a mythological time that is difficult to evoke in the present” (2009, p. 68). In the 
same manner, as the brief excerpt I quoted above underlines, the conception of Wihdat 
as home was slipping out of refugees' hands as the dominant notion of what it entailed 
to be a camp-dweller was increasingly rooted in a mythological time. The imagined 
Wihdat, in which one could feel at home, was represented in the minds of Palestinian 
refugees as the camp at the time of the first decades of their exile in Jordan. Projecting 
moral order onto a past is normal. What is interesting, however, is the fact that this 
representation, that so well evokes the homeliness of Al-Wihdat, seems to neglect that 
the first generations of refugees fiercely opposed any durable improvement in the camps 
on the basis that these places were not their home. Ironically, then, the Camp began to 
evoke the ethos of the home/village when slipped out as exclusively the locus of 
Palestinianness in exile. 
 
So, on the one hand, the arrival of new-comers in Al-Wihdat unveiled dynamics of 
everyday cooperation and sharing between them and the camp-dwellers (Bayat 2010). 
On the other, the exclusive forms of identity that aroused from refugees’ mingling with 
these “strangers” exposed clearly the anxieties and fears for the allegedly decreasing 
moral standards and weakening of forms of solidarities. In turn, these feelings served to 
foster forms of ethno-national identity by encouraging antagonism and a sense of 
superiority to other minorities and migrant populations, reinforcing the affective 
relationships that refugees nourished toward the space of the Camp. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has documented and explored refugees’ agency through their working lives 
and the practices that inform political economy in Al-Wihdat. The goal was not to 
simply give a better understanding of the refugees’ material lives. Here, I have also 
shown how socio-economic integration provides the ground for sustaining a nationalist 
identity in exile – although at times this process of integration might have 
disaggregating effects on camp dwellers’ social relationships and self-depiction as a 
homogeneous community. 
 
In so doing, I have shown how discrimination, material poverty, and other negative 
dimensions linked to the working and economic conditions of refugees have reproduced 
forms of self-understanding based on the conception of “the refugee” as embodying an 
ideal of resistance. The simplicity and authenticity associated with a modest life and 
humble origins were thought by camp-dwellers to confer upon them more intense forms 
of political commitment. On the other hand, however, minute displacements were 
introduced to this form of political subjectivity in consequence of the need to fulfil the 
obligations people in the Camp believed to be integral parts of adulthood and moral 
maturity. In this sense, refugees were not driven by a yearning for marginality but 
reproduced their political identity in relations to more practical responsibilities, 
notability the need to secure an income (see also Kelly 2008). Rather than simply being 
the raison d’être of narratives of sumūd and resistance, for example, poverty was talked 
about in terms of youthful uneasiness, violence and immoral behaviour. Overt 
exhibitions of independence or cunning without rational reflection were seen by many 
camp-dwellers as contributing to current hardships. Living an ordinary life entailed 
active processes of thinking about the consequences of one’s actions. In this context, 
camp-dwellers’ attempts to set up the “right connections” in order to overcome poverty 
were not perceived as threatening their nationalistic commitment. It was, rather, one 
way in which the ideological tenets of Palestinian nationalism could be produced and 
made more visible and also adaptive to exilic life.  
 
However, refugees’ goal of upward mobility was fraught with ambivalence. By 
challenging the notion that refugee camps are merely disciplinary spaces of 
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confinement, I then investigated how camp residents' working trajectories “feed into 
local framework of self and subjectivity” (Osella and Osella 2000, p. 117, see also 
Reeves, 2011). I documented the negative implications and displacing effects that 
camp-dwellers’ mobility has had on their self-perception as a national community. The 
experiences of Abdullah, Rafid, and Oraib shed light on the variety of ways in which 
refugees negotiate the demands of mobility at the time of great economic uncertainty. 
As these cases show, the political and affective dimensions of Wihdat have played a 
role in influencing camp-dwellers’ attitudes about migration. This was well reflected in 
how this bond was recreated, for example, through refugees' regular visits to the Camp, 
the remittances sent to improve their homes, the unwillingness to leave, and even the 
desire to build magnificent villas nearby. But if this bond was continuously re-enacted 
through these acts, these patterns of im/mobility were also transformative of the very 
relationships between camp-dwellers. If in some of these journeys, people attained 
success by becoming business people or professionals, others were left behind: tensions 
revolved around the ways in which people perceived migrants’ newly acquired wealth 
and position, which was often understood to be over-exhibited through the brash display 
of high-priced items such as expensive cars, mobiles, brand name clothing and 
accessories.  
 
Finally, I demonstrated how recent immigration in Wihdat has further exposed the 
complexities and ambiguities inherent refugees’ socio-economic integration. I argued 
that the daily encounters of Palestinian refugees and new immigrants have not wiped 
away but reinforced exclusivist forms of identity. Daily relationships with Iraqi 
refugees, Egyptian migrants, Filipino workers, and ghajarīn (Gypsies) contributed to 
reproducing a specific discourse in which an exclusive national identity as Palestinians 
was objectified and valorised, distinguishing Palestinian refugees from other 
communities in the Camp and beyond. On the other hand, the opening of Wihdat to new 
migrants led to de-territorialising and displacing the authoritative discourse inherent 
Palestinian nationalism, which sees refugees and refugee camps respectively as the 
embodiment and the site of Palestinian nationalism in exile. If Palestinian refugees 
proclaimed themselves as being the ultimate symbol of Palestinian nationalism and the 
real inhabitants of the camp (mukhayyamji), the anxieties associated to the seemingly 
selfishness and immorality of new immigrants unveiled a deviation from the idealised 
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image of the “refugee camp” as a Palestinian place. As camp-dwellers’ fears well 
highlight, the heterogeneity and everyday cosmopolitanism of camp life did not reflect 
the territorialisation of this ideal of Palestinianness, but rather the integration of 
refugees inside the territory.  
 
Refugees’ pursuit of an ordinary life served nationalistic ideals by challenging a 
marginality that was held to contribute to cultural decay and an immoral demeanour, 
characteristics that were widely said of being among the main causes behind Palestinian 
refugees’ incapacity to return to Palestine. In the next chapter, I will carry further this 
analysis by tracing the link between political and moral agency in the context of the 
growing importance of Islam in the daily lives of refugees in Al-Wihdat.  
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CHAPTER 4: “ORDINARY ISLAM” 
 
INTRODUCTION: AVOIDING, BLOCKING, AND CONCEALING THE POLITICAL 
 
One day, after a brief demonstration held in Wihdat and organised by the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF), Abu Omar once again expressed his criticism of politics. Like many others, 
he was deeply disenchanted. His criticism was also directed at political demonstrations 
and protests in the streets: “I don’t like political demonstrations!”. For him, political 
gatherings and events were merely moments of leisure or, at best, displays for political 
parties that pursue only their own selfish interests: 
 
 “Hamas takes to the streets and hails Sheikh Yassin; Fatah takes to the streets and hails Arafat; 
the communists [Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party] take to the streets and hail George 
Habash… but there is only one Palestine!! [..] If you go [to these demonstrations], you will see 
communist flags, Hamas flags, or Fatah flags, but not Palestinian flags!”.  
 
A few days later, a further episode caught my attention. I was lying on the sofa of the 
markez with a friend and watching TV. My companion was flicking through the 
channels and Nasrallah’s face – Hezbollah’s charismatic political leader – appeared on 
the screen: “beghsi (filthy)!!”, my friend exclaimed. “You don’t like him?”, I asked, 
“Why? He fights for Palestinians!”. He replied, “I’m happy if he fights against al-yahūd 
(the Jews), but I don’t like him! Do you know that he is shia, not muslim? Shia are 
worse than yahūdi!”81. 
 
At first sight, the behaviour of my companions might seem puzzling: Palestinian 
refugees who expressed harsh criticism against all Palestinian political leaders and 
parties indiscriminately, and who lashed out against a political leader who was 
sympathetic to Palestinians only on the grounds that he was Shi’a. However, the distaste 
manifested by my companions for Palestinian politics and symbols was part of a general 
disaffection that many in Al-Wihdat had for politics and political elites, especially in 
and about Palestine. In general, people in Wihdat spoke of politics (syāse) as something 
dirty, unprincipled, and unsavoury (compare Ruud 2001). This was true as much for 
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 Historically the Muslim communities living in Al-Wihdat are almost entirely Sunni. 
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Islamist parties and movements as for their secular counterparts. Muslim Brothers, 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and Fatah were perceived as being exclusively interested in chasing 
political seats, and not caring about the common good of Palestinians.  
 
However, if talk of politics was said to be haki fadi (ineffective/empty words), and 
political parties, movements and leaders were almost unanimously depicted as being 
amoral and corrupt, then, for most if not all of the people I met in Wihdat, attention to 
Islamic doctrine was a very important dimension of their everyday life. More than this, 
they considered Islam to be the only solution to their political problems. Abu Omar 
often stressed that the solution to Palestinian political issues must come through the 
formation of a moral personhood: “you see, Luigi, as long as we [Palestinians] drink, 
curse, and behave like animals [haīwānāt], we will never be able to get back to 
Palestine!”. Like him, many other people I met in Al-Wihdat believed that their political 
plight was an issue of faith. During my fieldwork, most of my friends were scrupulous 
in showing their appreciation for Islamic teachings and practices. The need to go back 
to the Islam of their pious ancestors living in Palestine was stated by both the older and 
younger generations in the Camp.  
 
Amidst raising levels of apathy and cynicism towards politics in and about Palestine, 
and the parallel growth in significance of “global” forms of Islamic discourse and 
symbolism, this chapter seeks to address the relationship between attempts to lead a 
pious life and Palestinian nationalism. In previous chapters, I have demonstrated that 
what characterised the daily life of camp dwellers in Al-Wihdat was neither political 
militancy nor active resistance against attempts to resettle them within the territory. On 
the contrary, Palestinian refugees have upheld the ideals of Palestinian nationalism by 
pursuing integration in Jordan through ordinary daily activities such as spatial (chapter 
2) and socio economic (chapter 3) practices. I argue here that the performance of a pious 
self in Wihdat has to be understood in the same light: as an attempt to ground the 
authoritative discourse of Palestinian nationalism within the need to live an ordinary life 
in Jordan.  
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In order to explore the complex imbrications and separations of piety and politics, 
however, we first need to address anthropological attempts to theorise the study of the 
political more broadly.  
 
The interaction between Islam and politics in and beyond the Middle East has been 
fiercely debated by scholars who see the progressive importance of Islam in public life 
as a throwback to an ancient time (e.g. Barber 1996, Lewis 2002), and social scientists 
who posit the call for political Islam in the vacuum of values generated by globalisation 
and the crisis of the nation-state (see Devji 2005, Keddie 1998, Kepel 2002, Roy 1994). 
More recently, the failure of Islamic groups to seize state power and their declining 
popularity in many countries, have led some authors to postulate the existence of a 
period of “post-Islamism” (see Soares and Osella 2009, for a critique, Soares and 
Otayek 2007). This is held to have led to the rise in new forms of Islamic 
fundamentalism that are concerned with the Islamisation of the self (1986, Roy 1994), 
the departure of Islamists from Islamic radicalism to more moderate and “Westernised” 
positions (Kepel 2002), or a greater engagement of Muslims worldwide with issues of 
civil rights and democracy (Bayat 2007). Up to a point, the declining popularity of 
Islamic groups in Al-Wihdat might lead an observer to claim that a period of post-
Islamism is underway in the Camp too.  
 
Nevertheless, I would caution against overdrawing the contrast between the process of 
individual self-fashioning and more “traditional” forms of political Islamism (see also 
Soares and Osella 2009). Despite the willingness of many to separate their ways of 
being Muslim from the treacherous world of the political, the seemingly “post-Islamic” 
way of behaving and displaying piety in Al-Wihdat consistently recalled the Salafi 
discourses openly connected with Saudi Arabia’s political and foreign policy 
objectives82. At the time of my research, audio-recorded sermons and publications of 
popular Salafi scholars and preachers from all over the word were widely consumed by 
my friends. Tapes and books were generally sold in the various stands on the streets of 
the Camp and in the book shops outside the King Hussein Mosque in the centre of 
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 According to Wiktorowicz, Salafis “are considered “tied to Saudi” because they receive Saudi financial 
support through contributions for proselytizing and publishing and are unwilling to articulate a 
challenging discourse that would threaten the Saudi regime” (2007, p. 232). 
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Amman83. The impact of this discourse in Al-Wihdat was visible, for example, in the 
strengthening of a sectarian distinction between Shia and Sunni Muslims84 and in the 
popularity of figures generally associated by Western media with Salafi Jihadism, such 
as Osama bin Laden, al-Maqdisi, and Zarqawi. 
 
Yet, describing camp-dwellers’ religiosity as being defined in terms of a singular trend 
– Salafism – would be misleading when attempting to understand the complexity and 
plurality of Muslim self-understanding and experience in the refugee camps. Regardless 
of the obvious differences in their approaches, it is surprising how little attention is paid 
by the above-mentioned authors to individual Muslims’ participation in shaping their 
religiosity and political subjectivities, and how this process varies according to different 
historical junctures. Other scholars have warned against adopting these generalisations 
too quickly (Marsden 2005, Osella and Osella 2008, Rosander and Westerlund 1997, 
Simpson 2006, Soares 2005), as they obscure the various and changing forms of 
religious identification, and maintain a biased representation of Muslim cultural identity 
as homogeneous and global. Indeed, in Al-Wihdat, Salafists or other radical Islamic 
groups were no more popular than so-called moderate Islamic groups such as al-
’ikhwān. Many camp dwellers were particularly sceptical of the Salafi movement, 
which they perceived as being merely interested in pursuing the short-sighted interests 
and political agenda of the Saudi regime.  
 
To understand Islam in Al-Wihdat and its relevance for Palestinian nationalism, I 
suggest that we should move beyond a debate on whether people’s piety in Al-Wihdat is 
best defined as Salafism or post-Islamism, and instead ask what it means to refugees 
and how it is performed. In so doing, I draw on two bodies of literature. 
 
The rejection of the political and the stress on the moral dimension of Islam recall 
compelling scholarly work that has preferred a fine-grained ethnography and a focus on 
Muslims’ individual experience, rather than the macro analysis of political scientists 
(Brenner 1996, Deeb 2006, Henkel 2007, Hirschkind 2006, Ismail 2006, Mahmood 
2005). This body of work in anthropology has called for a recognition of the moral and 
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 For the growing importance of the Salafi discourse in Jordan, see Wiktorowitz (2007). For the role of 
cassette sermons in the fashioning of a pious self, see Hirschkind (2007). 
84
 This polarisation has never taken the shape of sectarian violence. 
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ethical aspects of Islam as motivations that cannot be reducible to power and politics 
(see especially Lambek 2000). In her ethnography on revivalist movements in Cairo, 
Mahmood shows how the process through which pious women craft a docile self is 
neither an instance of passivity nor a moment of self-empowerment, but simply part of 
the subject’s desire to embark on a project of ethical self-fashioning (1986). However, 
framing piety as project of moral self-fashioning has important consequences at a 
political level, though this might not be the primary goal of pious-minded people; in 
Mahmood’s case, for example, this happens by naturalising an Islamic lifestyle that 
would ultimately subvert the secular and liberal project of the state (2005, see also 
Tugal 2009). Such an account is important because it allows us to understand the 
relationship between piety and Palestinian nationalism without becoming trapped in the 
rigid categories of political Islam. The importance of Islam in the life of many people in 
the Camp did not mean that refugees actively sought to challenge the state authorities 
and becoming engaged in armed violence. Rather, piety was understood by many as a 
genuine attempt to develop an ethical self. But the cultivation of a pious self was not 
completely divorced from their nationalist ideals: many in Al-Wihdat believed that 
consolidating an Islamic lifestyle was also the solution needed to fight Zionism and 
Western imperialism. 
 
However, while these ethnographies might be excellent in unveiling the ways in which 
piety ideally satisfies the conflicting demands of living life in Jordan whilst upholding 
nationalist struggles, their commentaries seem less capable of capturing the ambiguities 
and contradictions involved in this process of accommodation. In other words, the 
exceptional piety documented by this body of scholarship tells us very little about how 
refugees behave in situations in which the pressures of everyday life make it difficult to 
fulfil a moral ideal. As a corrective to this approach, in a recent study of Islam in Africa 
Soares and Otayek have advanced the concept of “Islam mondain” (2007); a term that 
points to the diverse types of sociality and ways of being Muslim in contexts of political 
and economic uncertainty. Scholars working in this vein have hence sought to document 
the ambiguities and inconsistencies of living a Muslim life (2007, Gregg 2007, Marsden 
2005, Schielke 2009, Soares and Otayek 2007). Adeline Masquelier (1986), for 
example, demonstrates that for young Muslims in Dogondoutchi, Nigeria, Islam 
provides the moral framework to connect with society. However, the tension between 
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the desire for success in life and the state’s failure to provide a valid educational system 
and job opportunities may lead Nigerian youths to selectively shift between different 
and sometimes conflicting forms of self-representations in order to capitalise on new 
possibilities. Likewise, Magnus Marsden explores how Muslims in Chitral do not 
conform to a set of ideal-types (such as Islamist, fundamentalist, liberal, traditionalist, 
etc.), but that they respond to the pressure of Islamisation in dynamic ways that “reflect 
a complex interaction of decision-making, intellectual energy, debate and critical 
discussion, and ideally balanced levels of affect and emotion” (1986). By drawing on 
these scholars, the goal of this chapter is to capture the complexity of Muslim social 
experience beyond a totalising focus on self-discipline. The time I spent in the Camp 
gave me the opportunity to observe the uneasy coexistence of religious morality and 
more mundane aspects of life, where ethical self-fashioning, the quest for romantic love, 
and consumerist binges were all features of refugees’ everyday lives in the camps. For 
camp dwellers, piety was a source of great comfort as well as deep anxiety. 
 
This chapter starts with an examination of how the political was perceived in the Camp 
as inherently treacherous. In so doing, I will first situate my discussion of Islam’s 
significance in the everyday lives of Wihdat dwellers within the context of the 
increasing popularity of Islamic parties such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood 
among refugees, and their decline in political importance in recent times. Like their 
secular counterparts before them, in the last few years Islamic parties and groups have 
come to be depicted by many people in the Camp as being selfish and ineffective. For 
camp dwellers, these attributes were inevitable outcomes of the intrinsically treacherous 
and dangerous nature of the political.  
 
The second part of this chapter will explore the moral (and political) significance of 
living a pious life for camp-dwellers. In the Camp, Islam was understood by many as a 
moral project that may eventually also reward the refugees politically – as long as it is 
not corrupted by political activism. The following section of this chapter will hence be 
dedicated to exploring modes of ethical self-fashioning in relation to Palestinian 
nationalism. To be a pious Muslim and a good Palestinian in the Camp, one had to 
strive in both material and spiritual terms towards a process of subject formation that 
was perceived as self-improvement. By documenting refugees’ involvement in the 
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burnāmej al-shabāb (the youth programme) of the Nadi Al-Wihdat, I suggest that one 
of the specific forms in which the co-dependence of piety and nationalism has emerged 
has been through people’s commitment to welfare activities and organisations  (see 
Deeb 2006).  
 
Finally, this chapter will shed light on the importance that an open-minded and dynamic 
interpretation of Islam plays in the life of many Palestinian refugees in Al-Wihdat. 
Among camp dwellers, the capacity to accommodate the cultivation of a pious self with 
the complex demands of daily life is paramount in their attempt to carry out an ordinary 
life in Jordan. 
 
POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL 
 
Al-’ikhwān in Jordan 
 
At the time of my research, a general contempt towards Fatah was shared equally by 
Palestinians living in camps and those outside. Despite its critical role in resisting the 
Israeli occupation and colonisation of the West Bank and Gaza strip, Fatah was widely 
regarded as ineffective and corrupt. The PLO’s loss of influence was also a reflection of 
another trend: the growing popularity of Hamas in the occupied territories (e.g. Chehab 
2007, Hroub 2000, Lybarger 2007, Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, Mishal and Sela 
2000) and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (e.g. Cohen 1972, Schwedler 2001, Taraki 
1995, Wiktorowicz 1999)85.  
 
Scholarly inquiry into Jordan’s so-called Islamists – popularly referred to in the Camp 
using the term shuyukh – has generally focused on the Muslim Brothers (al-’ikhwān al-
Muslimīn). Indeed, the Brotherhood has been a fundamental factor in Jordanian politics. 
Despite a recent drop in its popularity, attested to especially in the electoral defeat at the 
November 2007 national parliamentary elections, Al-’ikhwān was still playing an 
influential role when I conducted my research. Although its political wing – the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF) or Jabha al-Amal al-Islami – was legalised only in the early 1990s, 
                                                        
85In Al-Wihdat, the two were seen by refugees as inherently similar – albeit there were obvious 
differences in their ideological and functional structure. For the link between Hamas and the Brotherhood, 
see Khaled Hroub (2007). 
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the Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Jordan since its constitution. It was 
founded in 1945; however, it was from the late 1980s and 1990s that Al-’ikhwān came 
to play a pivotal role in the Jordanian political panorama. From 1984 onwards, the 
movement expressed a strong criticism of the Jordanian government’s non-democratic 
practices, and support for the Palestinian cause. Its campaigns against corruption, for 
political inclusion, for democratisation, and against the normalisation of the relationship 
with Israel, gained much consensus throughout the territory of Jordan. Although the 
decline of pan-Arabist and leftist groups in the region certainly played a role, much of 
its success was also linked to its capacity to exert influence through an extensive 
network of Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other charitable 
organisations. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the Brotherhood’s activities were boosted 
by a massive influx of money through oil-related financial support and revenues from 
the Gulf countries. This ultimately enabled the movement to establish a system of 
schools, clinics, and other organisations across the country (Wiktorowicz 1999). These 
grassroots activities implemented and managed by NGOs have created “vehicles for 
developing a clientele and support for the Brotherhood cause” (ibid, p. 7). Al-’ikhwān’s 
civil activism, however, is manifested not only through the movement’s involvement in 
and commitment to charitable activities: it is also expressed through professional 
associations such as the Engineering Association Council – the principal forum for 
political activism in Jordan (Larzillière 2012) 
 
Al-’ikhwān’s political success could be measured by the results of the parliamentary 
election of 1989, in which the movement gained 22 of the 80 seats. Behind the political 
influence of the Brotherhood and IAF there is also its longstanding relationship with the 
regime. Until the lifting of the martial law in 1991, indeed, the Brotherhood was the 
only political movement allowed to operate in civil society. The bond between the 
government and Al-’ikhwān was also reinforced because they shared a common enemy: 
the left-leaning opposition. The regime saw in the Brotherhood a useful ally, and a 
counter against the leftist threats of Nasser’s pan-Arabism, Communism, and Ba’thism 
(Wiktorowicz 1999). Most importantly, the “Islamists” never sought to seize political 
power in Jordan. They always remained predominantly a realist pro-democratisation 
movement that never really opposed the regime. On the contrary, the Brotherhood even 
had a positive influence on placating the riots that broke out in the kingdom after the 
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rise in the cost of living in 1989, and during the increase in tuition fees that led to 
student revolts in 1984 and 1986 at Yarmouk University; a cooperative attitude that 
resulted in them being bestowed with the title of “loyal opposition” (ibid.)..  
 
Among many Palestinian refugees in Al-Wihdat, the Brotherhood and the Islamic 
Action Front – its political arm – filled the political and social gaps left by the PLO’s 
incapacity to sponsor its supporters and allies. This officially registered Jordanian 
political party and moderate reform movement became the main representative body in 
Al-Wihdat. Here, Al-’ikhwān came to run a variety of organisations such as sewing 
centres, orphanage programmes, and associations providing financial and material aid to 
the poor, especially during the holy month of Ramadan 86. The influence of the Islamist 
movement on youths in the refugee camps is particularly significant. This reflected in 
part the Islamists’ focus on grassroots education and youth initiatives (Hart 2008), 
especially after the vacuum left by the diminishing influence of the PLO’s various 
factions, which was mostly filled by organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The camp youth clubs are a notable example: once firmly in the hands of various 
factions of PLO, they recently fell under the influence of Al-’ikhwān.  
 
Kullu nafs ishi’ (it’s all the same thing) 
 
In Jordan, despite the initial popularity enjoyed by the Brotherhood, Islamic groups and 
movements have not thrived in recent years. A clear sign of this trend is given by the 
results of the recent national parliamentary elections. Having gained 17 seats in the 
previous election, the movement had to deal with an unexpected and disappointing 
result in 2007 elections: it secured only 6 seats in the 110-member parliament and lost 
important cities that it had previously held, such as Irbid and Zarqa87.  
 
The waning popularity of such parties has multiple causes. The mild opposition of the 
Brotherhood towards the government, and its alleged association with members of the 
regime, certainly played a role. According to a report by the International Crisis Group 
                                                        
86For comparative literature on Islamic grassroots politics, see Jenny White’s study of Islamist 
mobilisation in Turkey (2007).  
87According to the Brotherhood, the defeat was instead caused by the involvement of the state in large-
scale election rigging (Ryan 2008).  
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in 1993, “Youths were angered by steps to normalize the relations with Israel and felt 
abandoned by Jordan’s mainstream MB which refuses to clash openly with the 
government over this issue” (in Larzillière 2008, p. 9). Al-’ikhwān were also widely 
accused of nepotism for backsliding into tribal dynamics and logic in their policy 
making. This denunciation, as Larzillière points out, “is all the more problematic for 
them as part of the support for Islamists […] indeed relies on their challenging of 
community management. They notably strengthen the position of youth with regard to 
that of the elders by claiming a higher religious legitimacy” (ibid). In addition, the 
discrimination systematically exerted by the government on its members eventually 
contributed to the delegitimisation of the movement. Indeed, since the decline of the 
left, Al-’ikhwān has “become the main target of the strategies of co-optation and 
exclusion from the government” (Krämer 1994, p. 278). In 2006, for example, the 
government curtailed a large part of the Brotherhood’s grassroots activities by closing 
the Islamic Centre Charity – the main means through which the movement operated in 
civil society.  
 
Although they were still quite popular, political sympathy for the IAF and Muslim 
Brothers was also rapidly decreasing in Al-Wihdat. Many in Al-Wihdat were overtly 
critical of the bland opposition of the Brotherhood to the government. When a well-
known sheikh (man of faith)88, affiliated with the Brotherhood, came to the Camp to 
give a speech on the holy places in Islam, the main atrium of the Nadi Al-Wihdat – 
where this kind of event was usually held – was crammed with people. The speech was 
an occasion for denouncing the alleged attempt by Israel to demolish Al-Aqsa Mosque. 
It was a widespread belief in the Camp that the true goal of the archaeological 
excavations implemented by the municipality of Jerusalem in the proximity of the 
famous mosque was not to find the temple of David, but, rather, to erode the 
foundations of Al-Aqsa, causing it to collapse. The sheikh was encouraging a mixed 
audience to act. Adopting a seemingly proven rhetoric, he reproached Arabs for their 
inactivity, stating that it was not the duty of Western countries to intervene in Arabs’ 
                                                        
88
 In Arabic, “sheikh” is an honorific appellative that can be literally translated with “elder”. It is 
commonly used to refer to a tribal leader or a spiritual guide such as an Islamic scholar. In Jordan, the 
term was popularly associated with people who were deemed to be well versed in Islamic practice and 
knowledge. I decided to loosely translate the term with “man of piety”. The term and its significance in 
the camp will be analysed in greater detail in chapter 5. 
142 
 
 
own affairs. Arabs, he claimed, had two goals: a long term goal that consisted in a 
united war, like that at the time of Saladin, to take back Jerusalem; and a more 
immediate goal that involved the need to foster worldwide public awareness for what 
was happening in Palestine. Despite the inflammatory vocal style of the performer and 
the “righteousness” of his arguments, the majority of my friends were not enthusiastic 
about the speech. As one friend put it, “he’s like the other Muslim Brothers, he says that 
we have to fight but then he adds ‘not now’ and ‘maybe later’, and they don’t do 
anything to change al-wade‘ [the political situation]”.  
 
Furthermore, I often heard people lamenting the nepotism and despotism of Al-’ikhwān, 
who were said not to tolerate any organisations and groups in the Camp other than their 
own. Many in Al-Wihdat criticised in particular their attempts to monopolise 
humanitarian action (especially through zakat and youth-based programs) as a political 
tool to serve their own interests. Rumours were circulating, for example, about some of 
the charitable activities implemented by Al-’ikhwān, most notably the “orphan 
program”. The Brotherhood gave 10 dinars to children in the Camp on a monthly basis. 
According to my friends, behind the unselfishness of this noble gesture lay a deeper 
intention to create a constant dependence (“so they can tell to everybody, and everybody 
knows that they have given money to them”). Providing support to children in need was 
just, they said, a self-interested way of strengthening and improving the visibility of the 
organisation, and, even more perniciously, to ultimately provide themselves with a more 
resilient electoral base.  
 
As a consequence of such disaffection with the Brotherhood’s political strategies and 
social activities more generally, many refugees had also ceased their involvement in the 
various social institutions under the control of Al-’ikhwān, such as the youth and orphan 
centres. One such person was Omar, a friend who I first met as volunteer in the orphan 
and youth programme (burnāmej al-shabāb) run by the Nadi Al-Wihdat. Confronted by 
one of the managers of a youth club affiliated with the Brotherhood – where he was 
spending some of his free time – and asked to make a choice between them and the 
Nadi, Omar opted for the latter, commenting on his decision as follows: “I did not like 
the fact that the ’ikhwān tell you what to do and how to do it!!” 
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Echoing the general disaffection with political parties and the ruling class in Palestine 
(see also Allen 2009, Kelly 2008), the distrust towards the Brotherhood was also 
extended to other Islamic groups. Hamas, germane of the Brotherhood in Palestine, had 
lost much of its appeal amongst camp dwellers. Disguised behind the empty words 
(haki fadi) and boastful statements of its leaders, the weakening of Hamas resistance in 
Palestine was often explained to me as a result of their hidden intention of coming to 
terms with Israel. In addition, Hamas was also widely blamed for having lost a clear 
agenda by engaging in what most saw as a sterile conflict with Fatah.  
 
So, rather than being said to be made up of pure and pious people, many people in the 
Camp claimed that, like any other political party, those who stood on an Islamic 
platform were no less dirty or corrupt. In the mind of people, rather than being a sign of 
purity and morality, the alleged strict observance of Islamic standards allowed the 
supporters of these groups to conceal the immorality of their own real goals. 
 
The despicable nature of the political  
 
The allegations of corruption and dishonesty that increasingly characterised people’s 
perceptions of parties that were once represented as the solution to the Palestinian 
political issue, fostered a sense of despair among Palestinian refugees in Al-Wihdat. 
This sense of despair led many to depict politics as a treacherous domain of life, 
dangerous at best. However, not only politics and political parties, but everything that 
refugees perceived as being “political” was represented as intrinsically treacherous and 
dangerous89.   
 
“Treason” (khyāne) was spoken of as being endemic to the political. There was a 
veritable concern in the Camp for rumours, for secrecy, and for secret services. It was 
part of this obsession with treason. This is hardly surprisingly. In a situation where the 
boundaries between loyalty and betrayal were blurred by the fundamental ambiguity 
between Palestinian-hood and Jordanian-hood, the fear of treason erupted violently as a 
consequence of the anxieties of not being able to clearly define who is who 
(Thiranagama and Kelly 2010, see also Appadurai 1998). As politics was the arena in 
                                                        
89
 In chapter 6, I will also explore how “the political” is thought of as being fundamentally boring.  
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which the tension between competing acts of loyalty was most frequently re-enacted, it 
was hence perceived as especially corrupt and deceptive. On the occasion of the 
parliamentary election held on 9 November 2010, for example, rumours circulated 
about people who gave their vote to pro-government runners from the Camp in 
exchange for favours and money: traitors who make deals with traitors, I was told. Not 
surprisingly, many of my friends were extremely cynical about the outcomes and the 
benefits of the forthcoming elections (intikhābāt):  
 
“I’m not going to vote for anybody… It’s the same thing, nothing will change” claimed one. 
Similarly, another, pointing at the banner close to the Nadi Al-Wihdat, said: “izbaleh [trash]… 
they are for the government [pro-governmental candidate], it’s a well-known family in the 
mukhayyam, they are the ‘Cauz’, they are disgusting [beghsu]! Once, one of them, the head of 
the family, said on television that Palestinians who criticise the government should leave the 
country”.  
 
Also, the rise and fall of groups and people was often accompanied by allegations of 
being corrupt, of collaborating with the “enemy”, or even of being a spy (jāsūs). As we 
have seen, this mechanism was well exemplified by the descending parabola of Fatah, 
Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood. These political groups – considered by refugees 
one of the main champions of their rights – fell into disfavour amongst many as a 
consequence of the allegedly corruption of its members and their seemingly collusion 
with the Jordanian or Israeli government90. The label of being a spy or a traitor was 
indiscriminately attached to everybody, and refugees from the Camp were even more 
liable to fall into the category than “outsiders” such as myself. But, again, accusations 
of treachery were extended to everything that was perceived as potentially political, and 
not simply to politics and politicians. For example, in Al-Wihdat, rumours circulated 
about people who sold their refugee cards. Many believed that beyond this was a 
scheme planned by the Americans and the Israelis: purchasing refugee cards in 
exchange for money and, ultimately, forcing people to sell themselves out, become 
traitors (khawana) and renounce their “right of return” or compensation.  
                                                        
90
 This belief was widespread to the extent that even Arafat was not immune to similar allegations. There 
were even people who told me that the leader of Palestinian resistance was a “mustarab”: literally “fake 
Arab”, the term was used to indicate a Zionist spy trained since the childhood to speak and behave as 
Palestinian. 
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Because of its treacherous character, however, the political was also perceived as being 
dangerous. As a matter of fact, outside the domestic sphere, Palestinian refugees from 
Al-Wihdat did not speak about politics: real or imaginary threats made such 
conversations hazardous to say the least. Political conversations would have exposed 
someone too overtly to the “spectre of treason” (see Thiranagama and Kelly 2010). 
Tales about political collaboration and complicity with the Jordanian secret services 
circulated frequently in the Camp. Evoked by the tension between resistance and 
integration, the seeming ubiquity of mukhābarāt (the secret service) filled the anxieties 
and fears of refugees. As such, refugees sought to avoid engaging with dimensions of 
the political discourse in Jordan that were liable to bring to the surface the underlying 
tensions between Jordanian-Palestinians and Transjordanians. “Ethnicity”, for example, 
was one of these dimensions. I still remember the general uneasiness I provoked when, 
on the occasion of a trip to Aqaba91 organised by the burnāmej al-shabāb (youth 
programme) in the Nadi Al-Wihdat, I asked a man whether he was a Bedouin. That day, 
the children and the adults of the Nadi were frantically working to prepare for their 
imminent departure. Some were gathering luggage outside the Nadi. Others, instead, 
were putting the luggage on top of the two vans that would take us to Aqaba. Everybody 
was doing something. Close to the vans were the two drivers. One of them was “pure” 
Jordanian – a friend whispered in my ear the word “bedū” (Bedouin) to indicate with a 
subtle sarcasm his allegedly Jordanian “authenticity”. Awkwardly, I exclaimed “ah, you 
are bedū!” My friends stopped talking and the man suddenly stiffened, replying to my 
curiosity with a sharp “yes”. Something seemed to have annoyed him. Later on, my 
friend reproached me, warning me that this was not a proper topic of conversation, 
especially in the presence of Palestinians, and even more so in a refugee camp. As the 
tribal discourse in Jordan was deployed by a specific branch of Transjordanian 
nationalism to support claims of authenticity, asking someone in a setting such Al-
Wihdat, where the construction of ethnicity is intertwined with social and political 
differences, about their origins was a way to invoke the antagonism between 
Transjordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians, and expose the latter to accusations of 
treachery (see also chapter 2). 
 
                                                        
91
 Aqaba is a coastal city located in the south of Jordan. 
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To conclude, as Kelly writes, “[i]t is not just the unknown that produces apprehension 
[about treason] but the all too knowable” (2010, p. 171). As people were all too aware 
of the dilemma that had to face as refugees of “a state to be” and citizens of Jordan, they 
were also conscious of the fact that virtually everybody and anything could have been 
guilty of treachery against the nationalist struggles and collaboration with the Jordanian 
government (el-hukūme). In this context, accusations of treason should be seen not as 
the marking of difference, but as the exposing of similarities between Jordanians and 
Palestinian refugees. The political – because of its agonistic nature (Spencer 2007) – 
was what best exposed the ambiguities and contradictions that emerged when the aim to 
live an “ordinary” and integrated life in Jordan clashed with their urges to fulfil 
nationalist ideals. Not surprisingly, the large majority of my informants in the Camp 
sought to distance themselves from the corrupt world of the political (see also Hansen 
2002, Lerche 1995, Ruud 2001, Spencer 2007).  
 
ISLAM AND RESISTANCE 
 
Islam, not politics! 
 
While politics and the political were largely perceived as ineffective and corrupt, 
attention to Islamic morality and discipline instead played an important role in the daily 
lives of refugees in Wihdat. 
 
When Hussein came into the main atrium of the Nadi Al-Wihdat, he signalled to me to 
follow him into one of small rooms of the Club. Here, on Fridays, the Department for 
Children (lejne al-atfāl) in the Nadi held a programme for young men and orphans 
(mainly) from the Camp, run weekly by voluntary workers. Sitting behind a small desk 
at the right-hand corner in front of the entrance, Hussein was teaching a class of 
children of various ages the difference between Islamic and “pre-Islamic time” 
(jāhilīya). Nearly twenty children aged between six and twelve were sitting around him, 
arranged in five rows of plastic chairs. “Islam” was part of the curriculum of the 
programme, which also included educational and leisure activities. As far as my limited 
understanding of Arabic at the time allowed me to grasp – the event took place at the 
beginning of my fieldwork – Hussein seemed to be a good teacher: the children in his 
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class looked particularly enthusiastic, spoke only when he questioned them, and when 
he did this they were always eager to answer. Over the course of the class, I was struck 
by the recurrence of the name “Abbas”; it was reiterated several times by Hussein. I 
hence asked him in English at the end of the lesson whether the “Abbas” he was 
referring to was the Mahmood Abbas, who at the time of my research was the president 
of Palestine and a prominent member of Fatah. He promptly answered: “no, not at all! 
Mahmood Abbas is wati [a bad person/a miserable person]! I was talking about Abbas, 
the relative of the Prophet. Not Mahmood Abbas!” The clarity with which Hussein 
dismissed a Palestinian political leader from a party that had established its headquarters 
in Wihdat in the late 1960s, reflected the attitudes of many camp people: their growing 
disappointment with and contempt toward Fatah and its leadership were also coupled 
with a growing appreciation of distinctively Islamic symbols and rituals. Hussein then 
continued: “Political leaders are bad, and Palestinian politicians are even worse. […] A 
decent person [muhtaram] does not get mixed up with politics today […]. Did you 
notice the difference between my father and Adnan’s father? My father has never 
mentioned Palestine, he just talks about Islam!” He was referring to an evening we had 
spent at the house of a companion few weeks earlier when Adnan’s father – a fidāʾī 
during Black September – spent a great deal of time exposing his views on the current 
political situation in Palestine and its causes. In contrast, in Hussein’s house the 
Palestinian question was never raised in the course of the whole dinner. Hussein’s father 
– whose pious commitment gained him the appellative of sheikh – was not the only one 
to think in this way. By refusing to engage in what they perceived as the muddy and 
treacherous world of the political, many refugees found a life project in the cultivation 
of a pious self.  
 
Likewise, the general disaffection toward politics and politicians did not lead refugees 
to unthinkingly embrace radical forms of political commitment. The role of the so-
called Islamic movement in the political sphere has generated anxiety amongst a 
Western audience worried about the politicisation of Islam and the rise of movements 
fundamentally opposed to democracy (Huntington 1996). Writing on the issues seems 
to assume, however, that the delegitimisation of the Muslim Brothers and other 
moderate Islamist groups in Jordan is likely to contribute to the radicalisation of their 
ex-supporters and sympathisers (Larzillière, Ryan 2008), especially amongst the most 
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destitute subjects such as the Palestinian refugees living in camps (Al-Khazendar 1997, 
see Rougier, 2007, for a similar argument in Lebanon). A friend’s answer to my 
interrogation as to whether he was a Salafist abruptly brought to my attention the 
foolishness of certain questions and how little esteem was given to political groups in 
general. “No, I’m Muslim”, he answered, cutting my questioning short. He then paused 
for a moment reflectively before continuing: “I don’t care about the Muslim Brothers, 
Hamas, Salafists or anybody else, I just take what I like from them, and I leave the rest”. 
Like him, the vast majority of people I met did not think of themselves in terms of being 
“Salafi”, “Islamist”, or “reformist”. Although Islam was important in the daily life of 
refugees, the majority of people I met did not identify themselves with a particular 
political group or movement. Untying Islam from the political was, for many, a 
necessary step in preserving the righteousness and purity of their faith.  
 
The “turn” towards piety involved a moral regulation of everyday life (Hirschkind 2006, 
Lambek 2000, Mahmood 2005). Going to the mosque, performing salāt (ritual prayers), 
and abstaining from practices deemed to be immoral, such as stealing, drinking, flirting, 
lying, and watching pornography, were said by my informants to strengthen Islamic 
values and pious forms of morality (Allen 2006). This was perhaps best reflected in 
prayer. The very large majority of people I met during my research in the Camp extolled 
the virtues of praying five times a day, preferably in a mosque. The benefits that – I was 
told – people could obtain from praying were great. The five prayers were a considered 
a boundary between morality and immorality. Many people told me that they became 
real Muslims only when they started to pray every day. For my friends, the realisation 
of the moral self had to pass through submission to God, and the performance of daily 
prayers was a fundamental way to reach this accomplishment (Mahmood 2005, cf. 
Simon 2009). But this style of religiosity also involved careful conduct with regard to 
dress and language. Many people strived to adopt a distinctive jargon92. This was most 
immediately evident in common patterns of greetings, now replaced by Islamic 
locutions. An Islamic style of dress for men and women was highly valued. Actions 
were often considered according to an Islamic moral code, and the appropriate moral 
stance to some questions of personal behaviour was sometimes the object of passionate 
discussions.  
                                                        
92
 See chapter 5. 
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In what follows (and in the next chapter), I will explore in greater detail how refugees 
sought to construct an ethical self by means of daily practices. What it is important here 
is that they had taken active steps to distinguish piety from what they refer to as the 
corrupted and dangerous domain of the political. Obviously, it would be arduous to 
track a commonality of intention in relation to Islam: while for some, Islam was not be 
mixed up with politics, for others the religious and the political were inextricably 
linked, despite many believing that the former comprised the latter. However, what 
virtually everybody agreed on was that Islam had nothing to do with contemporary 
politics and, most importantly, that the cultivation of a pious self was a moral project 
and not a political endeavour in itself. So, if properly followed and performed, Islam 
was perceived as a stronghold against the anxieties and troubles of life, a source of 
happiness that would provide the believer with internal peace for the whole of his life, 
and even afterwards. As a friend once told me, “people should not waste time with 
politics […] Islam is the best thing [’āhassan ishi] […] when my father died, he looked 
happy; you could see the serenity on his face. When he died it was as if he was flying 
towards God […]. He was a good Muslim [muslim mlīh]. This is the way people should 
live”.  
 
Piety and nationalism 
 
The cultivation of a pious self brought Palestinian nationalist ideals into the ordinary. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, since Black September, the Jordanian state had shown 
little tolerance for any form of political militancy in the Camp. If the depoliticisation of 
refugees was a requirement for their integration in Jordan, refugees did not generally 
oppose this project, preferring the prospect of living an ordinary life to the idea of 
becoming engaged in politics. In this context, the cultivation of a pious self was a 
project that favoured this process of integration. Along with a good knowledge of 
Islamic doctrine, being pious was defined in terms of a set of qualities and obligations – 
such as diligence, studiousness, and commitment to fulfil the practical obligations of 
kinship – that were often perceived as more desirable then engaging in overt forms of 
political militancy and resistance. At the same time, although Islam was not perceived 
as a strategy for achieving political goals, the cultivation of a moral self allowed camp 
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dwellers to hold on to the ideological imperative of Palestinian nationalism. Feeling 
betrayed by political organisations in Palestine and Jordan, for refugees, steadfastness in 
faith was what they fell back on, but also what they needed to make sense of their lives 
and exile in Jordan.  
 
Most of the people I met shared a concern for what they described as the increasing 
erosion of a pious disposition at the present time. According to them, the consequences 
were tangible: the corruption of values was the root of their moral, practical, and 
physical problems. Floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters were God’s 
punishments for the immorality of Muslims all over the world. For many, the plight of 
Palestinians was the consequence of God’s wrath. Governments and political parties 
were equally, if not more, guilty for being careless of Islamic precepts and moral 
conduct. As Abu Omar once pointed out: “the problem is not only people […] there are 
many good Muslims […] the problem are the governments! The governments do not 
care about Islam; they just want seats […]. When they start to follow Islam properly, we 
will finally be able to get Palestine back!” Only a return to the proper way of being 
Muslim, the Islam of the Prophet, would finally achieve lost unity. Indeed, Islam was 
the key to overcoming division and uniting every Arab Muslim under the flag of Islam, 
as it had been during the time of the Prophet or Saladin. Islam was widely said to 
eventually leading to the eviction of the evil (shitānī) forces – Zionism and Western 
imperialism – from Palestine. As another friend put it, “you see, Luigi, at the time of the 
Prophet the Muslims managed to take control of Palestine against overwhelming 
forces… they were hundreds, the enemies were thousands, but Mohammed – may Allah 
honour him and grant him peace – won against them […]”. If Islamic prescriptions and 
norms acted as prevention against various threats – especially political menaces – the 
task of every Muslim was to organise everyday life according to Islamic doctrinal 
principles and moral precepts.  
 
In line with his belief, Abu Omar aimed to strengthen pious disposition and promote 
education amongst the youths of the Camp through the burnāmej al-shabāb (children’s 
programme).  
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The burnāmej al-shabāb 
 
As on almost every other Friday morning, shabāb gathered in a semicircle along the 
lines of the penalty area of the big football pitch on the first floor of the Nadi Al-
Wihdat. In the middle, a young man was conducting the voices of the others as the 
director of an orchestra would. The youths first sang a song about Palestine, they then 
recited the first sūra of the Koran, and they concluded with a song on the Islamic holy 
places of Jerusalem (al-quds). This was the beginning of the programme, the goal of 
which, according to what Abu Omar said, was to “keep the children (atfāl) off the street 
... by teaching them about Islam and Palestine”. The programme was relatively popular 
in the Camp – running every Friday morning from 7:30 am until the call of the muezzin 
for the noon prayer (zuhr), and attracting around one hundred children and adolescents. 
After the prayer, the rest of the morning was taken up with educational and sporting 
activities. Arranged in three groups, each headed by a tutor, children were educated on 
different themes, mainly revolving around “Islam”, “sport activities” (nashāt riādī), and 
“Palestine” (nashāt watanī, literally “national activities”).  
 
A fundamental part of the programme was to tutor the youth on the basic tenets of Islam 
and Palestine seen as two connected topics. This was not only carried out by means of 
educational activities – such as classes on Islamic and Palestinian history – but through 
songs, trips, and leisure activities such as quizzes and sketches. Occasionally, for 
example, trips were organised to take the children to Aqaba (the only coastal city in 
Jordan) or even to Mecca for a pilgrimage (‘umra). The children also had a vast 
repertoire of songs about Palestine to perform. Most of them recounted the heroic deeds 
and suffering of their counterparts in Palestine. Other songs were instead about the 
beauty of their homeland. Much time was also given to listening to CDs of sermons by 
preachers from Saudi Arabia – such as Sheikh ibn Baz– discussing issues and problems 
affecting daily life. I have also attended a number of sketches and dramas staged by the 
children under the supervision of the educators. Both songs and sketches suit the task of 
teaching children about Islam and Palestine. One of these sketches, for example, re-
enacted the eviction of Palestinians by Zionist forces: a person was sitting alone until a 
stranger decided to sit in the same chair. The first person moved over slightly and let the 
152 
 
 
second share the same place. But the newcomer was not satisfied, and kept pushing the 
first person out until he was alone on the chair.  
 
The memory of exile and the suffering experienced from the establishment of Israel to 
the siege of Gaza were continuously re-enacted and re-narrated through these activities. 
Also, the questions asked by Abu Omar and the other tutors took this direction: “when 
was the Balfour declaration signed?” or “when did the intifadas start?”. Children were 
not only given classes on the history of the Palestinian issue, but the programme also 
lent them DVDs that they could keep in their home and watch for a period of three days. 
The goal was to raise awareness about what was happening in Palestine. These DVDs 
showed images of violence and the suffering of Palestinians, depicting events such as 
the atrocities committed during the II intifada and the siege of Gaza by the Israeli army 
since 2007. But they also showed acts of resistance and guerrilla warfare: Palestinian 
fighters, women, men, and children facing tanks, armed with stones, and sometimes 
carrying weapons.  
 
To Abu Omar and the other ’ustāza (educators), the burnāmej had to truly serve as a 
barrier against immoral dispositions and attitudes, educating children towards good 
conduct. Those, who did not comply with this model – who cursed, drank, took drugs, 
stole, and in general whose behaviour was deemed not pious – were made to feel 
unwelcome and ultimately thrown out of the programme. A case in point was the ritual 
pilgrimage to Mecca (‘umra) periodically organised by the lejne al-atfāl. The journey 
was supposed to last ten days and was, for the children of the programme as well as the 
educators, an irresistible opportunity to improve their faith and have fun in the company 
of their friends. However, a few weeks before leaving, the educators met to debate the 
case of two youths who were said to be cultivating immoral dispositions such as 
watching pornographic films, swearing, and smoking cigarettes. After a long discussion, 
they all agreed to let one of them join the group on the trip and to leave the other at 
home. What led to this resolution was the fact that, while the boy who would be allowed 
to join them on the trip was “new” to this immoral behaviour, the other had been 
accused of such behaviour in the past and showed no sign of reforming.  
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FLAWS OF PIETY  
 
Striving to be ordinary 
 
In Al-Wihdat, many refugees had certainly sought to ground Islamic principles within 
the concrete context of life. Islamic doctrine and belief were instruments of moral self-
improvement. As we have seen, they helped refugees to make sense of their exile and to 
uphold the Palestinian struggle for national sovereignty in the context of a growing 
dissatisfaction with the political. However, if refugees’ interpretation of and adherence 
to Islam were not defined by the rigid dogmas of militant groups, neither were they a 
perfectionist project of self-discipline. In order to understand the complexities and 
nuances of refugees’ political consciousness and agency, we need an appreciation of the 
ways in which refugees dealt with this project of ethical self-fashioning amidst other 
conflicting demands and desires. In their everyday life, camp dwellers more or less 
successfully balanced Islamic moral regulations with, for example, the ideal of romantic 
love or the desire to have fun. This ambiguity was not necessarily problematic. As 
Samuli Schielke writes, “often it can be rather comfortable, allowing people 
considerable leeway of action as long as one practices due consideration to avoid open 
conflicts and scandals” (2007, p. 22). In Al-Wihdat, if the performance of a virtuous life 
was a goal in line with the ideal of resistance and, ultimately, Palestinian nationalism, 
refugees adapted this project to the need of living an ordinary life. 
 
The very large majority of Muslims I met in and outside the Camp were neither 
unreflectively conditioned by any sūra of the Quran nor by a sermon by any particular 
preacher. For example, very few people in Al-Wihdat were said to be Jihadi Salafists or 
members of similar groups, whose followers my friends generally referred to as takfīrīn. 
In keeping with a rigid interpretation of Islamic sources, these people were said to lash 
out not only at those who worshiped or followed religions other than Islam, but they 
also openly attacked those Muslim regimes who allegedly fail to uphold Islamic law. 
For the takfīrīn, for example, the Jordanian regime is kāfir (apostate, pl. kuffār) and, 
hence, subject to violence (Wicktorowitz 2000). For Wicktorowitz, there is a split in the 
Salafi movement in Jordan between reformist and jihadist factions. On one side, there 
are those who believe that armed struggles against other Muslims require absolute proof 
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of their apostasy. As this certainty is rarely available, jihad against other Muslims is not 
permitted. On the other side, there is the jihadi group, “which argues that even if a 
regime practises Muslim rituals, any failure to uphold Islamic law marks it as 
unbelieving and therefore subject to violence” (Wiktorowicz 2000, pp. 223-224). These 
people, however, did not constitute the bulk of “Muslims” in the Camp, but represented 
an exception. According to my friends, one of the direct consequences of their lack of 
understanding was their strict and unreflective reading of the Quran, which prevented 
them from understanding that the jihad involves diverse forms and must be not taken 
literally. According to one friend, takfīrīn are a bunch of “narrow-minded people” 
(muta’assebīn) who “read that a good Muslim should do jihad, and they would take a 
machine gun and go straight (ala tul) to the closest police station to kill people”93. 
 
Being a “good Muslim” (“sheikh kwayes” or “muslim mlīh”) was hence something that 
was open and subject to interpretation. In the Camp, people had their own specific ways 
of being pious, adapting it to the context and to their circumstances, facing failure and 
inconsistencies. I met people who were notorious for settling disputes through the use of 
butterfly-knives, who explained to me that they were good Muslims because they 
abstained from drinking alcohol and smoking hashish. People carried on their lives 
without caring too much if there were contradictions in their way of being a “good 
Muslim”. For example, I heard Mohammed and his brothers stating many times that the 
problem with Arabs is the fact that they have lost their way. Mohammed, for example, 
told me that “people pretend to be Muslims but then everybody drinks and just goes to 
pray on Fridays. See my brother Fadi” turning to him, “he only prays on Fridays!” Fadi 
did not say anything; he acquiesced to his brother’s rebuke, and, shrugging his 
shoulders, added:  
 
“there are people who go to the mosque every day but they steal and do not care about others 
[...]. And there are people who think that to be a good Muslim you need to have a long beard 
and dress like the Prophet used to. But the Prophet dressed like that because that was the way 
people dressed at that time. If Prophet Mohammed came now, he would dress like people do 
now”.  
                                                        
93
 According to Wiktorowitz (2007), the jihadi tendency within the Jordanian Salafi movement claims 
that the Hashemite state is kāfir (apostate) for its failure to uphold Islamic law, and therefore subject to 
violence. 
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On another occasion, I was catechised for a couple of hours by a friend of Mohammed 
on the advantages of becoming a Muslim. He did not understand why I would not 
convert to Islam. In his eyes, my refusal to convert was incomprehensible: “yes I know, 
you are not Muslim! Bas leshenta ma tislam [why don’t you convert]?!”. He was 
determined to make me change my mind. He began to list the benefits of being a 
Muslim and the joy he derived from it. Eventually, we ended up talking about the 
significance of Ramadan to good Muslims and the blessings that came from it: 
“Ramadan is an important time for Muslims that helps people to relax, get stronger, and 
become better people […] You see, Luigi, I really think you should convert”. Given his 
self-confidence, I was quite surprised to find out that he was not fasting during 
Ramadan: “I mean [i‘ani] … I smoke, I curse… there’s no point in doing Ramadan”. 
Likewise, I was also constantly reminded by friends that Ramadan was intended to 
teach Muslims about patience, humility, and spirituality. At times, however, the 
modesty and frugality of Ramadan was replaced by a consumerist binge. A veritable 
trade flourished behind the spirituality of the month. Small stands, street sellers, and 
peddlers mushroomed before and during Ramadan, shops remained open until very late, 
and the consumption of food and soft drinks skyrocketed.  
 
Camp dwellers’ lives were fraught with these inconsistencies and ambiguities. 
However, the seeming duplicity in refugees’ behaviour was not an example of refugees’ 
hypocrisy; it was rather the demonstration of their capacity to navigate the complex and 
contradictory demands of everyday life. 
 
Inconsistencies and conspiracy 
 
At times, however, inconsistencies between a pious ideal and other conflicting demands 
triggered profound fractures within the self and became a source of great frustration. 
 
Much recent scholarship has demonstrated that people do not inhabit moral states 
unproblematically, but that they might experience contradictions and inconsistencies in 
living a moral life (e.g. Ewing 1997, Marsden 2005, Masquelier 2001, 2005, Schielke 
2012, Soares 2005, Soares and Otayek 2007). Living an ordinary Muslim life in Al-
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Wihdat did not necessarily result in feelings of calm and harmony. Conversely, being 
“ordinary” – or not being able to live a fully moral and thoughtful Muslim life – was 
often a source of deep stress and anxiety, fraught with situations that overtly 
contradicted the ideals of piety. 
 
In Al-Wihdat, contradictory and conflicting aims were entailed in the performance of an 
ordinary life – such as the desires both to live by the Quran and to pursue “illicit” fun by 
drinking, getting high, or having premarital sex. When ordinary aims contradicted 
refugees’ moral convictions, people were confronted with considerable anxiety 
(Schielke 2012). The experience of the failure to inhabit a moral space has ultimately 
affected the way in which refugees accommodate the impetus to carry out extraordinary 
existences within their need to live an ordinary life. In other words, the anxieties and 
frustrations associated with the impossibility of accomplishing a full moral self 
increased refugees’ sense of marginalisation and discrimination, as well as their despair 
vis-à-vis the political situation in Palestine. 
 
While my friends despised Salafi activists for being tied to political organisations and 
groups, they drew heavily on the conception of Muslim personhood and a “literalist” 
understanding of the Quran advanced by those who are often labelled as Salafi. Islam 
was perceived as an irrefutable and perfect set of directives and preventions that left 
little room for interpretation and compromise. Many of my friends believed that people 
should strive to return to earlier forms of Islam, most notably from the time of the 
Prophet and his companions. They therefore sought to embody those virtues, forms of 
thinking, and ethical capacities that they perceived as having been forgotten by present-
day Muslims94. However, people in the Camp were often torn by their incapacity to 
comply with a rigid, but fascinating, interpretation of Islam. Salāt was a case in point.  
 
As I mentioned in the previous section, many people celebrated the five daily prayers as 
truly distinctive of a pious self. In the Camp, the apathy and laziness of those Muslims 
who did not perform the daily prayers were widely condemned. I often heard people 
claiming that they experienced a sense of tranquillity and peace through their 
                                                        
94For recent work on Salafi Islam in Jordan, see Wiktorowicz (2007) and Caillet (2011); for comparative 
literature in the area, see Wiktorowicz (2001) among others. 
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submission to God during salāt. There was much in this that recall Gregory Simon’s 
observation in Minangkabau, Indonesia, about the importance of Islam in the life of the 
people (2009). According to Simon, “[a]lthough the practice of prayer may thus serve as 
a vehicle through which such contradictions can be challenged, and sometimes even 
transcended, it may also be a vehicle through which the intransigence of these 
contradictions is more directly experienced” (ibid. p. 259). Also in Al-Wihdat, despite 
the importance of salāt, many people neglected to pray. Hussein, for example admitted 
that he, like many others, frequently failed to accomplish the whole set of prayers. And 
when questioned about the reason, he confessed that although it was a source of 
comfort, waking up very early in the morning to pray or going to the mosque every day 
was exhausting. His inability to fulfil the perfection inherent in this ideal, especially 
when it was exposed by my direct questioning, fuelled at times a great sense of 
discomfort and failure among my friends.  
 
Likewise, a strong sense prevailed in Al-Wihdat that people had become more attentive 
to Islamic precepts and doctrine, and that this was a very good thing for their struggles 
for national sovereignty. Still, the inhabitants neither felt that they were any closer to 
achieving their political goals, nor thought of the Camp as a better place to live. My 
friends used to repeatedly say that it was not a good time for Islam. According to many, 
the immorality of the present time was the emanation of internal and external threats: 
the Arab immorality and the corruption exerted by the Western world. The moral 
weakness of Arabs – who might curse, drink, take drugs, engage in prostitution, cheat, 
fight, and exploit each other – and the attempts by Western governments and pro-
Western Arab regimes to corrupt the souls of Muslims, were the root of their moral and 
political problems. If the biggest world powers could not breach the defences of a group 
of Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, this was because God rewards true believers. A 
pious life was also rewarded by political success “because God helps good Muslims”. 
The examples were countless, stretching from the past to the present time, from the 
example of the Prophet to the Afghan wars and the resistance of Zarqawi in Iraq. But, 
apparently, Palestinians were still very far from the right path, and their immorality was 
most evidently expressed in the ongoing occupation of Palestine by Israel. As a friend 
once told me, venting his bitterness after having seen the news of an Israeli air strike in 
the occupied territories, “Muslimīn beghsu assa [Muslims suck nowadays], Luigi! We 
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lost Palestine because we were not good Muslims; we cannot get back Palestine because 
we are still bad Muslims”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to contribute to the wider goal of the thesis by addressing the 
role played by religion in fashioning the identities and political thinking of my 
informants. In so doing, I have demonstrated how an “ordinary way of being Muslim” 
has come to provide refugees with a new life project and an alternative and more viable 
way than politics to fulfil nationalistic goals and aspirations.  
 
In so doing, I have first shown how the growing importance of Islam in the Camp 
cannot be described as part of a broader trend of Islamic politics sweeping through the 
Middle East. Support for Islamic groups and parties was about more complex issues 
than refugees unthinkingly adhering to allegedly global forms of Islamic radicalism. 
This complexity was partly the reflection of the ways refugees sought to inflect Islam 
with nationalist meanings, and vice-versa. The continuities between Islamist and 
national-secularist discourses in the Middle East have been thoroughly explored by 
scholars in the last two decades throughout the world (e.g. Keddie 1998, Roy 2004, 
Zubaida 2004) and amongst Palestinian refugees (see Khalili 2007). I have 
demonstrated how Islamic and nationalist discourses were clearly entangled in Al-
Wihdat at the time of my fieldwork.  
 
This, however, has not resulted in a straightforward militancy of camp dwellers in 
Islamic parties and movements. Refugees were particularly critical of these groups, for 
which adherence to Islam and proper conduct among politicians and political parties 
were said to have given way to a cruder, more direct, and often embarrassingly 
shameless desire for power, office, money, and recognition. As I have shown, people in 
Wihdat camp were much more concerned with the attempt to cultivate a moral self than 
join a militant Islamic group. Islam was interpreted by many as a project of ethical self-
fashioning. But it also provided refugees with the material for the reinterpretation of the 
cultural parameters of their world. Camp dwellers’ efforts to keep Islam separate from 
the dangerous and dirty world of the political was not meant to suggest a complete 
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withdrawal from Palestinian nationalism into an isolated and bounded space of piety: 
the sacredness of national sentiment found its expression through militancy in Islamic 
political parties, movements, and organisations. Nationalist ideals were made possible 
by seeking to carry out an ordinary life in Jordan. By linking their faith to a broader 
political and social context, many in the Camp extolled the virtues of living an Islamic 
life as a stronghold against the political menaces of international neo-colonialism.  
 
At the same time, however, I have avoided framing refugees’ piety as a perfectionist 
project of self-discipline. Specific forms of ethical self-fashioning cannot be always and 
easily separated from the complexity of social life. In this sense, refugees’ religiosity 
reflected their attempt to carry out an ordinary life. For many in the Camp being 
ordinary was as important as the impetus towards self-perfection or adherence to a 
strict, reform-minded Quranic form of Islam or Islamic purification. In other words, if 
the performance of a virtuous life was a goal in line with the ideal of resistance and 
ultimately Palestinian nationalism, refugees have adapted this project, more or less 
consciously, to the need to live an ordinary life. The cultivation of a pious self in the 
Camp was captured more adequately in ordinary ways of being Muslim – “Islam 
mondain” (Soares and Otayek 2007) – where the multiple demands and desires of living 
life were not always consistent with this ideal. Camp dwellers’ critical capacity to 
interpret Islam enabled the uneasy accommodation of ideals of resistance and desires of 
integration. 
 
The next chapter follows the nexus between piety, ordinary life, and political agency 
focusing on the performance of masculinity among the young men of Al-Wihdat.  
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CHAPTER 5: ORDINARY MASCULINITIES 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE CAMP AS A “WILD PLACE” 
 
Either as the expression of immoral behaviour or unthinking radicalism, youth 
masculinity in the Camp was widely perceived inside and outside camps as threatening. 
Taking as its starting-point scholarly discussions on gender and nationalism, this 
chapter seeks to document the role that the performance of masculinity plays in relation 
to the political subjectivity and agency of youths living in Al-Wihdat. 
 
At first sight, the articulation of the seemingly paradigmatic forms of masculinity I 
encountered in Al Wihdat seems to fit academic accounts that emphasise the inherent 
hegemonic dimension of certain styles of manhood (Connell 1987). Masculine virtues 
such as male assertiveness, steadfastness and bravery were doubtless central to the ways 
in which Palestinian nationalism was imaginatively enacted and constituted in the 
Camp95. Palestinian nationalism was hence re-enacted in Al-Wihdat through the 
performance of seemingly dominant models of masculinity. This is not a new theme in 
anthropology: the contribution of the discipline to the study of gender has been 
conspicuous, to say the least. The discursive construction of masculinity has been a 
central theme of investigation in a well-established body of scholarship that has 
explored the role of gender in the imaginative and material production of the nation (e.g. 
Kandiyoti 1991, Kimmel 2006, McClintock et al. 1997, Mosse 1996, Mostov 1999, 
Parker 1992, Povinelli 1999, Yuval-Davis 1997, Yuval-Davis et al. 1989). Studies have 
also acknowledged the dynamism and plurality of masculinity and challenged rigid and 
static conceptions of manhood, shedding light on the production of masculinity in 
relation to diverse forms of nationalism and to a variety of factors such as ethnicity, age, 
and class.  
 
Having emphasised the fictitious character of traditional forms of masculinity, a 
growing scholarship has looked at the different factors that have contributed to the 
reconfiguration of masculinity amongst Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (e.g. 
                                                        
95
 It should also be noted, however, that in Palestinian nationalist discourse, the military and heroic 
masculinity of the Palestinian fighter has been partly replaced in recent years by the celebration of “pity” 
and “suffering”, whose main locus is the body of women and children (Khalili 2007). 
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Jean-Klein 2000, Massad 1995, Peteet 1994) and, more specifically, in Jordan (Hart 
2008). In doing so, these studies have also consistently drawn on the notion of 
“hegemonic masculinity” proposed by Connell in his book, Gender and Power (1987). 
They have thus investigated the process of national construction especially in relation to 
the production of a specific style of masculinity that takes shape against allegedly 
subordinate forms of masculinity, most notably those associated with “homosexuality” 
and “womanliness”. In a recent article on the construction of masculinity in Hussein 
Camp96, for example, Jason Hart shows how the instantiation of a dominant model of 
masculinity – typically associated with male assertiveness, over-toughness, and 
independence – was interwoven with the performance of Palestinian nationalism (2009). 
The author notes also that while this worked well to assert refugees’ enduring national 
identity, a hyper-emphasised Palestinian masculinity in Jordan was unlikely to be the 
most obvious goal to pursue for the transition to manhood in Jordan. Expressions of 
male potency identifiable with a distinct national identity would have irremediably 
signified marginalisation outside the camps (ibid.).  
 
My findings dovetail with these studies but only up to a point. As I will show, the 
display and performance of specific manly values was central to the reproduction of 
Palestinian nationalism in Al-Wihdat. However, to understand the intertwining of 
nationalism and gender in the Camp, the notion of “hegemonic masculinity” remains 
inadequate. When I conducted my fieldwork in Jordan, I noticed that there was not a 
simple division between ideal or hegemonic forms of masculinity and those that were 
subordinate. Rather, young men were engaged in performing a life that was not 
consistently in line with any broad category97; they were aware of the complexities of 
their daily lives and adapted their understandings of being a Palestinian man in exile to 
those realities. In this sense, we have to recognise the flexibility of Middle Eastern 
conceptions of masculinity, rather than simply thinking of camp-dwellers as frustrated 
males who strive to achieve an ideal form of masculinity in the context of a camp life in 
which their masculinity is constantly violated. Most importantly, I argue that 
categorising the multiple expressions of masculinity that I have encountered in the 
Camp as either “hegemonic” or “subordinate” would implicitly reproduces the 
                                                        
96
 A Palestinian refugee camp in Amman, a few kilometres away from Al-Wihdat. 
97
 Other scholars have shown more criticism toward this conception of masculinity; see for example 
Magnus Marsden (2007)  and the Osellas (2007).  
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underlying assumption in much scholarly work on Palestinian refugees’ political 
agency, framed in the terms of “irreducible resistance” versus “passive domination”. 
Although some authors have acknowledged the coexistence of different masculinities 
within the same individual (e.g. Hart 2008), their accounts continue to suggest a binary 
understanding that points to some form of duplicity in refugees’ agency: while certain 
male virtues such as male assertiveness and independence are ideally associated with 
resistance and political agency, others like diligence and compliance would point to 
integration and normalisation in the host country. What can be lost in similar accounts is 
that refugees in Al-Wihdat have continued to reproduce their allegiance to Palestinian 
nationalism despite or because of the performance of those traits of masculinity that are 
reconcilable with a process of assimilation, such as being diligent, responsible and 
reliable (muhtaram). 
 
In Jordan, exploring the ambiguities and complexities inherent camp dwellers’ 
performances of masculinities is all the more important because young men from the 
camps were widely held to be unruly and violent. I argue that the stigmatisation or 
stereotyping of men from the refugee camp (mukhayyamji) was part of a process of 
“othering”, in which the mukhayyamji’s masculinity was represented as a symbol of 
cultural and political difference, and the failure of camp-dwellers to embrace 
assimilation. Similarly to Ewing’s argument in relation to Muslim immigrants from 
Turkey in Germany in Berlin, Palestinian refugees from Al-Wihdat were imagined 
“through the lens of a socially shared fantasy that forms the context through which their 
visible attributes are noticed and interpreted” (2009, p. 3). This fantasy locates the 
camp-dweller as a stigmatised or, at best, stereotyped “other”. Notably, as Ewing points 
out, “even when a minority is granted full legal rights, these collective fantasies can be a 
source of basic challenges to the possibility for full cultural citizenship” (p. 6). An 
exploration of how the stigmatisation of camp-dweller masculinity has been used as a 
strategy to manage refugees and consolidate Jordanian national identity goes beyond the 
scope of my thesis. In this chapter, I will instead focus on how refugees have sought to 
challenge these stereotypes and pursued integration through the performance of 
masculinity, and how this performance was also orientated through the reproduction of 
Palestinian national values and ideals.  
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To understand these dynamics, the first two parts of this chapter will be an investigation 
into the main stereotypes associated with camp residents’ masculinity through an 
analysis of two paradigmatic models of masculinity, which I term here “dawanji” 
(trouble-maker) and “sheikh” (man of piety). Dawanji and sheikh’s masculinities have 
at times been ideal ways through which Palestinian nationalism has been re-enacted 
through the display of specific manly values. As we will see, these ideals of masculinity 
shared common features, being both models of resistance and steadfastness. Whereas 
adherence to Palestinian nationalistic ideals of resistance and steadfastness were 
exhibited through aggressiveness and over-toughness in one case, it was sobriety and 
austerity at stake in the other. It would be tempting to interpret the manly virtues that 
both types of masculinity have respectively embodied in the Camp as the primary and 
genuine way through which young males re-enact the ideal and values of Palestinian 
nationalism. Careful scrutiny, however, will collapse common stereotypes about 
adolescents and young men in the camp. Refugee masculinity was articulated towards a 
more mundane and ordinary project rather than being inspired by subversive ideals and 
performances. I intend to explore the ability of refugees to accommodate nationalist 
models of masculinity within their desire to live an ordinary life as citizens of Jordan.  
 
The third part of the chapter will hence document how apparently diverse and 
irreconcilable types of masculinity converge in the performance of what I call “ordinary 
masculinity” (Marsden 2007). With the term “ordinary masculinity”, I refer to the 
capacity to manage, but not fully comply with, a wide range of different yet 
intertwining masculine registers, which are also adapted to the mundaneness of daily 
life. I argue that the performance of an ordinary masculinity is the key in which refugees 
infused Palestinian nationalism with daily interests and needs, and what ultimately 
made possible the performance of a “Palestinian national masculinity” (Massad 1995) 
that is fully adapted to the facts of their exile. Finally, I will conclude this analysis by 
documenting fractures in the performance of masculinity. This does not refer to camp 
dwellers’ inability to conform to a specific model of dominant masculinity, but rather to 
their incapacity to reconcile the diverse masculine registers that constitute what I have 
defined as “ordinary masculinity”. This can be caused by a number of interlocking 
factors that range from refugees’ failure to come to terms with the facts of their exile to 
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the very impossibility of performing an ordinary masculinity because of the marginality 
and discrimination that many of them have faced in Jordan. 
 
IDEALS OF MASCULINITIES IN THE CAMP  
 
Lasting representations 
 
“Dīr balak fil wihdat [be careful in Al-Wihdat], it’s a dangerous place”, I was in few 
occasions reminded by friends who were genuinely concerned about my safety – mostly 
Jordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians who never lived in the camps. This was the type 
of image that people “from outside” (min barra) commonly held on camps 
(mukhayyamāt) and camp dwellers (mukhayyamjiyye).  
 
I have a clear memory of the first time I met the head of the police station of Wihdat, 
during a meeting in which I was seeking approval for doing research in the Camp. The 
man was sitting in his armchair, and his short legs barely touched the floor of his office. 
Swinging them up and down, he complained about the problems and troubles of his 
work, while a sizeable plasma screen television in front of him was showing a local 
soap opera:  
 
“My job is very difficult. Here there are any sorts of crimes! ... Kullu, kullu [everything]! Drugs, 
stabbings, homicides, prostitution, fights ... kullu, kullu! Especially in the summer because 
people get out of their houses and they give vent to their frustrations. [...] Unemployment and 
the poor condition of infrastructure aggravate the situation. [...] Yes, you can say so, the Camp 
is much worse than the surrounding areas. It is a dangerous place!” 
 
Such stereotypical depiction of the Camp and those who lived in it were especially 
powerfully and consistently articulated by the authorities and wealthy people of both 
“Jordanian” and “Palestinian” backgrounds. However, it was not uncommon to hear 
such ideas in poorer areas of Amman as well98. These images played an important role 
in constituting a Jordanian national identity. As Ewing writes, “the identity of the 
                                                        
98
 Not to mention Transjordanian nationalists who see camp dwellers and Palestinian refugees in general 
as an internal threat. 
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national subject, that is, of one who fully belongs to the nation as one of “us”, rests on a 
discursive process in which others are defined as “not us” (2009, p. 3).  
 
In Jordan, however,things were more complex. As we have seen, not only did refugees 
enjoy full citizenship rights, but the large majority of them lived outside camps. 
Regardless of generational, economic, and social differences, refugees from camps (min 
al-mukhayyamāt) and those living outside all identified themselves as belonging to the 
same category: that of the Palestinian refugee (al-laje' al-filastīnī). But this bond of 
communality was fraught with ambiguities and complexities. Because of the symbolic 
significance of the “camp” (mukhayyam) in the Palestinian national discourse, as well as 
the economic and socio-economic differences between camp and non-camp refugee 
communities, Palestinian refugees living outside camps tended to be both critical and 
appreciative of the camps’ inhabitants – imagined as unruly individuals and 
romantically perceived as genuinely embodying Palestinianess in exile (Farah 1999, 
Pérez 2011). Either way, however, the “camp dweller” continued to be popularly 
depicted as being incapable of fully belonging to the Jordanian nation. For example, one 
of the people who was most zealous in his attempts to persuade me not to  carry out 
research in Al Wihdat was Abdel Rahman, a Jordanian-Palestinian who worked as a 
driver and whose father spent some time in Al-Wihdat after leaving Palestine in 1967. 
So strong was Abdel Rahman’s contempt for Wihdat that not only did he warn me of 
the risks of being stabbed by the violent youths who crowded the Camp – he even 
feared that, if I stayed in the camp for too long, I too could end up behaving like a 
mukhayyamji (camp dweller):  
 
“I promise, Luigi, if you keep going to Al Wihdat, you will become a dawawīn (troublemaker). 
[…] When I was working as a taxi driver, I used to go there. But every time either people were 
already drunk or wanted to go somewhere, to a night club (nadi leili) for example, to get drunk 
or even worse. I remember last time I was there [in Wihdat] I almost had a fight with a man. He 
was drunk and he asked me to drive him somewhere where he could buy alcohol. When I 
refused he became aggressive. I told him to ‘please get out of the taxi’ and he started shouting. I 
had to tell him several times to go away and only after [I insisted] he finally went away. But 
after that I said to myself, ‘khalas’ [that’s it], this is the last time’”. 
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Al-Wihdat and Palestinian refugee camps in general were often portrayed by 
“outsiders” and the authorities as hubs for unruly and violent individuals (mushkalgie). 
This belief was accompanied by the idea that camps were epicentres of an apparently 
renewed fascination with strict Islam: gender segregation, a visibly higher number of 
veiled women (muhajjabāt), and the past popularity of Islamic political groups (see 
chapter 4) – especially Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood – were used as proof of the 
camps’ inherent support for political Islam. Along with the allegedly conservative 
attitudes of its residents, poor infrastructure and poverty were widely held as being the 
causes of Al-Wihdat’s reputation as a wild place. It was argued, for example, that the 
camp residents’ radicalism was ultimately connected with the poverty and economic 
destitution that was believed to be rampant in these spaces. New generations were 
thought of as being affected in particularly acute ways by the camp’s “poverty”: seen as 
idlers and loafers (dawawīn), and a constant source of social anxiety, the youth were 
said to be responsible for a large share of the problems (mashakel) that afflict the Camp 
– from petty crimes such as fighting, theft, drug dealing, and feuds amongst families, 
occasional political demonstrations that burst out of the rhythm of political turmoil in 
Palestine, and political militancy, to their decision to embrace “wrong” and overly 
radical ways of being Muslim. Quite contradictorily, Al-Wihdat was widely thought of 
as being problematic because it was seen as both a place of immoral sinners and of 
Islamic terrorists (‘irhābiyyn). Youth from the camps were widely believed to 
contribute to the strength of any opposition in Jordan. So, if Al-Wihdat was known for 
being a place brimming with unruly individuals, this stigma was also associated with 
the widespread belief that young men and adolescents in the Camp were unthinking and 
ignorant conformists in the grip of Muslim fanatics. These stereotypes have eventually 
led some authors to question the very idea that camp dwellers might nurture a genuine 
feeling of identification with the Jordanian state (Al-Khazendar 1997, p. 35-36, see also 
Brand, 1995, pp. 149-150).  
 
Significantly, this process of stigmatisation has had powerful lingering effects on the 
camp dwellers themselves. Some people in the Camp spoke of these spaces in a manner 
that suggested they had internalised the images of the Camp as a space of immorality, 
violence and fanaticism that were so often articulated by “the outsiders”. Sara was one 
such person. At the time of my research, he was a mukhtār in Al Wihdat. He was born 
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in Palestine in the late ‘40s. Like many other old men in the Camp, he was critical of the 
tenor of life in the camp during the period in which I conducted fieldwork: “I remember, 
I was there [in the Camp] when they set up the first shelters [Al Wihdat had been built 
with shelters since the very beginning]. Life was very difficult but simple... in the mid-
fifties we had electricity, the first generators […]”. Sari continued by highlighting some 
of the ways in which life in the camp was easier now, yet that such ease was also 
connected with  many more problems of living there. In particular, the man depicted the 
Camp’s youths as one of its most intractable “problems”:  
 
“They are the shabāb of the Camp that cause many troubles here. They are 17-18 years old, fed 
up with their problems, with no jobs or money.  They say: ‘you [the Government] are 
responsible for my problems and you must do something! […] Many of them drink alcohol, 
smoke hashish, and take drugs [which in the Camp are often sold by coffee sellers and 
stallholders]. They are troublemakers [mushkalgie]! “ 
 
The manner in which Sari represented the youth as a one-dimensional source of 
immorality for other camp dwellers was not too far from the depiction given by the head 
of the police station of Wihdat or by Abdel Rahman just above. But are these faithful 
representations or rather caricatural images of camp youth? To answer this question, I 
will first proceed with an analysis of how these representations were narrated and, to 
some extent, performed by the young men and adolescents (shabāb) of the Camp. In Al-
Wihdat, these representations of youth found manifestation in the figure of the reckless 
street man (dawanji) and in that of the fanatical man of piety (sheikh) respectively. 
 
Dawawīn, violence and the street 
 
Scholars have documented in considerable detail the importance of violence – endured, 
narrated, or performed – to the creation and reproduction of masculinity in the Arab 
Middle East (see, most notably, Gilsenan 1996). More specifically, these themes have 
also been addressed in literature dealing with Palestinian experiences of the I Intifada 
(see, programmatically, Peteet 1994). Al Wihdat was notorious in Jordan for being a 
space of violence. Indeed, mainly in its urban and domestic forms, “violence” was quite 
widespread in the Camp. On walking into Al-Wihdat, it was quite common to see or 
168 
 
 
hear about a toshe (quarrel/fight). The narration of violence – perhaps more than its 
performance – was an important part of camp life. In any case, violence – narrated, 
exerted, or endured – was strictly intertwined with people’s understanding and 
enactment of masculinity.  
 
Feuds and clashes arose and died in the hara (neighbourhood). The street (al-shāra‘) 
was also the ideal place where people could either weaken or enhance their own 
reputation for being manly. Walking through the Camp, it was not uncommon to come 
across groups of adolescents and young men arguing or fighting over issues concerning 
respect and authority in the hara. There was much at stake, and the street was the best 
context in which to exhibit superiority over others, or to challenge local authority 
figures in a manner that also displayed one’s masculine bravery. Violent confrontations 
were quite limited during wintertime, a period of year during which people tended to 
stay in their homes. In contrast, the sultry heat of the summer pushed “refugees” outside 
of their houses and was also said to stir up their tempers. Often, quarrels were prompted 
by ordinary issues such as car crashes, economic competition, or neighbourhood 
jealousy. At other times, brawls arose over homing pigeons, family matters, women, or 
daily “misunderstandings”. In some cases, the dispute generated a feud that ended up 
involving also the extended families, leading to an escalation of tensions that often 
culminated in bloody confrontations. 
 
 
Figure 17: children playing in the street (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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Figure 18: children and shabāb in the street (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
While camp dwellers often spoke of Al-Wihdat as being a homogenously violent space, 
at other times they recognised that certain areas had a worse reputation than others in 
terms of the behaviour of their inhabitants. Shāra‘ liddawi and the alleys that radiate 
from it were one such case: these alleys were widely thought of as being an especially 
poisonous environment. Many of the camp dwellers I spoke to explained this in terms of 
the high concentration of troublemakers (dawawīn) and gypsies (nawari/ghajarīn) who 
lived in this area of the Camp: they were deemed to corrupt the morality of its people, 
especially the youth.  
 
The street and the hara were a laboratory and a testing ground for young men who want 
to fully embody a specific model of masculinity. The display of violence was frequently 
said to be a prominent feature of a model of masculinity best embodied by the figure of 
the dawanji (sing. of dawawīn). The word “dawanji” may be roughly translated as 
“thug”. It was generally used to refer to trouble-makers inside as well as outside camps. 
Although there were dawawīn everywhere in Jordan when I conducted my research, the 
traits associated with this figure referred to a “hostile” attitude toward the authorities 
that was believed to be distinctive of refugees from the camps (mukhayyamji). Because 
of the irreducible hostility that the term evoked, being dawawīn in Jordan was fraught 
with ambivalence. The word had doubtless taken on in recent time a clearly negative 
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connotation, and those who complied with this ideal-type commanded little support in 
or outside the Camp. The very origin of the name is synonymous with idleness. In 
Arabic, the word shares the same root as dīwān. If the dīwān is the place where men 
meet with other men to chat and discuss, the dawawīn are those who do not work and 
pass their time idling in the company of their fellows. With the same commitment the 
pious people in the Camp would show to their devotion, these men exhibited a similarly 
strong appetite for women, independence, male assertiveness, and transgressive 
behaviour. They would organise their time around forms of sociability such as drinking 
and drug consumption that “mainstream” attitudes in the camp would hold as being 
“immoral”. They would hang around the streets of the Camp, play shadda (cards) or 
videogames in the games rooms, “talk dirty” (biseb), or simply lazily stare at the 
homing pigeons performing their aerial tricks from the tops of the houses. Generally 
speaking dawawīn were said to be idlers who wasted their time doing nothing. 
However, at the time of my fieldwork, being dawawīn could still be a source of pride. 
People who conformed to this model – who used the very term “dawawīn” to refer to 
themselves – were not ashamed of this label and displayed, with a certain degree of 
pride, the features associated with being able to act in such a way. As the word signified 
being tough, canny, and streetwise, some skills and dispositions related to this ideal type 
were still appreciated as a mark of being genuinely from the camp. 
 
Dawawīn were also recognisable by their outward appearance, notably the ways in 
which they combined distinctive dress patterns and particular aesthetic features. The 
dawawīn sometimes had long hair, and displayed their tattoos and a specially-grown 
long nail on their little finger with pride; they often dressed in a shabby way, wearing 
worn jeans, dirty t-shirts, and tattered tracksuits, but occasionally combined these with 
garish garments like studded shoes or belts with brash metal buckles. Haircuts and 
styles of dress were not the only way to perform, display, and enact this identity. 
Tattoos were also quite common, especially amongst dawawīn. There were certain 
recurring patterns, ranging from the evergreen flaming heart on the bicep to nationalist 
slogans. Many dawawīn, for example, sported three stars/points that sketched out the 
shape of a triangle on the back of their hands between the thumb and the forefinger. 
Each point or star implied a word: three points for a three word sentence that means 
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“kuss ‘ukhtāk el-hukūme!”99. Furthermore, dawawīn were also identifiable by being 
referred to by specific nicknames (algāb). Giving nicknames was a fairly common 
practice in the Camp. People were often named after objects, animals, or famous people 
that had or may have had some connection with aspects of their character, physical 
appearance, or “deeds” performed in the past. For example, tall people might be called 
shajara or silam, which respectively mean “tree” and “stairs”; a man could be named 
“hit” (wall) for his stoutness and strength. Dawawīn would often earn nicknames such 
as “bonduqiyye” (shotgun) for their violent behaviour 100.  
 
However, the best way to recognise a dawawīn, I was told, was by the scar left on his 
cheek by the knife of someone like him. In many cases, violence was etched on their 
faces in the shape of diagonal scars as memories of past vengeances. Sometimes 
violence was also self-inflicted. One day, for example, my friend reported to me, 
shaking his head in visible disapproval, that a man who was questioned by a police 
officer in the Camp began screaming and cutting himself with a razor blade, carving 
deep cuts into his flesh from his shoulders to the bottom of his chest. Although he 
eventually managed to escape, his behaviour was more a symbolic display of strength 
for public consumption than a practical way to escape control.  
 
As scholars less drawn to the Cartesian dualism between body and mind have 
demonstrated (see for example Das 1997, Mahmood 2005, Wacquant 2004), the body is 
not only a blank canvas for the inscription of culture but also a site where the individual 
is defined and social relations are negotiated. Self-harming and tattooing the body must 
be located within the same sphere of meaning that makes these acts not only plausible 
but also sensible (Desjarlais 1997, p. 233 - 234). With regard to self-harming, for 
example, the anthropology of violence and medical anthropology have shown that 
violence and suffering are never simply acts of speechlessness, nor are they simply 
relegated to the individual sphere, but they belong to the domain of intersubjectivity 
(e.g. Daniel 1996, Feldman 1991, Makdisi and Silverstein 2006, Peteet 1994, Scheper-
Hughes 1992, Taussig 1986). Michael Gilsenan traces how narratives of violence 
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 Loosely translated as “fuck the government”. 
100
 The study of nicknames has attracted the attention of diverse scholars (see Vom Bruck and Bodenhorn 
2006). For a notable study of nicknames in Jordan as a device of social control, see Antoun (1968); on the 
use of nicknames among criminals, see Gambetta (2009, chapter 7). 
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emerge out of social negotiations amongst actors with different access to symbolic and 
material resources (Gilsenan 1996, cf. Briggs 2007). In this sense, the strength of a story 
depends on the character of the storyteller and the historical context in which it is 
narrated. In a recent publication on communication codes amongst inmates in the USA 
and elsewhere, Gambetta argues that apparently senseless and violent behaviour follows 
a rational logic. In this sense, the dawawji’s act of deliberately harming himself should 
be regarded as an effective signal through which a weaker actor seeks to avoid control 
and submission from a powerful one (the police officer) by communicating his 
dangerousness and fearlessness (Gambetta 2009, chapter 5)101. 
 
Shuyukh, piety and the mosque  
 
Shabāb in the Camp did not only establish their masculinity in the street and through the 
performance of violence, but their assertion of manly virtues also developed around 
religious practices and discourse (Ismail 2006). Having explored the dawawīn model of 
masculinity, I now turn my attention to another, apparently incompatible, style of 
masculinity: the “sheikh masculinity”. 
 
The exhibition of independence and transgressive behaviour did not find a sympathetic 
public among Sheikh Abu Omar and the other supervisors of the “Youth Programme” 
(burnāmej al-shabāb) at the Nadi Al Wihdat. In the course of our daily chats, Abu 
Omar often stressed the role that the peer group, and ultimately the environment play in 
the transition to social adulthood for many children:  
 
“Some boys become dawawīn, [while] others [become] good guys (muhtaramīn)... Family 
(‘ā’ile) and friends (’āsāeb) are decisive in pointing kids on the ‘right path’ (al-sirāt al-
mustaqīm) […] Ashraf, Ismail, and other shabāb are muhtaramīn, but they grew up in a very 
bad hara with friends that are no good […] Ashraf last year was also a very good student. He 
finished the year with a ‘7’ [his school mark]. But now his mother is complaining about him, 
she told me that he sits in front of the computer all day– perhaps even watching pornography– 
and he doesn’t want to do anything […] She cannot do anything because she is a woman on her 
own, and his [Ashraf’s] father is always absent because he works from morning until night”.  
                                                        
101
 For a criticism of Gambetta's rational actor approach, see Pettenkofer (2011); for a different reading of 
self-harming as a vehicle of communication, see Desjarlais (1997). 
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Notwithstanding studies that have problematised the categorisation of forms of 
masculinity as “dominant” and “subordinate” (most notably Marsden 2007, cf. Connell, 
1987), it would be tempting to define the dawawīn as being in opposition to the forms 
of masculinity adopted by the sheikh (pl. shuyukh). The division between these two 
models of masculinity recalls a pattern highlighted by other anthropological work 
conducted in the Arab Muslim world (see for example Ismail 2006, Martinez 2000) that 
points to some of the ways in which the path from youth to adulthood involves young 
men being confronted with the choice to join either “the party of drugs” (hizb al-zalta) 
or the “party of the mosque” (hizb al-jami‘). In Al-Wihdat this choice led to young men 
either becoming a dawanji or a sheikh. Sheikh in Arabic has a wide range of meanings. 
At the time of my fieldwork, those people who strived to adopt a style of life consistent 
with Islamic piety and had a broad knowledge of Islamic doctrine were popularly called 
shuyukh, regardless of any affiliation with a particular political group. As a matter of 
fact, in Al-Wihdat, almost anyone who exhibited a groomed long beard, a sombre 
haircut, and a dishdāsha102 was generally referred to as being a sheikh. Whereas the 
dawawīn were synonymous with intemperance, ignorance of Islamic precepts, and 
immorality, the word sheikh was often associated with moral dispositions, especially 
piety, humbleness, and sobriety. The term was also related to wisdom and knowledge. 
Most notably, a sheikh would strive to develop a style of living that reflected the 
example provided by the Prophet Mohammed in his life103.  
 
A nexus of spatial context and moral characteristics were also included in this style of 
masculinity. Games rooms, pool rooms, and the street were primarily the domain of the 
dawawīn, where young men would gather to chat, be idle, and watch women passing. In 
contrast, shuyukh would spend their time working, praying, spending time with their 
family, and studying the Quran, preferring the mosque to the street. What is striking 
here is the spatial dimension of moral personhood: the perceived deficiencies in 
people’s morality and immoral forms of masculinities were widely accounted for by 
others in the camp in terms of the time spent on the street. In other words, more than the 
failure to conform to Islamic values, it was al-shāraʿ (the street) that played the key role 
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 An ankle-length garment with long sleeves, similar to a robe. 
103
 For an analysis of the importance of figures of the Islamic tradition in the process of self-fashioning, 
see among others Deeb (2009) and Tugal (2009).  
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in a man’s moral degradation. Along with family and friends, for Abu Omar, the 
mosque and the Nadi could also be helpful in keeping adolescents away from the street 
and, ultimately, from immoral behaviour more generally. As we have seen in the 
previuos chapter, Abu Omar and the other educators (’ustāza) in the burnāmej al-
shabāb sought to educate young people to be studious and to adhere to Islamic 
teachings and practices by recurring to a number of teaching methods, most notably 
lecturing and peer-teaching.  
 
 
A further domain, in addition to those of space and the body, in which the expression 
and performance of pious forms of masculinity were especially visible is that of 
language. The recurrence of certain verbal locutions marked someone as dawawīn – like 
“‘ard ‘ummi”, which literally means the “honour of my mother” – and others were 
frequently adopted by shuyukh and pious Muslims – such as the spasmodic reiteration 
of “al-hamdulillāh” (praise to Allah). Because of its rudeness and the large amount of 
cursing and abuse shouted aloud such as “kuss ’ukhtak” or “kuss ’ummak”104, the 
distinctive linguistic style adopted by dawawīn would not be appropriate for a “true” 
sheikh. In this sense, the importance of Islam was also reflected at the level of daily 
language. Many words that were pointed out to me as the proper traditional manner for 
greeting someone or give one’s condolences, I later found out, had only been adopted a 
few years earlier. Great appreciation was put on a man’s linguistic refinement, and a 
complex etiquette regulated a wide system of salutation. The specific way to address, 
honour, and greet people was highly valued amongst refugees as a sign of cultivation 
and politeness, and a standard of civility indispensable to being a good Muslim. 
Shuyukh and pious people put a great deal of importance on the polite style of Islamic 
speech to adopt depending on the circumstances. This display of politeness played a 
significant role in shaping a pious masculinity in contrast to the unruly and ignorant 
dawawīn. For example, I was told that salāmtak (health be with you) was not the best 
way to address someone who sneezes. The term, which had commonly been adopted as 
an act of courtesy toward someone who was ill until recently, was replaced by the 
Islamic locution “yarhamuk allāh” (may Allah have mercy on you). If a non-Muslim 
were to sneeze, the best choice of words would be “yadī kum allāhu wa yaslih ba 
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 Literally, the “pussy of your sister/mother”. 
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lākum” (may Allah give you guidance and make your children pious). The pattern of 
courtesy, however, demanded that this formula followed the ever-present “al-
hamdulillāh” (praise to Allah), a phrase pronounced by the one who sneezes 
immediately after sneezing. The courtesy exchange would then conclude with 
“yarhamuna allāhu wa iyyakum wa yaghfiru lana wa lākum” (may Allah have mercy on 
us and you, and may He forgive us and you), which is the proper answer to “yarhamuk 
allāh”. A few years earlier, I was told, people would have simply said “sahha” (health) 
and answered “shukrān” (thanks). Similarly, formulas and locutions to celebrate or 
congratulate someone – for example a bride and groom – or to offer condolences for the 
loss of a relative have been replaced by alternative Islamic expressions.  
 
This way of speaking was connected by many to piety and refined manners (ādāb). As 
such, speaking was not only an index of the moral qualities of single individuals: for 
many people, the social dimension of language made it a general index of the moral 
fabric of society. To them, the lack of ādāb (civilised manners), most clearly expressed 
in the street jargon of the dawawīn but also in the more austere language of secular 
everyday life, was symptomatic of the moral and political decline of Jordanian society 
as a whole, described as corrupted and not genuinely Islamic (see chapter 4). 
Conversely, by striving to adopt a distinctive jargon and a proper etiquette, my friends 
sought to pin down an Islamic moral code into the fabric of everyday life: at once an 
ethical and political endeavour105. 
 
FROM DAWAWĪN TO SHUYUKH 
 
From resistance to idleness 
 
“A toshe! [quarrel/fight]”, Fadi warned me, pointing at a police van in the middle of the 
road that was drawing the attention of a growing crowd of people. The van was parked 
in front of a small alley that led from the main road into the maze of alleys in the camp. 
It was clear that something was happening there, because people were darting out from 
the small alley onto the main road like steam escaping from a pressure cooker. “It is 
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 For a similar and more in-depth analysis of the moral (and political) bearing of language on Muslims 
in Pakistan, see Rollier (2010); for comparative work on ādāb in the Middle East and in South Asia, see 
respectively Schielke (2009) and Metcalf (1987). 
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always like this”, Najjar commented, “when [the weather] gets hotter in the summer, 
there are always more problems”. In the Camp, it was a commonly-held opinion that 
this seasonal shift in the performance of violence was coupled with another temporal 
change: the gradual decrease of the number of dawawīn, whose behaviour was said to 
be the source of many problems.  
 
The unfolding of masculinities in the camp can be narrated historically. “There was a 
time in which the dawawīn were muhtaramīn [honourable men]!” people sometimes 
told me. There was, indeed, a time in which Jihad – who had spent some time in an 
Israeli prison in the 1960s – did not mind displaying the huge “Palestine” tattooed on 
his right forearm. When I conducted my fieldwork, the situation had significantly 
changed and the man felt awkward with his allegiance engraved on his body: “I’m not 
young anymore and Wihdat is different now… before there were a lot of dawawīn in Al 
Wihdat, and I was one of them… life fil mukhayyam [in Al-Wihdat] was more intense 
in the past. But now I don’t want people to think I’m a dawawīn106”. If in the past the 
demonstration of independence and hostility towards authority had served to reinforce a 
distinctive identity as Palestinians, it later became a potential source of embarrassment 
for many camp dwellers. In the years preceding Black September, and in its aftermath, 
dawawīn instead fitted the ideal of active resistance. Many fidāʾīyyn (guerrilla fighters) 
were also dawawīn, and in refugees’ narratives, the two terms were often used to 
indicate the same kind of person. As long as the figure of the armed fighter embodied 
the ideal of resistance, dawawīn were highly praised and esteemed for their 
“quarrelsome” spirit. I heard many using the word muhtaram (honourable) to refer to 
former dawawīn. But the very same people would not have described them in the same 
positive way when I conducted my fieldwork.  
 
Since the late 1990s, with the political and symbolic significance of refugee camps 
progressively vanishing in the nationalist rhetoric of the PLO, and the “dream of return” 
gradually becoming a myth, the overemphasis on those traits that served to reinforce the 
distinctiveness of camps as separate and oppositional political spaces was unlikely to be 
the most obvious goal to pursue for the transition to manhood in Jordan (Hart 2008). 
Notably, the time in which there were most dawawīn in the Camp was before and 
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 The world “dawawīn” (pl. of dawanji) is often used for both singular and plural cases. 
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during Black September. Also, Nader – the owner of a game room equipped with a few 
PlayStations, which was informally called Al-Mahal (The Place) by its customers – 
confirmed the gradual diminution of dawawīn as a result of the control exerted by the 
government over the territory: “Before, there were famous dawawīn living here [shāra‘ 
liddawi], I knew at least five dawawīn that were living here and there [pointing in 
different directions]. But they all ended up badly: hanged by el hukūme [the 
government]!”. 
 
Such overt expressions of toughness and hostility were not only discouraged by the 
authorities, they were also no longer widely admired symbols of male assertiveness 
among camp dwellers themselves. Since the seventies, so-called revivalist religious 
discourses have played an increasing role in Jordan (e.g. Wiktorowicz 1999). For Hart, 
the progressive influence of Islamist groups in camps, such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
(al-’ikhwān), had a significant bearing on rearticulating camp ideals of masculinity 
around Islamic values and principles. The over-toughness of previous generations 
inspired less sympathy amongst young men, for whom instead “adherence to Islamic 
teaching and practice, studiousness, modesty and obedience seemed particularly 
admired qualities” (ibid. p. 11).  
 
As shown in chapter 3, local explanations also assumed that the rising cost of living was 
the primary cause beyond the disappearance of dawawīn and the “cooling down” of 
active resistance. The increasing cost of living in Jordan, the intensifying control of the 
government over the camp space, and the descending trajectory of secular nationalist 
discourse in Palestine stripped dawawīn of much of their political agency. Deprived of 
this capacity, those who remained dawawīn gained a reputation for being loafers, or 
even criminals.  
 
Conflicting masculinities, common features  
 
Heroic resistance aimed at subverting tyranny and overcoming imperialism are 
persistent themes both in Islamist ideologies and nationalist/liberationist discourse (see 
for example Khalili 2007, Roy 2004). As Laleh Khalili points out, “[i]n their national 
homes, Islamist movements were clearly entangled with the nationalist movements, 
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alongside or in opposition to which they often declared their being. […] Post-1967 
Islamists in the Arab states saw themselves as an alternative to the “failed” Arab 
nationalist project even as they borrowed its discourses, goals, and strategies” (2007, p. 
29). Building on the work of Khalili and others, in what follows, I want to show how 
interactions between Islam and nationalism were visible also at a social level in terms of 
the local ideas about and practices of masculinity. In this sense, it would be a mistake to 
see the two ideals of masculinity – dawawīn/ fidāʾīyyn and shuyukh – as the 
embodiment of contrasting and antithetical discourses. However, the differences 
between dawawīn and sheikh were not as marked as people claimed.  
 
First of all, many refugees who had been known in the past as “notorious” dawawīn had 
suddenly changed their beliefs and attitudes, becoming shuyukh: giving up drinking 
alcohol and taking drugs, changing their style of dress, and adopting a distinctive 
jargon. If the performance of “dawanji masculinity” was devoid of any political content, 
becoming de facto pointless and immoral if not dangerous, shuyukh gained prominence 
and acquired a popular following. According to my friends, Islam fulfilled the hope to 
pursuing a meaningful life, which had been left unfulfilled by the broken promises of 
secular nationalism. Religion replaced the latter as a way through which people could 
escape the idleness and boredom of dawawīn by giving sense to their life. If, for many 
of my friends, dawawīn were afflicted by boredom, pious believers were relieved of that 
by their faith: Islam gave people the possibility, I was told, of choosing between 
deviance and commitment, between boredom and fulfilment.  
 
Secondly, while dawawīn came to embody a less desirable and appealing style of 
masculinity amongst the refugee community, some of the features associated with 
dawawīn did not cease to exist but were inherited by the figure of the sheikh. In the 
camp, shuyukh came to embody a style of masculinity that was not only appreciated for 
its pious-based qualities – such as studiousness, modesty, and obedience: male 
assertiveness and virility were also part of shuyukh ways of being. Looking at a robust, 
bearded man, for example, a friend one day called my attention to the man’s imposing 
figure. With a self-satisfied tone, the man – whose father was a sheikh – pointed out that 
physical strength is as important a quality for these “men of faith” as their pious 
disposition.  
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The masculine self in the Camp came thus to be associated with the figure of the 
dawawīn, who exhibited his manliness through acts of courage and self-sacrifice. 
Despite obvious differences, shuyukh took the role of the fighter from the 
dawawīn/fidāʾīyyn and borrowed some of their manly qualities such as steadfastness, 
male assertiveness, and resistance. The display of this “new” type of masculinity often 
revealed antagonism either in relation to the Jordanian government, which was 
perceived as immoral and tied to Western imperialism. For example, when reflecting on 
how political change would come about, many people in the Camp mentioned the 
example of leaders such as Salah al-Din, who freed the Holy Land from the occupying 
forces with the power of his faith. Not surprisingly, many shabāb in Al-Wihdat were 
fascinated by the protagonists of the “Islamic Jihad”. Bin Laden, Zarqawi and others 
were highly acclaimed by some as pious fighters who were willing to give up their lives 
and wealth to fight for the freedom of Islam in a country far from their homeland. 
Shuyukh were the protagonists of the Islamic jihad, people who followed the example of 
the Prophet and also fought wars far from their homes. From this perspective, 
Americans, Israelis and their allies in the Middle East and North Africa persecuted good 
Muslims, those who sought to bring to an end the political, social and cultural 
subjection of Arabs to the yoke of the West. Islam and pious Muslims were considered 
by many in the Camp as a bastion against Western despotism. The act of self-sacrifice, 
which may have been involved in fighting a battle under the sign of “freedom” (hurīe), 
was held in high regard by some of the adolescents and young men in the Camp. The 
example was also given of Afghans’ pious life being rewarded even with political 
success, “because God helps good Muslims”. As a friend once said: “have you seen 
what happened in Afghanistan with the Russians, and now in Iraq and again in 
Afghanistan with the Americans? They have not still managed to conquer them! And 
why can the Americans not catch Bin Laden [at that time, Bin Laden was still on the 
run]? And why did they only kill Zarqawi after many years?!”. 
 
Often, it was more the fascination for the martyrs and the heroes of the so-called Islamic 
jihad than the adherence to the agenda of these groups that held appeal for people. 
When I asked Najar whether he liked Al-Qaida, he replied: “I don’t know… I can tell 
you that I like Osama Bin Laden a lot”. In fact, many in the Camp actively made 
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comparisons between Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Osama Bin Laden. One such a person 
was Sheikh Najjar, who told me on one occasion of his fascination for figures like Che 
Guevara and Fidel Castro107; others in the Camp displayed a similar appreciation of 
iconic figures who had stood against American despotism and Western imperialism. 
Najjar, however, sported a long beard and placed much emphasis on Islamic teachings 
and practices, and in doing so gained the title of sheikh. His fascination for secular 
heroes such as Che Guevara might at first sight seem at odds with his piety. This is less 
surprising if we consider that nationalist and liberationist discourse still have some 
influence on Islamist movements in the Middle East. The extent to which my friends 
borrowed the valorisation and militarisation of masculinity from nationalist and 
liberationist discourses is significant. According to Najar, indeed, “there is no difference 
between people like Osama and others like Che Guevara. They are both strong and fight 
for freedom against America […]. Osama in Afghanistan and Zarqawi in Iraq have 
fought for the freedom of Islam!” Dawawīn and shuyukh thus shared many more 
similarities than my friends were inclined to admit; the story of Bunduqiyye exemplifies 
this particularly clearly. 
 
Bonduqiyye  
 
During the time I spent in the Camp, my friends frequently pointed out to me people 
who were thought of being dawawīn yet who had radically changed their demeanour 
and appearance to become respected shuyukh. I asked many people what ultimately 
motivated this spiritual change and physical transformation for so many dawawīn. I was 
told that these people were referred to as living in darkness and ignorance (jāhilīya), 
disregarding Islamic precepts and doctrine until their gradual awareness of having 
wasted their time and energy doing nothing worthwhile finally roused them from their 
torpor. This change was said, sometimes, to motivate these newly reborn pious Muslim 
to engage in “noble and pious” undertakings, such as, for example, fighting for the 
freedom of Islam from the Western yoke in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, the figure of 
the avenger – a sheikh or someone who acts on God’s behalf, whose virtues lie 
especially in being capable of overcoming evil and unjust blasphemers in violent 
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 For comparative literature on the political significance of the commodification and transnational 
circulation of the images of Che Guevara, see Raman Parvathi (2009) 
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contest – recurred also in many other accounts. If taken singularly, the plot of such 
stories itself is not remarkable as it follows a quite standardized pattern: offence, fair 
punishment, overwhelming forces, and rightful victory. What is interesting in these 
stories, however, is that they introduce us to a specific ideal of masculinity, declined 
around the values of piety, power, and force. Notwithstanding the considerable appeal 
that similar stories might have held for some shabāb, very few people in Al-Wihdat 
were said to have left and ultimately fought in Iraq or in Afghanistan. The distance, the 
cost, the time, and the risk involved in such an enterprise apparently persuaded the large 
majority of these prospective fighters to abandon their warlike ambitions. Bonduqiyye 
was an exception.  
 
Bonduqiyye was aged, when I first saw him, in his late fifties. He was known for his 
outbursts of irrational violence in the Camp and for having been a thief and murderer in 
his youth: a reputation that gained him the nickname “bonduqiyye” (shotgun). As a 
matter of fact, I was never introduced to the man. Because of his wild behaviour and 
insanity, my friends dissuaded me from meeting him personally. Nonetheless, I came 
across him several times. He used to spend much of his time wondering the streets of 
his neighbourhood or sitting on the kerb and gazing at people in a rather bewildered 
manner. He was living in the area of the camp called wihdat al-taht (Lower Wihdat) – a 
southern hara relatively distant from the souk – next to the house of one of my friends, 
Hussein. It was here, outside his house, that I met him for the first time. After a quick 
exchange of greetings with him, my friend whispered to me that the man had the 
reputation for being something worse than a loafer: “you see this man, this is 
Bonduqiyye, and he was the king of the dawawīn [malik al-dawawīn]!” Hussein 
continued: “he was a dawawīn, the biggest dawawīn in Wihdat. He used to steal, drink, 
curse, and even kill. Then, he changed; he embraced Islam, and became a much better 
person. He started praying and respecting people, he stopped stealing and behaving as a 
dawawīn. Eventually, he decided to go to Afghanistan and fight with Osama Bin 
Laden… but he didn’t meet him [...] He met Zarqawi in prison, though” 
 
People in the camp disagreed on whether Bonduqiyye had been changed after having 
met Zarqawi in prison, or before. They all agreed, however, that, at some point in his 
life, the man dismissed “Western” trousers and a clean face to appear bearded and 
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dressed in jāllabiya. Apparently, Bonduqiyye adopted a style of life consistent with a 
Salafi revivalist understanding of Islam. This led to an abrupt break with his sinful past 
as he became a new committed person (multazim). The unexpected change was said to 
have had an all-encompassing effect in Bonduqiyye’s life. Pious discipline was hence 
not only applied to his style of dress, but also to the other dimensions of his everyday 
life. The perfectionist nature of this project led him to fulfil religious obligations, 
socialise only with people who were religious in the same way that he was, and give up 
his “career” as a thief and criminal. Bonduqiyye was also said to have pushed his 
commitment (‘iltizām) even further by deciding to travel to Afghanistan in order to fight 
against the American military occupation of the country in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September 2001. However, people less fascinated by Bonduqiyye’s pious 
change maliciously suggested that he never really changed and that what had pushed 
him to travel to Afghanistan was not a pious goal but rather his notorious violent 
disposition.  
 
Bonduqiyye was an established feature in the Camp’s landscape. Anecdotes and stories 
about him abounded in the Camp: a violent dawawīn, a brave sheikh, and an 
unpredictable majnūn (fool/insane person). “Now, he is old but before he was very 
strong [...]. Once, a gypsy passing nearby cursed God while Bonduqiyye was praying. 
Bonduqiyye finished his prayer, caught up with the gypsy, and beat him badly”. In 
retaliation, apparently, some hours later a large group of gypsies gathered in the streets 
of the camp looking for the offender. In a short time, a huge crowd of dawawīn gathered 
on the roof of the houses and began throwing stones and other blunt objects at the 
gypsies. Some of my friends, who participated in the clash, still laughed recalling 
Bonduqiyye pretending to be a sheikh and throwing a huge rock at his adversaries to the 
cry of “Allah Akbar” (Allah is great). In another story with him as the protagonist, a 
man from a Jordanian family from Al-Tafila108 cursed God. Bonduqiyye gave him a 
sound beating. The other members of the family tried to avenge the “disrespect” but the 
feud ended with the annihilation of the entire family.  
 
                                                        
108
 Al-Tafila is a town located 183 kilometres southwest of Amman, known to be inhabited predominantly 
by Transjordanian families. 
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The most consistent and widespread rumour was that upon his return from Afghanistan, 
Bonduqiyye was caught by the Jordanian mukhābarāt. Apparently, the secret service 
brutally tortured him with electric shocks to the degree that his mind was irremediably 
injured. Bonduqiyye never recovered from this encounter. After that, he ceased to be 
considered a pious man and was said to have returned to being a dawawīn. He was said 
to have become insane and irrational (majnūn). In fact, Bonduqiyye was unpredictable 
at best. On one occasion, for example, I saw him snatching a tray of mansaf by force out 
of the hands of one of the Egyptian employees of the catering agency in charge of 
providing daily distributions of food to the orphans of the Nadi during Ramadan.  
 
Bonduqiyye was also rumoured to be a takfīr109. For these reasons, I was told, he would 
have never tolerated the presence of an infidel (kāfir) like me. However, he was 
considered a serious threat for everybody in the Camp. Embracing what was described 
to me as an inflexible position, the man not only lashed out at “infidels” like me (kāfir), 
but also against other Muslims. What is interesting, however, is the low reputation that 
Bunduqiyye enjoyed in the Camp, also motivated by his radicalism. I indeed expected 
somehow that the fascination for models of masculinity predicated upon Islamic values 
and male potency would have inevitably led my friends to approve the extreme 
positions of the takfiris. However, rather than admiring his uncompromising approach, 
most of my friends called him muta’asseb (narrow minded) and ‘onsori (racist). For 
most of my friends, Bonduqiyye’ extremism was the reflection of his wild nature and, 
now, insanity. Conversely, open-mindedness and critical thinking were instead qualities 
held in high regard among my friends (cf. Marsden 2007).  
 
Having documented the changes in and similarities between models of manliness in Al-
Wihdat, I now turn my focus to how camp-dwellers strived to adapt this new ideal of 
masculinity to their wish of living an ordinary life. 
 
LIVING THE IDEAL 
 
Unbearable models  
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 See chapter 4 for a discussion of this movement in Jordan.  
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Piety and religiosity in the Camp did not generate any predisposition to Jihadi Salafism, 
nor did it lead people to fashion a perfect and coherent pious self. As Samuli Schielke 
put it,  
 
“the rigor of Salafi piety of the piety movement produces much starker contrasts between 
commitment and deviance […]. This can become a problematic and troublesome experience, 
however, when one or some of the ideologies of the self a person holds to are based on a 
demand for strict and exclusive perfection – as the Salafi revivalist notion of subjectivity based 
on ‘commitment’ (iltizâm) is” (2009, p. 23, cf. Mahmood, 2005).  
 
The constant suspicion about the “true” nature of shuyukh was, indeed, evidence of the 
impracticality of fully complying with the “perfectionism” inherent in this model of 
masculinity. The sobriety and rigour that “sheikh masculinity” made refugees extremely 
sceptical and critical about those who claimed to embody such inner qualities. During 
the time I spent in the Camp, people frequently warned me about the fraudulent 
austerity of many shuyukh. Far from being examples to follow and model to imitate per 
se, the term “sheikh” could easily be devalued. Aesthetic features were deceptive and 
could be actively manipulated by someone for personal interest. It was a commonly-
held opinion within the Camp that a beard and dishdāsha did not necessarily point to a 
true sheikh, though they certainly earned him the appellative. There were people who 
posed as sheikh but were believed to really be dawawīn. Since over time being a sheikh 
had progressively come to embody an ideal style of masculinity, some people simply 
pretended to be a sheikh solely to gain respect and popularity in the Camp. Therefore, if 
it had been interpreted genuinely, the role could have been a source of great respect and 
esteem in the Camp. Conversely, being a sheikh did not spare anyone from social 
condemnation and disapproval. I have also heard people debating whether it was better 
to sit with a dawawīn or a sheikh. They were complaining about the hypocrisy and 
dishonesty of some shuyukh who were believed to be mere drunkards (sukharjin) and 
professed a strong allegiance to Islamic doctrine only to behave immorally when out of 
sight. For one of them, dawawīn were somehow more “genuine” and honest. I was 
taken aback by one of them, who I had come to respect on religious issues because of 
his principled conduct, when he said: “kullu shuyukh bekhsu! [all shuyukh suck]”. 
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Although his statement was largely playful, it pointed to the alleged untrustworthy and 
dishonest nature of some self-professed shuyukh110.  
 
However, the exceptional piety of a “sheikh” model of masculinity was not only 
difficult to maintain in the face of the ambivalent pressures of everyday life; in some 
cases, it was not even desirable. As we have seen, while young men expressed 
admiration for the display of pious qualities, at the same time they often ridiculed the 
inability of takfīrīn to think rationally. According to my friends, I should not pay much 
attention to the takfīrīn because they did not reflect the way people in Wihdat thought: 
“there are not many in the Camp... only people like Bonduqiyye, Sheikh Issam, and few 
others... not more than ten!”, a friend once told me. This is not to say that the figure of 
the sheikh and the “holy warrior” (mujhāhid) ceased to hold appeal for the shabāb and 
young men of the Camp. In Al Wihdat, the names of those who managed to fight 
Western imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq were often uttered with respect, and those 
who came back were treated with certain deference. However, for my friends, the 
display of pious qualities did not necessarily involve engagement in armed jihad. And, 
as the story of Bonduqiyye highlights, the gains to be made by unthinkingly embracing 
a weapon in order to fight a holy war against internal and external threats were far from 
self-evident. I heard many in Al-Wihdat expressing criticism toward the narrow-
mindedness of those who could not reconcile Islam with the need to live an ordinary 
life. As such, rather than admiring their radical approach, most of my friends saw these 
people as muta’assebīn (narrow minded). 
 
The irresistible call of the ordinary 
 
Notwithstanding the ideal of manliness that the two types of masculinity so far 
discussed have respectively embodied throughout the years in Al-Wihdat, most of the 
people in the Camp were thus engaged in a quite different type of project: performing a 
kind of ordinary and middle ground masculinity far from the manly rigour of the 
shuyukh and even further from the hyper-masculinity of the takfīrīn and dawawīn. In 
other words, by infusing these forms of “nationalist masculinities” (Massad 1995) with 
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 It should be noted that the Muslim Brothers – who at the time of my research were deemed to be 
corrupt and despotic by a large part of the camp population – were referred to by the appellative of 
“shuyukh”. 
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daily interests, passions, and needs, adolescents and young men have inhabited and 
created what I define here an “ordinary masculinity”. 
 
First, as I came to understand it, being a true mukhayyamji required young men in the 
Camp to have a careful balance of toughness, independence, and smartness as well as 
those attributes that make one a good and trustworthy person (muhtaram), such as 
conscientiousness and hard work. Over the course of my stay in Al-Wihdat, I heard 
camp dwellers boast relatively frequently about the Palestinian ability to successfully 
carry out business, especially through smart or savvy behaviour and self-assertion. This, 
I was told by my friends, was a distinguishing mark of Palestinians and especially of 
refugees from the camps. One day, for example, a friend who I came to know for his 
studiousness and piety puzzled me by admitting that he and one of his friends from the 
Camp had managed to round up their monthly salaries significantly by taking money 
from the counter of the KFC in Shāra‘ Gardens, where they were both employed as 
seasonal workers. Working outside the Camp was for many shabāb a part-time activity 
that decreased during winter time with the reduction of tourism in Amman. For my 
friends, it was hence quite acceptable to scrape together extra money in a job that they 
would probably have lost anyway when winter came. It was easy for one of them, which 
was working as a cashier, to pocket money without ringing up the receipt. With evident 
self-satisfaction, my friend recalled the story, pointing then to how “shabāb from the 
Camp are not like Jordanians of Jabel Amman, Shmeissani, or Abdun!”. This difference 
was also displayed through demonstrations of potency and toughness. It seems, indeed, 
that on another occasion he and his friend gave a sound beating to a couple of 
Jordanians employed in the same fast food restaurant for having allegedly ordered the 
two “mukhayyamji” around at work.  
 
Ordinary jobs, however, were also widely said to require a great amount of patience and 
dedication, and other skills and attitudes that were very different from being smart and 
streetwise. These skills were perceived to be essential to successfully pursue a career. In 
another occasion, the same friend, in fact, blamed his co-worker for not being able to 
secure a long term job, because he was too lazy (kaslan) and too short-sighted to see 
that being reliable and trustworthy was in most cases more profitable than displaying 
hyper-toughness and independent behaviour: “He is a dawawīn. He cannot do the same 
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job for more than a couple of weeks […]. He spends all his time in the games room, 
watching girls (banāt) and drinking… when he manages to find someone who pays for 
his booze”. Like this man, many of my friends argued that the incapacity to find a 
steady job was incompatible with being pious and respectable (muhtaramīn). 
 
At the same time, the highly valued adherence to Islamic teaching and practice was also 
reinterpreted in an often very flexible way by the majority of the youths in Al Wihdat. 
Many in the Camp professed a strong allegiance to the tenets and precepts of Islam. As I 
showed in the previous chapter, Islam was widely perceived to be the solution to their 
national quest. “Sheikh religiosity”, however, with its insistence on perfection and 
purity, made it extremely difficult for most shabāb in the Camp to follow their example. 
If the inflexibility and austerity of this model was unlikely to be steadily maintained in 
the confusion of everyday life, many shabāb opted for the instantiation of more 
complex and ambiguous forms of masculinity (Marsden 2007, Masquelier 2009). An 
awkward coexistence of religious morality with more worldly distractions marked the 
daily life of many young men in Al-Wihdat. The time people spent glorifying the 
significance and importance of Islam was equivalent only to the time employed in 
violating and breaking its norms. Drinking, illicit romantic affairs, smoking hashish, and 
cursing were part of the not-so-marginal mundaneness of transgressing: activities 
denounced in public and performed in private circles. Real life blurred differences; 
being shuyukh or dawawīn in the Camp was more a matter of degree than a sharp-edged 
dichotomy.  
 
A case in point was “love” (hub). Love was almost ubiquitous in the life of shabāb in 
Al-Wihdat, finding expression in a variety of domains that ranged from internet, to 
poems, to everyday discussions. An investigation into this dimension and the anxieties 
it generates has been the central issue of a large numbers of studies (e.g. Abu-Lughod 
1986, Bayat 1997, Hart 2007, Marsden 2007, Masquelier 2009, Schielke 2012)111. For 
the sake of brevity, I will refer here solely to pre-marital prohibitions. In Al Wihdat, 
premarital sexual intercourse was publicly condemned. The perception that women 
from the Camp (banāt min al mukhayyam) were generally more modest and pious than 
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 For an investigation into how Palestinian nationalism has historically entered the domain of women’s 
sexuality, see among other Massad (1995), Peteet (1991), and Sayigh (1998). 
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girls from outside (banāt min barra) was also important amongst my friends. As a 
matter of fact, the constant surveillance over pre-marital inter-gender relations made it 
difficult for illicit intercourse to occur. The greater enforcement of gender segregation 
in Al-Wihdat were a source of pride among people in the camp, who often compared the 
superior modesty of “their” women with the immorality of Jordanian and Palestinian-
Jordanian women outside Al-Wihdat. When men wished to get married, they generally 
asked their mother or sister to look for a prospective wife. The search was first carried 
out, ideally, within the extended family and, if unsuccessful, extended to a broader 
group of people such as their circle of friends and acquaintances. But while waiting for 
the marriage to happen, many did not trouble themselves with the Islamic obligations of 
sexual abstinence before marital life. In this case, if the Camp was the moral space 
where Islamic obligations were reinforced, outside Al-Wihdat unmarried men 
abandoned their austerity. In such cases, shabāb turned their attention to other areas and 
parts of the city where the environment was more “suitable”. The university was one of 
these spaces where men and women flirted and where illicit meetings could take place. 
But even in the Camp, behind the stairs in buildings, in the maze of narrow alleys, and 
in its physical interstices in general, quick chats and insistent glances took place.  
 
In order to reveal these complexities and inconsistencies that young men in Al-Wihdat 
face in their attempt to live a virtuous life, the story of Ashraf is paradigmatic. Ashraf, 
like many other young men in the Camp, emphasised the importance of Islamic 
morality to his everyday life. As such, he performed his ritual prayers five times a day, 
refrained from drinking alcohol, fasted during Ramadan, and, in general, strove to 
comply with Islamic teaching and doctrine. However, the leitmotiv of the entire trip to 
Lebanon I made in his company was inspired by a less pious goal. 
 
During the first half of my fieldwork, Ashraf asked me to go with him to Beirut, a city 
that he never saw before and he planned to visit since a long time. Beirut had quite a 
reputation in Jordan of being a sin city, and the young man was thrilled by idea of 
spending a weekend there. The higher visibility of “vice” and “immorality” – such as 
alcohol and immoral dress patterns and habits – in the city centre and in other areas was 
what made Beirut so attractive in the eyes of my companions. Although Jordan does not 
lack these forms of immoral entertainment, these “bad habits” were limited and 
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consigned only to determined pockets of the city. Not surprisingly, when his father 
called on his mobile, Ashraf lied about the real destination of his trip, Ashraf told him 
that he was in Syria: “my father thinks I am in Syria now!! He does not want me to go 
to Lebanon; he thinks it is a bad place”. Ashraf also thought of Beirut as an “immoral 
place”, and he juxtaposed it with Amman and Al-Wihdat: “Amman is the best place and 
Al-Wihdat is the best place in Amman. In the Camp they are all muhtaramīn!”. 
 
Rather inconsistently, however, Ashraf’s few days spent in Beirut were characterised by 
what in my eyes seemed an ambiguous coexistence of religious morality and discipline, 
and “carnal desires”. Prayers and partial abstinence, as well as the belief that Al-Wihdat 
was a better place because of the greater morality of its inhabitants, were 
counterbalanced by Ashraf’s quest for sex. Indeed, Ashraf left with a very clear target in 
mind: to stare at, flirt with, and eventually spend some time with women. Everything 
was subordinate to this mission in Ashraf’s priorities. I had already been warned by 
Hussein of Ashraf’s burning desire, but I expected that his desire to misbehave would 
embrace a wider range of “sins” than sex alone, such as alcohol and hashish. Instead, 
Ashraf neither drank alcohol nor smoked hashish, and his transgressive quest for 
impermissible fun revolved only around women. Unfortunately, his expectations were 
eventually frustrated by the much higher cost of Lebanese daily life that made entering a 
pub or a disco prohibitively costly for the vast majority of shabāb from a Palestinian 
refugee camp in Jordan. Although Ashraf’s “goal” was primarily voyeuristic, he 
ultimately intended to have something more substantial than simple glimpses of Beirut’s 
renowned women. However, his two attempts – first asking a taxi driver to take him to a 
night club, and then trying to touch a woman directly in a “massage parlour” – were 
doomed to fail because of Ashraf’s severe lack of money and my refusal to lend him 
extra funds. Ashraf thus had to content himself with a simple walk on the streets of the 
fancier areas of Beirut.  
 
Ashraf’s story reveals how camp dwellers’ modes of being masculine were contextually 
enacted and performed as they moved in different contexts and embraced and inhabited 
alternative modalities of thought, agency, behaviour and subjectivity. In Al-Wihdat, as 
elsewhere, this was a widely recognised part of being a person. Neither Ashraf nor most 
of his friends regarded his trip to Beirut as ultimately incompatible with being a good 
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Muslim, and he negotiated the moral dilemma of accommodating his pious ideals within 
his seemingly “immoral” urges quite well – although at times this might have generated 
inner tension and social tensions (see chapter 4). However, far from being an indication 
of unpredictable and hypocritical behaviour, his conduct was just part of how camp 
dwellers deal contextually with the quandaries of social existence. 
 
FRACTURED MASCULINITIES: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING ORDINARY 
 
Discriminated masculinities 
 
Still, the coexistence of diverse registers of masculinity that the pursuit of the 
“ordinary” seemed to promise was a deeply fragile project. I will here give an account 
of the failures, setbacks, frustrations and disappointments in men's attempts to carry out 
what I have termed “ordinary masculinity”, or the capacity to reconcile different models 
of masculinity.  
 
Within this framework, it is important to shed light on the relationship between youths 
in the Camp and the authorities. From the viewpoint of camp authorities, shabāb in Al-
Wihdat embodied opposition to the state. Refugees continued to be popularly depicted 
as a community that was inherently hostile to the authorities. As a matter of fact, young 
men’s encounters with “the state” usually involved forms of police discipline, 
repression and monitoring. Police control of people living in Al-Wihdat and in its 
proximity was quite pervasive. As a middle-ranking cadre of UNRWA put it in the 
course of an interview:  
 
“Amongst youth there are lots of problems like drugs, alcohol, and unemployment. Many 
youths are fed up of their situation in the camps, so they cause trouble […]. Most of the people 
there don’t have a job. So they run small stands in the main street, where the camp market is 
held. This is their main source of income, but they don’t have a licence to do it. So, when the 
municipality comes, they are forced to leave. They generally wait until they go away, and then 
they put their stands on the street again, but sometimes the police confiscate their stuff. This is 
what upsets the youths most. They get angry.” 
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Nonetheless, refugees did not seek confrontation (cf. Peteet 1994). Rather, agency more 
often took the form of cooperation or, in many cases, evasion (see also Ismail 2006). 
The encounters with state authorities were often narrated in terms of humiliation and 
injury; being harassed by over-zealous police officers, I was told, was a very common 
experience. My friends carefully avoided approaching the area where the massive police 
station (makhfar) of Al-Wihdat was located without their IDs or other identification 
papers. If they were stopped without proper documents, this would mean their being 
detained in the station until a relative or a friend could come to vouch for them.  
 
If the objective behind the control, beating, and restriction exerted upon the bodies of 
males was to render the potentially resistant body of refugees into a docile and 
integrated subject, the result was quite different: the actual effect of such policies was to 
exacerbate the marginalisation of their masculinity, relegating it to a condition of 
liminality or negation.  
 
This “crisis of masculinity” was further aggravated by the negative stereotypes applied 
to camp dwellers that ultimately contributed to fostering further social marginalisation 
and economic discrimination. If refugees were prevented from emphasising the traits of 
their masculinity that were associated with an enduring and virulent national identity, 
discrimination and blocked upward mobility, especially in the public sectors, also 
endangered the transition to social adulthood, which was largely focused around the 
capacity to provide for a family and live an independent marital life. My friends in the 
camp frequently complained of their incapacity to forge a productive masculinity by 
stepping into the more practical responsibilities of kinship and marital life: in the 
stagnant Jordanian economy, getting married was a costly affair that overt 
discrimination in the public sector postponed even further112. In addition, the 
combination of the problems of living in an area that was economically marginal and 
deprived, aggravated by a severe shortage of connections and contacts to get things 
done (wāsta), strengthened the idea amongst camp dwellers of being second-class 
citizens. One friend, a young man who worked as a taxi driver, put it to me as follows: 
 
                                                        
112
 For comparative litterature, see Masquelier (2005). 
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“We are not strangers (’ajaneb) in Jordan, but we are not like the ’urdunīn [Transjordanians]; 
we are second-class citizens (muātab min al daraje al thanye)! Even class four!! If a Palestinian, 
a nawarī (gypsy), and a masrī (Egyptian) go to the makhfar (police station), the Palestinian will 
be the first to be arrested! […]. I have a friend who works as taxi driver. He was going to Aqaba 
with a friend of his, a Jordanian, who was driving another car. The police stopped the two cars. 
One asked for their passports and said to the other [police officer] ‘this one is fine, he is a 
sabawi. They let him go and gave my friend instead a ticket for high speed (…). You see, 
Amza?”, my friend continued, pointing at his brother, who was younger by two years, “he 
passed the tawjīhī [diploma] with a 70. That is very good, but he did not find a job. Jordanians 
who get 50 in the tawjīhī find a job! And they can work in the army or in the police. I can tell 
you, we are under the Jordanians!”  
 
For many of my friends, the discrimination that they had to face as Palestinian refugees 
living in camps not only prevented them from fulfilling the fundamental requirements 
of masculinity, such as those relating to marriage and parenthood. In addition, such 
discrimination impacted on their performance of everyday masculinity, influencing the 
very domain of personal style. The authorities in the Camp were also often worried 
about the progressive “Islamisation” of the youths. The figure of the Islamic activist as 
the lawless and violent terrorist and an enemy of the state was ideally represented in the 
figure of the young man from the refugee camp (see also Ismail 2006). For Abu Omar, 
who was complaining that it was not possible to adopt a style of dress consistent with 
his ideal of piety because “if you wear traditional clothes, they [the authorities] think 
you are a terrorist. I tell you, ‘Islam’ and ‘Palestine’ is a dangerous mix for them. I 
would like to wear dishdash or jallabia, but with my job it is impossible [he works as 
photo-journalist for Al Wihdat football team] … I would be stopped by the police 
everywhere! Then, if you add that you are from a refugee camp, they will arrest you as 
soon as they see you”, he ironically concluded.  
 
Discriminations and negative stereotypes have ultimately jeopardised refugees’ attempts 
to carry out a life as “ordinary” citizens of the kingdom. At the level of camp-dweller 
masculinity, this endangered the performance of an “ordinary masculinity” – i.e. the 
capacity to conjugate different styles of masculinity – and ultimately the possibility to 
progress into full adulthood as either Palestinian or Jordanian males. In other words, if 
discrimination fuels the feeling among refugees of not being ordinary subjects of the 
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kingdom, it also sanctions the celebration of male potency, political independence, and 
toughness identifiable with specific models of Palestinian nationalist masculinity. This 
is brought to light, for example in the documentary movie “Full Bloom”, in which the 
Jordanian filmmaker Sandra Madi explores these dynamics in Al-Baq’a Palestinian 
refugee camp. The film draws the real portrait of Faraj Darwish, a young boxing 
champion whose promising career came to an abrupt end upon his refusal to fight in a 
match against an Israeli boxer. Faraj was born and lived his life in Al-Baq’a, a big urban 
camp established in the environs of Amman. As for many other shabāb in the camps, 
his life was slow, intrinsically boring, and lacked excitement and surprise. 
Unemployment and unfulfilled aspirations filled him with frustration and offered little 
change to the unchanging and predictable rhythm of life. He passed his time 
monotonously by chatting with friends, idling at home, playing with homing pigeons, 
and occasionally training. Unlike other shabāb in the camps, however, there was a time 
when Faraj was well-known and popular in the country. In 2004, when he was 21 years 
of age, he gained the title of Arab boxing champion in Algeria. The victory also earned 
him the chance to meet the King of Jordan. Afterwards, the newly decorated champion 
trained to pursue his dream to compete for the Olympic title. But in the year 2006, 
Darwish was barred for life by the Jordanian Federation from competing officially 
because of his refusal to fight an Israeli boxer at an international championship 
competition in Turkey. The ban irremediably damaged Faraj’s blooming career, leaving 
the boxer powerless and embittered, capable neither of reaching full socio-economic 
integration within the kingdom nor of becoming a virile symbol of Palestinian 
nationalist struggles as a boxing champion from Baq’a. 
 
The failure to move through conflicting registers of masculinity reinforced refugees’ 
experiences of marginality, frustrated their search for an “ordinary life”, and ultimately 
broadened the chasm between being “refugees” and “citizens”. Some of my friends 
remained trapped in this condition. Exasperated by the situation, a friend once bitterly 
expressed this feeling of marginality by drawing an analogy: “You know, Luigi, what 
we [refugees] say about our situation here in Jordan? We say that Palestinians are ‘zei 
kuss el bakara: la ehna barrā wa la ehna jua’ [like the vagina of the cow: neither 
outside nor inside]!  
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The example of the fathers 
 
Discrimination jeopardised young men's prospects of securing a livelihood, prevented 
the performance of an “ordinary masculinity”, and reinforced divisions between the 
different aspects of their selves that, in ordinary circumstances, they were quite capable 
of managing. However, this experience of failure was also generated by unsettled 
tensions between the desires of fulfilling the idealised style of nationalist masculinity 
and the demands for conformity from the local economy and polity (Hart 2008). Camp 
dwellers’ capacity to manage and combine different and sometimes conflicting styles of 
masculinity coexisted uneasily with the greater clarity of the more idealised nationalist 
conceptions of masculinity: most notably the masculinity of the “fathers”. 
 
Many camp dwellers pointed to the sober and pious masculinity of their peasant 
ancestors as an ideal to strive for (compare Swedenburg 1990). In this sense, the nexus 
between humbleness and being Palestinian – that I have explored in chapter 3 – had a 
significant bearing also on the way young men in the Camp imagined their own 
masculinity. In Wihdat, the elder (khitiār or, more respectfully, hajj) was the depositary 
of the peasant tradition and the living demonstration of the Palestinian national struggle 
and suffering over the years (see also Khalili 2004)113. His role was fundamental in 
passing on the memory of Palestine and Palestinian-ness, the specific way of being 
Palestinian re-enacted through food, dialect, songs, embroidery, and so on. Since most 
of the first generation of refugees was illiterate, people in the Camp relied heavily on 
the narratives of their grandparents – jīl al-nakba or jīl al-thamānīe w’ārba‘īn (the 
generation of ‘48) – to imagine life in the villages in Palestine before the Nakba. In the 
narratives of the first generation, references to the rural life in the villages before the 
arrival of the Zionists abounded. The impact of these memories on the new generation 
was strong. My friends referred with pride to themselves as the children of the 
countryside (awlād al balad) to denote the cultural authenticity of the Camp, a space 
where peasant tradition and culture were still preserved (see also Farah 1999). Most of 
                                                        
113
 Laleh Khalili has written about Palestinians who live in refugee camps in Lebanon that “as the 
generation that remembers living in Palestine passes away, commemoration of quotidian life in Palestine 
becomes for subsequent generations not merely a narrative or practice of remembering and 
reconstructing, but the basis of their political identity and the motivation for their political mobilisation” 
(1986). 
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them confessed that their most joyful wish was to own a piece of land to be cultivated 
and farmed. The first generation of refugees – the pre-Nakba generation – was seen as 
representing the pre-colonial time, a golden age in which Palestinians were living in 
harmony with their tradition and respecting Islamic tenets and doctrine. Many of the 
young men in the Camp, however, talked about the pressures of living up to the 
standards set by their elders. Past generations were often held up as examples of ideal 
masculinity and celebrated as models for living a moral lifestyle. Their moral qualities 
and physical skills were often reported to me as a standard of masculinity that new 
generations were no longer able to fully re-enact.  
 
If the “generation of ‘48” set the example of the sober and pious masculinity of the 
grandfathers, the heroism of the fathers throughout the late ’60s, ’70s and ’80s defined 
another model of masculinity which took shape around the manly values of 
steadfastness, heroism under fire, military courage, and self-sacrifice (Massad 1995). 
Some recalled the time when their fathers fought against Israelis in Jordan or in 
Lebanon; many praised the past heroism of the fidā’ī (guerrilla fighter) and shahīd 
(martyr) who died in their attempt to pursue the national goal. People were proud to 
have an uncle or a father martyr who died in the Battle of Karama during the civil war 
in Jordan and Lebanon114. Such a person was Abu Hussein. “Abu Hussein always thinks 
about his father when he prays”, a friend once told me. His father became a shahīd 
(martyr) when Abu Hussein was three years old. He was killed in Lebanon by Israeli 
soldiers and buried in a cemetery for shuhadā (martyrs) in Syria, which the son 
periodically visited. The man, at the time of my fieldwork in his early thirties, was 
proud of his father and his glorious death. He often showed me the picture of the tomb – 
a long epitaph engraved on the stone quoted part of the sūra baqara on shahāda 
(martyrdom) – that he treasured on his laptop and smartphone. He made no secret that it 
was his wish to re-enact the example of his father. On a few occasions, in fact, he also 
confessed his wish to fight in the Occupied Territory for Palestine and Islam: “I want to 
                                                        
114
 On 21 March 1968, in reprisal for a series of raids by the PLO against Israel, around 15,000 Israely 
troops, armored behicles, and helicopters attacked the small town of Karama. As the village was located 
on the east bank of Jordan River, the Jordanian Army decided to fight alonside the Palestinian fidā’īyyn. 
On a militar level the battle ended in favour of Israel. Karama Battle resulted in massive losses for Fatah’ 
forces, which lost 120-200 figthers and saw a large part of the city destroyed. However, also the Israeli 
army suffered heavy losses: 28 Israeli soldiers were killed and 12 tanks were captured. Because of these 
losses, the battle became an epic victory of Palestinians against Israel celebrated throughout the Arab 
world (see Khalili 2007, pp. 156-157). 
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go to Palestine to fight. I don’t know when, I only know that I will go. Not necessarily 
to kill, I can also help in other ways”. The urge to follow in his father's footsteps was 
particularly evident on the occasion of a two-day journey that I made to Aqaba in his 
company. During the last part of the journey, the road to Aqaba ran parallel and with 
great proximity to the border between Israel/Palestine and Jordan, and my companion 
glanced with mixed feelings of excitement and sorrow at the nearby city of Eilat in 
Palestine. Turning his gaze away from the hills and to the other side of the border, Abu 
Hussein said: “I can’t see these mountains and do nothing. My father died for them, and 
I don’t do anything…”  
 
The recognised generation gap between camp youths (shabāb) and elders (khitiārīn) 
came about not only because of the ideal of perfection set by older generations, but was 
also interpreted as the consequence of declining standards of masculinity that afflicted 
the younger generations (see also Masquelier 2005). For them, the shabāb of Al-Wihdat 
had become loafers and troublemakers, and their weak (da‘īf) parents were seen as 
incapable of controlling and educating their children. In their eyes, it was the corruption 
of the simple and pure way of life that led to the weakening of religious feeling and 
eventually the loss of their country. In one case, the UNRWA’s teachers’ strike was the 
trigger that led a couple of men in the Nadi to start a long tirade about UNRWA, youths, 
and moral decay:  
 
First man: […] “schools are very bad. There is alcohol, drugs, and young guys come to hang 
around the girls. Yesterday, I went to the school and I saw a glass of wine on the floor. My son 
told me a week ago that a man tried to sell him a drug tablet for 10 piasters [psychotropic 
drugs]” 
 
Second man: “Yes, of course! That’s why shabāb raided the UNRWA Clinique a few days ago. 
Alcohol and drugs helps them to forget their problems [...]” 
 
First man: “The problem is that they don’t know the way of Allah. We are very far from Islam 
[...]. I’ll tell you what the problems are: TV, satellite, internet, and sexy [pop] singers! They fill 
the mind of shabāb with stupid things. Youths’ minds are empty! They can do everything! And 
where are their families? Their fathers are bad, and their mothers are even worse [it was not 
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clear whether this was because they were too busy to care for their children or because they 
were inherently bad]! But in the past, when we were young, Islam was everything!!” 
 
The image of idle youths whose lack of means condemn them to social marginality was 
hence seen as a consequence of their inability to forge a mature masculinity through the 
cultivation of a pious disposition. But shabāb were held accountable only in part for 
their hardships: unemployment, poverty, and juvenile criminality were seen as both the 
outcomes and the causes of the deviant and immoral masculinity of youths.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the complex relationship between masculinity and 
political agency. Terms like “refugee camp” or “camp-dweller community” might 
induce towards lingering assumptions on the homogeneity of models of masculinity 
within a space like Al-Wihdat. In Jordan, these ideal forms of masculinity were 
abstracted and reified, with some being romanticised and others “abjected” (Ewing 
2008), but all pointing to the camp dwellers’ lack of integration. However, camp 
dwellers’ masculinities did not rest upon uniformity. The ability to move through and 
master diverse and sometimes contrasting registers of manhood was an important 
dimension of daily life in Al-Wihdat at the time of my research.  
 
During the course of their adolescence and early adulthood, young men in the camp 
have reproduced “Palestinian nationalism” as a system of human values and as an 
everyday reality of “normal life” through the negotiation of diverse forms of manhood, 
most notably embodied by the figure of the dawawīn and the sheikh. Despite their 
obvious differences “dawawīn” and “sheikh” masculinities share common attributes 
traditionally ascribed to what authors have called hegemonic forms of masculinity such 
as male assertiveness, moral or physical strength, and independence. By exploring the 
production of masculinities in diverse settings, I have come to recognise a shift in the 
significance of the political in people's lives. The time in which there were the most 
dawawīn in the camp was before and during Black September. Afterwards, disillusioned 
by the broken promises of Palestinian nationalism on one hand, and deprived of their 
political agency by poverty and governmental control on the other, many withdrew from 
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political activism. Remarkably, many famous dawawīn in the camp “embraced” Islam 
and became muhtaramīn (respectable) or even shuyukh (pious men). What was once an 
ideal of political masculinity eventually became the embodiment of the immoral 
apolitical idler, and the dawanji came to be gradually replaced in the Camp as the 
dominant model of masculinity by the sheikh. Those who remained dawawīn gained a 
reputation for being loafers or even criminals. Allegiance to Palestinian nationalist 
ideals and occasional hostility to the Jordanian regime, which in the past was expressed 
mainly through the performance of overt expressions of toughness and political 
independency, have gradually been replaced by other forms of manliness. Reflecting 
political and social trends in the region towards the employment of symbols and texts 
associated with Islam, humility, temperance, modesty, obedience and a great knowledge 
of Islamic teaching and practice gradually become important qualities in the camp.  
 
However, the similarities between these two ideals of masculinities were striking. 
Bonduqiyye’s story draws attention to this aspect. A reckless dawanji and a pious 
sheikh, Bonduqiyye affords us a glance into the historical interplay and relationship 
between apparently hegemonic models of masculinity. He became a sheikh having 
previously been a feared dawawīn, and eventually gained a reputation of “insane”. At 
the same time, his story also sheds light on the critical reflectiveness that distinguishes 
people’s understanding of Islam and political agency. Bonduqiyye’s spiritual epiphany 
did not result in him acquiring any uncritical forms of respect. Although widely admired 
and respected for his decision to fight for Afghanistan, he was still thought to be wild 
and narrow-minded, and not a good Muslim. The almost uniqueness of Bonduqiyye’s 
story highlights how, despite the fascination that certain ideals of masculinity may have 
at times exerted on youths, the majority of people in Al-Wihdat were neither actually 
performing nor wishing to embody either of these two models. At first sight, the 
dominant types of masculinity centred on the hyper-masculinity of dawawīn, or on 
sheikh, may be thought of as the primary medium through which refugees could assert 
their distinctiveness as Palestinians in Jordan. But the exclusive performance of these 
masculinities was also quite costly. If the valorisation of the over-toughness and 
independence of the dawawīn was discouraged by the authorities and eventually 
disparaged by later generations of refugees, the rigour of sheikh was difficult to 
maintain in the face of ambivalent feelings and more mundane urges.  
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Ultimately, these allegedly hegemonic masculinities privileged an unbearable 
“extraordinariness” at the expenses of more manageable and ordinary ways of being a 
Palestinian in Jordan. The vast majority of people in the Camp were instead engaged in 
the performance of “ordinary masculinity”. Ordinary masculinity, in contrast to the 
other two models, brings to light the reproduction of nationalist masculinities in times 
of protracted exceptionality. Its performance, if successful, displays refugees’ day-to-
day engagement with the facts of their exile in Jordan alongside their need to uphold the 
values and ideals of Palestinian nationalism. It opens a space in the national discourse 
for the ordinary way of being male, which is generally overshadowed by sometimes 
cumbersome ideals of masculinity. This capacity, I have argued, is what has ensured the 
ongoing distinctiveness of a Palestinian political identity.  
 
In the next chapter, I will conclude my analysis of the significance of the ordinary into 
refugees’ political identity and agency by exploring in greater detail young men’s time-
off activities and strategies to deal with boredom. 
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CHAPTER 6: TIME OFF! “LOITERING” IN THE CAMP 
 
INTRODUCTION: THURSDAY NIGHT 
 
Wandering with Hussein around Shāra‘ Liddawi, we heard a voice calling us over. 
Turning our heads we saw Ghazi, one of the regulars at the Al-Mahal. He was lying on 
the sofa in the barber’s shop located next to the game room. Ghazi was not alone in the 
sālūn (barber’s shop); other shabāb were sitting listlessly and watching the TV. “T’al 
t’al! (come here!)”, he called, and invited us to sit with him. He arranged a couple of 
plastic chairs for us and asked what we wanted to drink: “shāī or gahwe? (tea or 
coffee?)” Returning with the hot drinks, Ghazi confessed to being extremely bored: he 
had spent the last five or six hours doing nothing other than hanging around in the 
barber’s shop and playing the PlayStation in the Mahal. He wanted to do something: 
“what about buying a bottle of vodka? What do you think? (shu raīkum?)”. He wanted 
to drink, but Hussein was not at all keen to spend the rest of the night watching Abu 
Sharif and me drinking alcohol. He had recently returned from the ‘umra and this had 
strengthened his determination to behave piously and avoid keeping “bad company”. 
We left Abu Sharif with the promise that we would call him after the prayer, and 
walked on towards Rami’s house. On the way, after meeting the kashashīn (pigeon 
trainers) wandering in the Camp with a friend, we met Rami’s brother. Along with a 
man in his forties, he was sitting on the kerb rather lethargically, and staring passively at 
the asphalt. He returned our greeting in a listless fashion. We moved on and finally 
spotted Rami sitting on the footpath in front of his house: Rami, a friend, and a group of 
young people were talking to another friend who was passing by. Apparently, this man 
was also bored. He did not have a job and, even worse, the right season to find one was 
passing by: “you are complaining now… but in the winter it is much worse, you know 
that!”, Rami pointed out. He nodded and then shrugged his shoulders: “shu bidna nsawi 
(what can we do about that?)”. All of a sudden, he invited us to join him for the prayer. 
Rami and Hussein accepted willingly. I declined the offer and waited for them outside 
the mosque. 
 
Friday night (jum‘a bil leil) in the Camp was not generally a thrilling experience for the 
shabāb who lived there. Everybody stayed up until late into the night, but the activities 
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did not really differ from any other day. People had two options: they could either stay 
in the Camp or leave it. In the second case, young men would often go to the more 
upmarket areas of Amman, Abdoun, Jabal Amman, and Shmeissani. Alternatively, 
younger boys in their teens would spend their time in Shāraʿ Madaba, a main arterial 
road that borders Wihdat, or in the small square in front of the masjid al-darwish, a 
beautiful mosque located in the proximity of the Camp. In this pedestrian area, benches 
and several shops made the place an attractive solution to their boredom: men and 
accompanying women would gather to spend some time together, drink juice, eat 
sunflowers seeds, and chat. Those who stayed in the Camp did not have many options: 
shabāb and young men would often play football. For my friends, playing football in 
the Nadi al Wihdat was an engagement that could not be deferred. They would meet in 
the Nadi late in the evening, usually at around 11 pm. Although only a relatively small 
number of people were able to enter the Nadi late at night, playing football until late on 
Friday evenings was quite common amongst the youth in the Camp. However, since 
there were no open spaces to play in the Camp, shabāb would usually go to Gwesme – 
this wide clearing around the Malik Abdullah II Stadium provided them with a suitable 
spot in which to play football. Games rooms, pool rooms, and coffee stalls were also 
quite popular. A favoured alternative to football, especially with the hot season 
approaching, were the frequent wedding parties that also punctuated life in the Camp: 
these parties would usually begin in the late evening and go on until well after midnight. 
However, the street was by and large the most likely option that young men would 
choose: sitting on kerb, standing on street corners, or strolling around was what young 
men would generally do with their free time.  
 
A widespread feeling of ennui and apathy were the order of the day. The discussion is 
articulated around a key issue: the relationship between boredom and the political in Al-
Wihdat. This chapter is focused on time-off activities in Al-Wihdat. In order to 
understand how refugees have made Palestinian nationalism a viable project in the 
context of their displacement in refugee camps, an examination of the different spaces 
of male life and strategies for dealing with boredom is fundamental. My argument in 
this chapter is that leisure and entertainment – like socio-economic integration and 
ordinary ways of being a Muslim and a man – are part of those acts of daily life through 
which young men from the Camp have sought to navigate the extraordinariness of their 
202 
 
 
condition without renouncing to their allegiance to Palestinian nationalism. If the time 
people spent together sipping hot drinks and chatting in the street, playing football, or 
training their homing pigeons on the roofs of their houses were the expression of 
refugees’ attempts to live an ordinary life, these activities contributed to strengthening a 
sense of closeness and national identity among camp dwellers.  
 
BOREDOM AND LOITERING AROUND 
 
The origins of boredom 
 
A widespread feeling of boredom seemed to infuse the life of many in Al-Wihdat. 
People would express their boredom by shrugging their shoulders and saying ‘ādī’ 
(normal, ordinary), a word that conveys a general feeling of apathy. In daily speech, this 
expression of boredom (malal) was often used as an adjective, so that people would 
often be describing themselves as being zahgān (bored/fed up). This state was said to be 
generated by a number of factors.  
 
First of all, echoing existing anthropological work on boredom, refugees often 
explained this emotional state by drawing a connection between being bored and socio-
economic deprivation. This condition was often explained to me with reference to the 
lack of job opportunities, social equality, and proper infrastructures. This situation was 
strikingly similar to others cases reported by ethnographies elsewhere. There is an 
emerging body of scholarship in social sciences that has investigated the connections 
between boredom and the frustrated aspirations of youths in the neoliberal economies in 
Africa and South Asia (Hansen 2005, Jeffrey 2010, Mains 2007, Schielke 2008, 
Verkaaik 2004). For most of these authors, boredom is a distinctively modern condition 
that is attributed to the existential emptiness experienced particularly by young men in 
the face of unemployment, socio-economic marginalisation, and their feeling of being 
left out of great economic and social transformations115. Their work resonates with my 
findings in Wihdat, where boredom and ennui were generated within the gap between 
the aspirations of young men in Al-Wihdat and the economic reality of contemporary 
Jordan. Among camp dwellers, boredom was caused in large measure by the lack of job 
                                                        
115
 For a relevant exception see Musharbash (2009). 
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opportunities and career prospects. Adolescents and young men often lamented how 
their frustrated trajectories of upward mobility and their day-to-day experiences of 
discrimination condemned them to a forced a state of social immobility. Many in the 
camps neither worked nor studied.  As a friend once told me: “if you don’t get a good 
mark in the diploma and if you are poor you don’t go to the university... and you don’t 
work because in Jordan there are no jobs. So, what can we do? We can just wait and get 
bored!”.  
 
In Al-Wihdat, however, boredom was not merely the product of particular 
configurations of the neo-liberal economy, but also the effect of the excess of the 
political into the lives of Palestinian camp dwellers. In this sense, I intend to also draw 
on another body of scholarship that has shed light on the link between boredom and the 
political, and how boredom (malal) has come to dominate Palestinian political ethos 
over the past few years (Allen 2009, Kelly 2008). As Allen notes, “in the midst of 
traumatic, deadly daily events, and beyond the bravado and ‘sumūd’ that made up the 
normative sentiments of Palestinian nationalism, it was boredom and zahaq (a state of 
being fed up and frustrated) that came to be a dominant ‘political ethos’” (2009, p. 473). 
Similarly, Kelly writes that “[a]longside the spectacular acts of violence that have 
dominated the newspaper headlines, for most Palestinians the second intifada has been 
marked by boredom and frustration” (2009, p. 353). Boredom is also a central theme in 
the work of Palestinian intellectuals and artists – such as Mahmood Darwish’s poetry, 
“State of Siege”, or Elia Suleiman’s films, “Chronicle of a Disappearance” and “Divine 
Intervention” – that evokes the feelings and actions set forth by bored and frustrated 
generations of Palestinians. In the Occupied Territories it was the overwhelming 
presence of death and political violence that placed boredom at the centre of people’s 
everyday worlds and confined people to their homes, making them restless and tired, 
unable to carry out a “normal” life. In Jordan, it was the ineffectiveness of politics 
(syāsīn) and the ineptness of political parties (’āhzāb) that infused refugees’ everyday 
lives with a pervasive sense of boredom (malal) and led many to claim to be “fed up” 
(zahgān) of the useless political refrain around Palestinian rights and suffering that were 
periodically invoked by political leaders. 
 
204 
 
 
By combining these two bodies of literature, I argue that boredom was in large part the 
consequence of not being able to carry out a normal life (hayā ‘ādiyye) or, rather, what 
refugees expected a “normal” life to be. On the one hand, being bored was caused in 
large measure by the lack of job opportunities and career prospects against the backdrop 
of the stagnant Jordanian economy. In keeping with such an explanation, boredom was 
said to affect mostly young men and adolescents, who were often unemployed, and was 
more intense in winter when the muddy alleys of the Camp and the cold curbed 
shabāb’s willingness to look for a job. On the other hand, boredom was also expressed 
in terms of their deep frustration for the continuous failure to find a solution to the 
“Palestinian issue”: rather than making life more meaningful, politics and politicians 
increased their feeling of being bored and fed up (zahgānīn min el syāsīn). It is worth 
drawing attention here, however, to how these two factors were perceived by camp 
dwellers as being intertwined and ultimately conducive to the pervasive influence of the 
political. The already meagre chance of gaining decent employment, for example, was 
drastically reduced by the negative stereotypes associated with being “Palestinian 
refugees from the camps” (lāji’ūn min el mukhayyamāt); the discrimination they faced 
in Jordan was often imputed to the incapacity of the political elites to effectively 
advocate the rights of Palestinian refugees. Likewise, in the eyes of many, it was a 
political conspiracy that aggravated the condition of deprivation that seemed to affect 
the Camp. As a friend who was exasperated by the latest cuts in UNRWA services once 
told me, “the UNRWA cuts, the drugs, the alcohol, and the unemployment are parts of a 
plot to sink Palestinians and refugee camps. They are killing us, always! You see, Luigi, 
Western people can only die once, but not Palestinians... We can die a thousand times. 
This is what they are doing to us; they have been killing us since 1948!”.  
 
 
 
Palestinian nationalism and fun 
 
One of the most obvious consequences of boredom in the Camp was the proliferation of 
spaces and activities of recreation. In Al-Wihdat, the attempts to escape boredom 
constituted an important part of refugees’ daily lives – especially for adolescents and 
young men. However, as boredom was ultimately perceived as being the result of the 
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saturation of the political in their lives, it would be wholly inaccurate to see loitering as 
completely divorced from the political. By mitigating the excess of the political in 
refugees’ lives, infusing it with mundanity, and crafting a sense of collectivity among 
camp dwellers, these activities made a Palestinian national subjectivity viable in the 
context of their progressive integration into Jordan.  
 
Yet, the nexus between emotions, politics and morality is not something new in 
anthropology. Much anthropological work focuses on the ways in which leisure 
activities do not simply communicate a desire for escapism. As scholars have suggested, 
and recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have abundantly demonstrated, 
new technologies and social networks have played a pivotal role in sparking debate and 
fostering political change in the Arab world (e.g. Eickelman and Anderson 1999). 
Studies have also investigated how a specific “sub-political consciousness” is at times 
re-enacted inside spaces of leisure such as taverns and saloons (Thompson 1963, pp. 55-
59) or through sport (MacClancy 1996) and other particular forms of leisure (Kumar 
1988). Another body of work has shown how gender and kinship politics are 
reproduced within coffee shops (Cowan 1991, Herzfeld 1985). Other studies on young 
men and free time underline the importance of “hanging around” in the production of 
distinctive forms of masculinity (e.g. Chakrabarty 1999, Weiss 2009). In his book 
“Timepass”, Craig Jeffrey hints at the possibility that idleness is not only an expression 
of social suffering, but also something else – perhaps a cultural and political practice, a 
mode of self-fashioning and self-expression (2010). Magnus Marsden, for example, in 
his research amongst Chitrali Muslims in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, 
sheds lights on the political significance of istok, all-male musical gatherings that are 
very popular in the region. The fun of these musical events, he claims, is often “framed 
and invested with political and affective significance by participants in a way that 
creatively builds on the theories of emotion advanced by their Islamist detractors” 
(2007, p. 474). The interplay of specific forms of masculinity and emotion during the 
istok challenges the parameters of morality advanced by the region’s “men of piety”. In 
a similar fashion, Oskar Verkaaik shows how militants of the Muhajir Qaumi 
Movement (MQM) perceive their participation in the nationalist movement as a good 
opportunity to have fun. Fun is the channel through which MQM produces its own 
nationalistic discourse, promoting a Muslim identity that is “a paradoxical reconciliation 
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of complementary but contradictory discourses on Muslim nationalism and ethnic 
solidarity, Islamic modernism and Sufism” (1986, p. 185).  
 
My argument moves along similar lines insofar as I am interested in documenting how 
fun and entertainment were central to the re-fashioning of the political.  
 
First of all, time off-activities were a way through which young men in Al-Wihdat 
sought to negotiate their social suffering and mitigate the “excess” of the political by 
becoming engaged in the trivial and mundane116. A great deal of time for many people 
in the Camp was spent meeting people, chatting and occasionally playing football, or 
attending wedding parties (zaffāt) in summer. “Now the summer is coming… you will 
see, Luigi, al-mukhayyam [the Camp] is going to be much more fun […]. Every Friday 
there is a hafle al-shabāb (stag party)”, a friend once commented to me. There was, 
however, a broader range of other activities available in Al-Wihdat. Football was 
definitely one of these. It was extremely popular in Al-Wihdat among boys and young 
men – watched in TV and played in the UNRWA school yard or, alternatively, in the 
football field located on the first floor of the Nadi Al-Wihdat117. But young men would 
also smoke shisha118 in small cafes near the Camp, mostly run by Egyptians. In 
addition, activities such as training homing pigeons took on an important role in the 
Camp. Sitting on the roofs of their houses, the kashashīn (pigeon trainers) dedicated a 
great amount of time to their hobby: feeding and grooming their birds, separating those 
that were sick, or just observing them flying in circle. Places like games rooms – 
generally small rooms equipped with a few screens and PlayStations – and barber’s 
shops were often crowded with youths of all ages.  
 
Barbershops and game rooms were also a warmer alternative to the street. Especially in 
winter, people would spend much of their time listening to Western and Arabic pop 
music, watching music videos, Hollywood or Egyptian soap operas, or listening to 
religious sermons on the radio. But the popularity of these spaces was explained 
                                                        
116
 Other research carried out in different geographical areas has investigated how fun and time-off 
activities are the means through which youths navigate their social malaise (e.g. Corrigan 1976, Cowan 
1991, Jeffrey 2010, Whyte 1969). 
117
 See “figure 19”. 
118
 A type of smoking pipe used in eastern countries in which the smoke is filtered through a water pipe 
before reaching the inhaler pipe. 
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especially by their social significance. These places were meeting points that were open 
until late at night: youths gathered and spent time chatting, joking, grooming or drinking 
coffee119. They were forums of public life where shabāb spent their time sitting, talking, 
being informed of job opportunities, talking about politics, gossiping, playing cards, and 
listening to the news on the TV. The tradition of young men gathering in such spaces 
and engaging in social practices of conviviality is definitely no singular to Al-Wihdat. 
What is peculiar about the popularity of these activities and places, if anything, is that 
they were all iconic of a desire to live a normal life (hayā ‘ādīe) beyond the imperative 
of political resistance; a desire even more striking if compared to the emphasis placed 
on personal and collective austerity that has been documented by other scholars of 
Palestinian communities during the first intifada (see for example Jean-Klein 2001). 
 
However, as I stated previously, loitering was also central to how the political was re-
enacted, conveyed, and narrated. In this sense, it is important to recognise the 
importance of spaces of everyday and apparently idle sociality to the fashioning of 
political views and subjectivities, and to show how the political merges with other 
discussions and feeds into them. In urban West Bengal, Dipesh Chakrabarty (1999) 
brings to the forefront the importance of male social exchange in culturally defined 
spaces (addas) for the fashioning of masculine conviviality and political consciousness. 
Beauty salons, games rooms, street corners, coffee stalls, or the roofs of the kashashīn 
were comparable contexts in Al-Wihdat. Here, the boundary that separates the most 
disparate topics of conversation was not clearly defined and, as often happens, people 
started to combine them. Sex and morality provided the background for political 
analysis, climate change blended into the most extreme conspiracy theories, and ethnic 
discrimination often served as a complement to business talk. As talking about the 
“illicit” was permissible and quite common within the relatively secure circle of friends, 
these discussions operated in the sense of Herzfeld’s notion of “cultural intimacy” – 
“the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of 
external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of 
common sociality” (1985, p. 3). These moments of sociality were hence very important 
in Al-Wihdat. In such spaces, shabāb crafted a sense of intimate solidarity, strengthened 
also by common experiences of discrimination in Jordan. The frequent use of humour, 
                                                        
119
 See “figure 20”. 
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horseplay, and biting jokes was instrumental in reinforcing interpersonal association 
among young men from the Camp (compare Jeffrey 2010, Verkaaik 2004). One friend, 
for example, generated bitter laughter when, sitting in a friend’s newly refurbished 
barber’s shop, he made a sarcastic comment to another friend who was lamenting his 
condition of  unemployment: “there is no job here [in Jordan] for us [camp dwellers]”, 
the man grumbled, “the only thing that we can do is just wait, wait until we die! Yes, 
perhaps only when we are dead, we can find a better situation”. “Don’t bother about 
that”, my friend responded, “I am sure that God has built refugee camps in paradise for 
Palestinians” 
 
 
Figure 19: football field in the Nadi Al-Wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
209 
 
 
 
Figure 20: coffee shops (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
Excessive “fun” 
 
In the next section, I will document in greater detail how refugees have infused 
Palestinian nationalism with mundanity by focusing on two apparently different types of 
time-off events: political commemorations and football matches. However, before doing 
so I want to shed light on how entertainment was also a source of moral debate and 
discussion: in some contexts, it was the particular mode of entertainment that provoked 
debate; in others, it was the type of contexts in which these activities took place.  
 
Shabāb’s free time should not be romanticised as a moment of camp dwellers’ 
boundless conviviality. If these activities generated a sense of intimacy among peers, 
they also contributed to dividing the camp community along moral fractures. This 
discourse of male idleness bears similarity to the distinction Craig Jeffrey made 
between Indian students who “imagined themselves as intelligent, unflustered observers 
of urban life and spoke of illiterates as slack-jawed, easily riled buffoons—the lowest 
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common denominators of urban street culture” (2010, p. 475). In Al-Wihdat, camp 
dwellers made a distinction between different forms of pastimes by opposing the figure 
of the “good (moral) person” (muhtaram) having fun against the image of the “useless 
loafer” (dawawīn) engaged in excessive and immoral loitering. Such debates had 
important repercussions on the way refugees conceptualised their own political 
subjectivity. Whereas the former behaviour was the epitome of the good Palestinian, the 
latter was the embodiment of immorality and the enduring political plight of 
Palestinians. The result of the indolence and immoral behaviour of lazy people was 
clear and plain for everybody to see in the decadence of present times: entire families 
lacking a fatherly example and stable financial support; children and adolescents devoid 
of proper guidance, who wasted their time running across the streets of the Camp; 
shabāb, lying on the sofa of barber’s shops or idling on footpaths, engaging in immoral 
activities such as cursing, smoking, watching pornography and drinking alcohol. And, 
as we have seen in the previous chapters, immorality was widely deemed in the Camp, 
to be one of the main causes behind the Palestinian catastrophe (Al-Nakba). 
 
My friends, for example, saw a clear difference between their “moral” ways of having 
fun and those of the dawawīn of Shāra‘ Liddawi. This distinction, however, did not 
prevent them from engaging in a number of time-off activities. According to them, 
loitering was not antithetical to Islamic piety. Despite the significance of Islam in 
people’s lives, many in Al-Wihdat reinterpreted the call to soberness and austerity 
promoted by more “orthodox” readings of Islamic and Muslim tradition, making it more 
flexible.  
 
In so doing, I draw on recent scholarship that has documented ways of having fun that 
transcend a sharp divide between pious forms of pleasure and apparently more authentic 
expressions of joy (Marsden 2005, Rollier 2010, Verkaaik 2004). These authors have 
challenged the idea advanced by those who see the playful spontaneity of “authentic 
fun” as necessarily incompatible with the moral ideal advanced by Islamist and pious-
minded people (Bayat 2010, chapter 7). 
 
In Al-Wihdat, many – including those who gained the appellative of sheikh – had an 
unabashed fondness for watching and playing football, alternated listening to the 
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Islamic sermons of well-known preachers with listening to popular Lebanese and 
Egyptian pop stars, and, most importantly, did not find any contradiction in doing so. 
One day, for example, Sheikh Abu Omar recounted to me a conversation he had had 
shortly earlier with a clerk employed in a fish shop located in the northern outskirts of 
the Camp. The man, an Egyptian in his early thirties, wanted to become a sheikh. Abu 
Omar was often approached by people on issues of piety because of his principled 
conduct, and so advised the Egyptian to simply follow the Quran. The clerk, however, 
was concerned that such a change would turn him into someone like his uncle, a sheikh, 
but also a sad and angry (za‘lān) person who condemned any form of fun. Abu Omar 
sardonically commented that he did not see the point in being like that: “if you are 
sheikh, you can still watch a film (tishuf film) and play football (tla‘eb kura al-
qadam)!”.   
 
On the other hand, other forms of entertainment that were popular amongst young men 
in Al-Wihdat, such as the consumption of hashish and alcohol, were publicly 
condemned. However, generally, it was less the activity than the setting where this was 
performed that was under attack. Non-gambling card games (shadda), for example, 
were an almost ever-present feature of life in the Camp. Although – I was assured – 
there were no specific indications in the Quran that forbade these activities, some people 
believed that such games distracted men from more godly activities such as praying or 
listening to audio sermons. In spite of such anti-card game arguments, most camp 
dwellers found playing shadda very amusing and not at all in contradiction with Islamic 
moral standards. The game was halal (religiously allowed) insofar as it did not preclude 
the fulfilment of Muslim duties such as the salāt. As a friend very simply put it, “there 
is no problem [mush mushkile], you pray, and afterwards you can play!” Conversely, if 
shadda was permissible, the settings where these games were played commanded little 
approbation amongst pious-minded people in Wihdat. Pool rooms and games rooms 
were such type of places: especially popular amongst youths and young men, the 
clientele that they attracted was said to be made up mostly of dawawīn, gypsies 
(nawari), and drunkards (sukharjin).  
 
Yet, although many of my friends believed that these places were sites of immorality, in 
fact there was no clear division between those who criticised and those who engaged in 
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such forms of sociality. As a matter of fact, games like biliardo and shadda were very 
popular in the Camp, and people like my friends found themselves torn between the 
desire to play these games and the importance of maintaining a good reputation. This 
moral impasse, however, was often settled by simply choosing a place outside the Camp 
and reducing the number of visits. In other words, loitering required a careful balance 
(see also Schielke 2008); if not judiciously managed, excess loitering (daiyya‘ el-waget, 
lit. “wasting time”) might have turned a person into being an āz‘ar (good for 
nothing/thug): someone who idled away his time doing nothing (yatasak‘a), a feature of 
being dawawīn. 
 
 
 
 
“APOLITICAL” NATIONALIST CELEBRATIONS 
 
Commemorative ceremonies (ihtifālāt) at the Nadi 
 
I now turn my attention to an aspect of camp life that has been widely considered as 
being central to the reproduction of Palestinian identity and resistance: commemorative 
events. Celebrations such as weddings and funerals, exhibitions, stories, songs, pictures, 
and also religious symbols such as the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa, contribute to 
transmitting the memory of Palestine and keeping it alive. The iconic role of these 
objects of memory has been crucial even in the fiction and poetry of Palestinians artists 
such as Ghassan Kanafani and Mahmood Darwish. Most importantly, as many scholars 
have pointed out, pro-Palestinian celebrations and events are not merely acts of 
nostalgia but are paramount to forging a sense of nationhood among Palestinians. A 
heterogeneous and large body of scholarship has abundantly investigated how strategies 
of cohesion and resistance are articulated through commemorative narratives (see 
Farmer 1999, Sayigh 1994, and Tilly 1994 amongst others). The significance of the 
Nakba (the catastrophe of 1948) and its associated objects of memory in the political 
life of Palestinians (see Khalili 2007) – olive trees, house keys, embroidered dresses, 
and village life in general – has been explored extensively (Abu-Lughod 2007, Khalili 
2004, Slyomovics 1998, Swedenburg 1990). Recent studies have also focused on 
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commemorative practices that celebrate Palestinian heroes and martyrs from the start of 
the nationalist movement in 1960 and its tragic development during the II intifada 
(Allen 2005, Khalili 2007).  
 
My approach is located in these studies. Situating narratives at the core of 
commemorative practices, Laleh Khalili argues “that every commemoration, whether it 
is a ceremony, a monument, a mural, or commemorative naming, explicitly or implicitly 
contains a story” (2007, p. 5, see also Verkaaik 2010). In Wihdat too, these ceremonies 
were vehicles for the transmission of nationalistic narratives. This does not mean, 
however, that participants unthinkingly endorsed the ideological and political rhetoric 
channelled through these events. A great deal of criticism was often expressed not only 
after or before but even during the various kinds of celebrations held annually in the 
Camp, such as those commemorating the Nakba Day (yom al-nakba) or the Naksa Day 
(yom al-naksa). My friends often ridiculed the speeches, as well as the poses assumed 
by the speakers at these events. They were not sympathetic to the reasons and motives 
behind the participation of people in such events creating a distance between themselves 
and the jumhūr (crowd) whose involvement they believed was not motivated by a true 
interest for political issues, but, rather, to immoral reasons, such as flirting with girls or 
just “hanging out”.  
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that refugees, who were extremely critical 
of the efficacy of these celebrations, were completely indifferent to the ideological 
values that these ceremonies commanded. I have never met anybody who did not praise 
these ceremonies as an occasion for celebrating a common story and cause. As Yurchak 
shows (2007), the routinisation of such rituals leads to acceptance of the form but not 
necessarily of its contents. In our case, despite the harsh criticism expressed by many of 
the participants in these types of celebrations and their ideological messages, the 
repetitiveness of these commemorative ceremonies in the Camp has contributed to 
strengthening a sense of community. Similarly, the re-enactment of certain stories and 
histories, the performance of semiotically rich ritual elements, such as the playing of 
dabke (a Palestinian traditional dance) or performances by Palestinian folk musicians 
and the incessant displays of Palestinian symbols (flags, scarves, maps) reinforced 
allegiance to an imagined Palestinian community. Most of all, these ceremonies, held in 
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the Nadi, located at the centre of the Camp, reinforced among my friends the belief that 
camp dwellers more than anybody else embodied Palestinian steadfastness (sumūd) and 
commitment to return. 
 
The Nakba celebration 
 
A case in point was the annual celebration of Al-Nakba I attended during my fieldwork 
in the Nadi Al-Wihdat.  
 
Despite at the beginning of the event rumours seemed to confirm the government’s 
refusal to grant permission to commemorate the Nakba in Wihdat, a celebration was 
eventually held in the Nadi under the aegis of its lejne al-thaqāfe (Department of 
Culture). These kinds of celebrations were usually quite standardised and contained 
many ritual elements: the recital of a sūra (verse) of the Quran, the hail to the King, the 
speeches of the invited speakers, and, occasionally, performances by Palestinian folk 
musicians. The visual realm was always characterised by the abundant display of 
Palestinian and Jordanian flags and drapes, and the ever-present face of the King.  
 
That day – the 15th of May – had been planned long before. The meeting room of the 
Nadi was packed with men and women of different ages. They were all accommodated 
in a large atrium – the room that had reminded me of an abandoned department store the 
first time I saw it. A conspicuous group of police officers were patrolling both the 
entrance to the Nadi and its main hall. In the left corner of the hall, mukhābarāt (secret 
service) officers were jotting down notes and taking photographs. Journalists, 
photographers and cameramen added to the crowd in the room. People were sitting in a 
semi-circle around the podium that was set up for the vocal performances of the 
speakers. There was a mixed group in the Wihdat club for the anniversary of the Nakba. 
Although separate seating for women and men was not strictly enforced, the former 
tended to sit to the left of the platform. Men occupied the remaining two-thirds of the 
room, some sitting, and most standing. On the back of the stage, two big flags – one 
Palestinian and one Jordanian – represented the solidarity of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan with the suffering of the people of Palestine. However, a giant poster of the King 
in the middle of the two flags suggested who the ultimate patron of the celebration was. 
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A few posters and flyers of the event were scattered on the wall and the floor of the 
Nadi; some banners waved by the spectators completed the scene.  
 
The opening started with the salute to the King and the reading from the Quran. After 
that, it continued with speeches given by seven speakers. The men – two Jordanians and 
five Palestinian-Jordanians – loudly evinced their support for the Palestinian cause and 
the suffering of its people. As often happens in these kinds of discourse, victims and 
martyrs were invoked by the speakers to make their speeches more effective. One 
speaker in particular made an explicit reference to other contexts, such as Algeria, 
where a much smaller number of martyrs led people to a revolution (thawra). The orator 
was wondering how many victims Palestinians would need to do the same. Saddam was 
also mentioned as a victim and symbol of resistance against imperialism. At the end, 
medals were distributed to the speakers. 
 
 
I cannot say whether it was vanity – as my friends maliciously suggested – or a 
veritable sense of duty to inspire the vocal performances of the old guards of the 
Palestinian resistance, but what certainly did push many shabāb to attend the event was 
boredom: the conference was a pleasant distraction from the daily routine in the Camp. 
A generalised feeling of boredom saturated the room. Many yawned, other looked 
around listestly. A friend whispered in my ear that he had better things to do than 
wasting his time listening the raving of the speakers.  
 
Like other events for Palestine that I attended, the celebration of the Nakba was also an 
occasion for distraction. And despite the great efforts of the speakers, once again the 
singers were met with greater approval by those gathered. Indeed, things began to 
change when the speakers brought to a close what in the eyes of my friends looked like 
“empty words” (haki fadi).  Shortly afterwards, a documentary was screened. As with 
many others I watched, in this film images of devastation, grief, and misery were 
followed unfailingly by actions of urban guerrilla warfare, steadfastness, and 
rebellion. The shabāb seemed satisfied with this event. Hisham, a young man from 
Gaza, explained it to me by saying that the references to the martyrs and heroes in the 
speeches were more emphasised this time then during the commemoration that was held 
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the previous year in the Nadi. The conference then turned into a sort of live concert as a 
well-known Palestinian singer and his band, wearing traditional dress, began playing 
nationalistic songs. No longer bored, the crowd was jubilant at listening to the music. 
Bursts of applause and joy accompanied the screening of the documentary and the 
musical performance by the singer. Many other people, mostly shabāb now also entered 
the gathering attracted by the music and noise. Photographers and cameramen were 
bustling around with the intention of recording and framing any instant of the event. 
The public now participated with visible enthusiasm. The event was a great opportunity 
to flirt, dance, and have fun.  
 
The celebration prompted different responses. While Hisham and the other shabāb of 
the Nadi described the day to me as “helū ktir” (really nice), others were instead very 
critical of the nature of this commemoration. According to the latter group, it should 
have been more a moment of remembering and mourning rather than a mere party for 
amusing youths. Their scepticism addressed not only the nature of the day’s event, but 
also the real intention of the speakers: “they speak, so they feel important!!”. The 
motivations that inspired most of the shabāb and young men to attend also came under 
question: “al-shabāb here do not care about the celebration, they just come to flirt with 
the girls (yimshi warā’ al-banāt)”. As a friend put it, “I am here just because there is 
nothing better to do today [fish ishi tani al-yom]”.  
 
The celebration at the Nakba draws hence attention to the kinds of emotional 
involvement that participating in this and other similar events involved. Fascination for 
patriotism was one reason why such ceremonies continued to enjoy considerable 
success in Al-Wihdat. Yet there was more to peoples’ decisions to attend such events 
than formal commitment to Palestinian nationalism alone. The celebration provided 
camp dwellers with opportunities for flirting with girls, listening to music, and also the 
possibility of maliciously backbiting about the speakers. As such, a diverse mixture of 
motivations linked to a range of emotional states, from fun to boredom, ultimately led 
people to attend these ceremonies. People participated in this event and other similar 
gatherings that I attended in different ways: many were happy, others were cynical, and 
some were critical of the rhetoric of such commemorations. Stating that fun, boredom, 
enthusiasm and aversion were the most common emotions participants displayed 
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towards these events, however, also has unexpected implications. It means that 
indifference was not as common a feeling as might have been expected based on what 
refugees said about their discomfort toward politics and political elites: despite their 
indifference towards or mocking of the speakers’ political rhetoric and staid  opinions, 
spectators, were not indifferent to participating in the celebration as a whole.  
 
Seeing people’s participation in ceremonies solely through the lens of their passive 
acceptance of or resistance of an event’s political contents would not explain the 
contradictory fact that many people in Wihdat were able to both criticise these 
gatherings, and to be pleasured form participating in it. In other words, the political was 
boring but these gatherings were, for many, an irresistible occasion to have fun or, at 
least, escape boredom. By enjoying the company of friends, the presence of girls, and 
good music, refugees infused the political contents of the celebrations with apolitical 
transgression and fun. But, however profane the reasons for attending the celebrations 
may be, refugees did not cease to reproduce Palestinian nationalism; quite the contrary: 
participating to these rituals produced among them a feeling of togetherness and shared 
intimacy that would have been otherwise impossible without turning a boring and 
highly standardised political ritual into an opportunity for transgressive forms of 
behaviour (Verkaaik 2004, Yurchak 2006). 
 
POLITICAL FUN 
 
Fun and football 
 
An enduring memory of my fieldwork is the several evenings I spent watching football 
in the Markez. “Shu bitshaja‘e [which team do you support]?” was one of the most 
recurrent question I was asked during my fieldwork. “Football” was a central part of 
refugees’ daily life. It was played in the UNRWA school yards or in any other clearings 
that served the purpose, watched on television, and evoked by the logos and official 
colours of popular teams – such as Barcelona or Real Madrid – printed on the t-shirts 
and tracksuits that refugees wore daily.  
 
218 
 
 
Moreover, whereas political demonstrations and events were often attended because 
they were amusing diversions from the tedium of daily life, leisure activities – such as 
football – at times took on distinct forms of political significance. People often drew a 
link between politics and football. The Algeria vs. England match played in the 
preliminary heat of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in July 2010, was a case in point. As I 
expected, the large majority of refugees supported Algeria. For many, the World Cup 
was the time for payback against colonisers and imperialist countries (musta‘mirīn). As 
a friend once told me, “I used to support Brazil and Argentina […] now I support 
whoever is against the colonisers”. However, “political” sympathies for football teams 
extended beyond the simple colonised/coloniser dichotomy. Abu Omar, for example, 
once explained to me why he supported the Italian football team despite its disastrous 
performance during the previous edition of the World Cup: “you asked me why? Here is 
the reason”, he said, pointing at a picture on his laptop that displayed a crowd of Italian 
fans in a stadium who were waving Palestinian flags and placards with slogans 
supporting the resistance in Gaza. “You see the posters? When Italians won the World 
Cup in 1982, they dedicated it to us!”. But football was connected to the Palestinian 
national struggle not only through the imputed political sentiments of international 
teams, however: the camps also had their own teams and these occupied an important 
place in Jordan’s national culture. This was most evident when the Wihdat team (farīq 
al-wihdat) – a sports club founded in 1956 in the Camp – played against its historical 
rival, the Faisaly team (farīq al-faisaly) – a club associated with ethnic Jordanians. 
When this happened, there was little room for ambiguity in the minds of the people in 
the Camp: football was politics. I often heard people repeating in occasion of these 
matches that “‘ādī syāse mish mubārā ‘ādīe! [This is politics, not a normal football 
match!]”.  
 
Apparently, people in the Camp were much more likely to incur the wrath of the 
authorities for football matches that turned into collective protests against the regime, 
than for political demonstrations. However, how can we explain the fact that people 
who manifested and expressed their profound distaste for the political were still keen to 
use football as a political arena? This is the question around football and politics in Al-
Wihdat, and it is the complex imbrications of the two that I now explore.  
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There is, of course, nothing special about the political significance of football. The 
relationship between politics and football has been abundantly documented in the 
Middle East as well as elsewhere (Armstrong and Giulianotti 1997, Ben-Porat 2001, 
Fozooni 2004, Sorek 2007` amongst others). In Jordan, the political significance of the 
matches between Al-Wihdat and Al-Faisaly has been the subject of a research study 
(Tuastad 1997) and a plethora of newspaper articles (e.g. Abu Toameh 2009, Omari 
2010), and even a leak from WikiLeaks (Keinon 2010). The problem with these 
accounts is that while they have the merit of exploring how football channels political 
tensions, they look at football primarily for “its expressive and instrumental role in the 
reproduction of nationalism” (Tuastad 1997, p. 118). I do not intend to downplay here 
the obvious political dimension of Al-Wihdat football club, which became one of the 
symbols of Palestinian nationalism in Jordan after the crushing of guerrilla fighters 
during Black September (Massad 2001, Tuastad 1997). However, I believe that if we 
are to understand the significance of Wihdat football club in the daily lives of refugees, 
we should look at football for its ludic dimension rather than for its capacity to act 
merely as a political medium. Focusing on this dimension can ultimately enhance our 
understanding of how fun and football enabled camp dwellers to navigate the 
ambiguities of their lives – ambiguities that the political would otherwise crystallise. 
 
To understand the political importance of football in a context dominated by a general 
discomfort surrounding politics and the political, I will turn to Oskar Verkaaik’s 
ethnography of the Muhajir Qumi Movement (MQM). The author explains the 
extraordinary popularity of this religious nationalist group in Pakistan by the irresistible 
opportunity for fun that the movement offered to urban youths. Verkaaik notes that 
members of this group often drew a contrast between their activities and the seriousness 
and pretentiousness of state-promoted forms of nationalism in the country. To describe 
the specific nature of MQM’s activities, he draws on a distinction made by Obeyesekere 
between “dromena” and “chatartic” rituals. Obeyesekere describes the former as 
“solemn, stately rituals […] which […] embody cultural, religious, and philosophical 
values and are characterized by controlled behaviour and seriousness, camouflaging 
conflict and anxiety. Catharses, in contrast, are ‘vulgar’ rituals that move in an opposite, 
regressive direction. They are characterized by acting out behavior and often levity and 
obscenity” (Verkaaik 2004, p. 119). According to Verkaaik, the activities of MQM 
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recall cathartic rituals insofar as they share the same “self conscious parody of high 
cultural forms and values, and a collective enjoyment of the ludic, of comedy and 
satire” (ibid.).  
 
Likewise, I here draw an analogy between political celebrations and “dromena” rituals, 
on one side, and football matches and “cathartic” rituals, on the other. While, as we 
have just seen, many refugees in the Camp despised the solemn and serious nature of 
formal celebration, football matches were widely appreciated for their ludic and joyful 
nature. Yet, at the same time these events provided an important form of empathy with 
Palestinian nationalism that could not be attained otherwise within the corrupt and 
boring world of the political.  
 
I will explain what this involved and how it was experienced by refugees by giving a 
brief account of the celebration of an important victory of the Al-Wihdat football team 
in the Camp. 
 
Riots in the Camp 
 
It was a sunny evening in early April. Along with a few friends from the Camp, I went 
to the football stadium in Amman where the Al-Wihdat football team played the 
majority of its home matches. Malab Malik Abdullah II (King Abdulla II Stadium) was 
located within walking distance of Wihdat Camp in the nearby neighbourhood of 
Gwesme120. The proximity of the stadium and the wide clearing that encircled it 
provided the shabāb of Wihdat and the surrounding areas with a suitable place for 
playing football. That day, however, the riot police were patrolling: Wihdat Football 
Club (nadi al-wihdat) was playing and, as ever, unrest was expected by the authorities. 
The deployment of security forces was noticeable and a thick cordon of officers stood 
along the entire perimeter of the football field. However, this exceptional display of 
force was not the norm. At ordinary games most of the fans were Palestinians from Al-
Wihdat, and only a few police officers would patrol the stadium; on this day, however, 
                                                        
120
 For security reasons, however, the matches between Faisaly and Wihdat were generally played in 
Zarqa, a nearby city, and not in the Malik Abdullah II Stadium, close to Wihdat refugee camp. 
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there was much more at stake than usual:  Al-Wihdat was just one step away from 
winning the Cup of Jordan (casse al-’urdun). 
 
Al-Wihdat eventually won and celebrations were no less vibrant than I would have 
expected: in small groups, people flooded into the streets of the Camp chanting songs 
while waving Palestinian flags and football scarves. Having watched the match at home 
in the Camp, we decided to join the crowd in the street. Important Al-Wihdat victories 
were always moments of shared joy and collective participation in the Camp121. In 
terms of the number of people involved, other celebrations such as political 
demonstrations or the annual commemoration of the Nakba were insignificant. The 
enthusiasm and joy that accompanied this spontaneous gathering were greater than 
anything I had seen since I had been living in the Camp. The streets were full of people 
jumping and dancing, and traffic flow – in itself always problematic in the narrow alleys 
of Al-Wihdat – was completely blocked. In the important arterial roads of Shāra‘ 
Sumaiyya and Shāra‘ Madaba, the sound of the drums accompanied the explosion of 
crackers and fireworks, while the Wihdat football anthem was played loudly from 
stands and small shops.  
 
The spontaneity of these celebrations was also indicated by the complete lack of 
organisation. Separate groups of people – which, in the dim lighting of the outer areas 
of the Camp, looked like just darker spots in the street – met in the street and started the 
celebration. Shabāb spasmodically waved flags and Wihdat football scarves, 
occasionally using aerosol sprays as flamethrowers. As a mark of the strong bond that 
united Wihdat Football Club with camp-dwellers, soon after the prize-giving in the 
stadium, the cup was brought into the Camp and excitedly displayed by a group of 
people who were presumably standing in a car. The vehicle – not visible because of the 
number of people on and around it – was parading around Shāra‘ al-Nadi. In the space 
of a few minutes, thousands of people overflowed Shāra‘ Madaba and the streets around 
it. Blocking traffic flow, many hailed the victory by singing slogans such as “God, 
Jerusalem, and the Arabs” or “we are from Wihdat, we are the children of Palestine”. 
These clusters of people eventually joined to merge into a bigger one. Moving back and 
                                                        
121
 Although women and old people were watching, only men and shabāb (youths) participated in the 
celebration. 
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forth in Shāra‘ al-Nadi between the Souk and Shāra‘ Madaba (where a main police 
station was located), the multitude attracted more people, growing rapidly in size. 
Nobody led the crowd; occasionally leaders, appeared, stirred up the crowd, and 
disappeared.  
 
However, the “mood” of the crowd changed quickly. The joy about the success of the 
Wihdat team was replaced by songs and chants against Al-Faisaly and the royal family, 
and the jubilation turned to turmoil.  New slogans were replacing the old ones – such as 
“kuss ukhtak el-hukūme” (fuck the government) and “feisalawy maniak” (Faisali 
supporters are asses). Insults were lunched also at the police officers who were 
zealously observing the celebration, perched on the observation balconies that were 
located on top of the towering police station. Some also began to set off fireworks close 
to or even in the direction of the police station. The size of the crowd alone would have 
probably been a sufficient reason for the police to scatter the crowd; in fact, 
immediately after the first fireworks were set off police officers arrived at the scene 
dressed in full riot gear.  
 
It did not take long for the police to intervene with batons and tear gas; they were, 
according to my friends, only waiting for a pretext of one kind or another to scatter the 
crowd. Moving back from the epicentre of the clash/celebration, we came across groups 
of shabāb running away. Poor street lighting in Al-Wihdat raised fears and tensions 
further. Indeed, a few hours earlier a friend of mine had commented that a temporary 
blackout in the Camp was the direct result of regime machination: “it’s the hukūme 
(government)! They are doing it because of the match”.  The main road that provides 
access to Al-Wihdat from Shāraʿ Madaba was blocked by temporary check points. A 
friend commented, his voice shaking with excitement, that: “it seems like we’re in 
Afghanistan!”. 
 
Fun and Palestinian nationalism 
 
The whole episode may have induced some observers to conclude that political life 
amongst refugees was framed in terms of a radical antagonism between Jordanian-
Palestinians (filastīnīn min urdun) and Transjordanians (’urdunīn), and that young men 
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in the Camp made instrumental use of football to channel their political struggles. I 
instead highlight once again the need to look at the ludic dimension of football in order 
to grasp the complexities of camp dwellers’ political identity. 
 
Al-Wihdat’s football matches generated a generalised enthusiasm in the Camp, and my 
friends listed important victories by the local team among the most cherished moments 
of their lives. However, as Verkaaik writes, “[i]t often takes only a tiny step to go from 
fun to violence, and it is frequently taken without much consideration” (1986, p. 118). 
The fierce rivalry between Al-Wihdat and Al-Faisaly often turned into political 
criticism and unrest. It was hence not uncommon that the aftermath of a football match 
between the two clubs turned into a sort of urban guerrilla fighting. Fun provided 
Palestinian refugees in Al-Wihdat with the capacity to act under a common feeling of 
identification as Palestinians. During these matches, national and ethnic nuances were 
wiped out and boundaries sharpened: Palestinians supported Wihdat, Transjordanians 
supported Al-Faisaly. This identification reached such an extent that when Wihdat lost 
an important match and consequently the championship, many were embittered and 
remarked to me: “They took Palestine, then al-Aqsa, and now Wihdat”.  
 
For camp dwellers, however, allegiance to Palestinian nationalistic ideals during 
football matches was more than the discourse on Palestinian national identity and 
struggles promoted by party leaders. They experienced this ideal as a form of leisure, 
humour, and irreverence, which gave them a sense of power, amplified by the self-
awareness that being together inspired. It was not only solidarity, though, but also 
internal competition within the group that defined the relationships between its 
members. Again, it is worth quoting Verkaaik when he states that “[a]lready standing 
somewhat outside mainstream society and often lacking formal leadership, such groups 
may put pressure on members to show their wit and courage by going beyond the limits 
of what is generally deemed morally acceptable”(1986, p. 186). The transgressive 
crossing of the boundary between the legit and illicit was a common feature of 
important at Al-Wihdat matches. Aroused by the noisy sound of drums at the stadium, 
audible even from the South-Eastern outskirts of the Camp, Al-Wihdat’s fans (jumhūr 
al-wihdat) often accompanied the performance of their team with mocking and sarcastic 
songs. On these occasions, for example, a common slogan that the crowd shouted to 
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encourage Al-Wihdat sees the substitution of Malik (King) with “Wihdat” as a term of 
reference in what originally was a nationalistic pro-Hashemite slogan – “bir-roh bid-
dam nafdika ya malik” (by soul and by blood we support the King/Wihdat)!”. In Al-
Wihdat, this was even more evident when the euphoria and joy about the victory of Al-
Wihdat took a dangerous and yet thrilling turn – i.e. when the shabāb started criticising 
the King and his entourage, including the authorities. Such deeds would often be 
recalled with pride within the peer group, and were narrated again and again to loud 
laughs and clapping.  
 
However, the irreverent and ludic nature of these events points to yet another dimension 
of fun: its creative capacity (Verkaaik 2004). Against the backdrop of the disastrous 
political situation in the Occupied Territories and the discrimination faced in host 
countries, fun did not simply make it possible for camp dwellers to infuse new life into 
Palestinian nationalism and to use it to counterbalance their shared experience of loss 
and marginalisation in Jordan. More than that, the creative power of fun enabled camp 
youths to give new meaning to the notion of “Palestinianness”, and a new form to their 
allegiance to Palestinian nationalism, one more suited to their desire to live life in 
Jordan. Of course, the dynamics of friend/enemy identification that defined the 
agonistic world of the political (Spencer 2007) were also played out during football 
matches: this was most evident when Al-Wihdat played against Al-Faisaly. But because 
of its ludic and non-serious dimension, however, fun enabled a flexibility that the 
sclerotic world of the political did not permit. The self-contradictory ambiguity of being 
both Palestinian refugees and Jordanian citizens was of little importance to my friends 
when Al-Wihdat played. If supporting Al-Wihdat meant anything at all, it was the 
desire for transgression, the feeling of togetherness, and the euphoric atmosphere that its 
supporters experienced when the team played. This made it possible to support Al-
Wihdat as a symbol of Palestinian identification, despise Al-Faisaly as the antagonist 
team that represented the “Transjordanian community”, and yet feel themselves 
genuinely Jordanian citizens afterwards. For example, one day a friend told me that a 
man, disguised as a Wihdat fan but suspected of being a Faisaly supporter, managed to 
get access to the online forum of the Al-Wihdat football team – informally called al-
mouq‘e (the site). Apparently, the man posted insults, threats, and other obscenities on 
the forum based on the alleged ethnic origin of the team and its supporters. The event 
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left my friend quite puzzled, and he commented on the foolishness of the episode: “I do 
not see what Palestine and Palestinians have to do with the Wihdat team. Why would 
you insult Palestinians if you don’t like the team?! Insult the team, if you really have 
to!” 
 
Not surprisingly, the fun experience during football matches did not only set apart camp 
dwellers from the so-called Transjordanians; at times it served to unify the population of 
Jordan. The support for the Jordanian football team was a case in point. Most of my 
friends had an ambivalent attitude toward this team. Some were genuine supporters 
because Jordan was their country as well as the country of their fathers. Others instead 
denounced the abuse and the discrimination that they underwent as “second class 
citizens”, and complained about the normalisation of relationships with Israel, as 
reasons why they would never support Jordan. However, as a large number of the 
players of the Jordanian team were Palestinian-Jordanians who played in the beloved 
Al-Wihdat Team, the victory of the national team seldom left my friends in Al-Wihdat 
unconcerned. For example, when Jordan’s victory against Singapore qualified the team 
for the Asian Cup play-off, the success of the local team eventually triggered a wave of 
enthusiasm on the streets of the capital as well as in Al-Wihdat. Again, Joseph Massad 
notes that, in the Arab football championship of 1997, the defeat of the Syrian national 
team by Jordan generated a similar response: 
 
“At the end of the game, which most of the people of Jordan watched on satellite television at 
home or in cafes, thousands of people and cars crowded the streets of Jordan’s cities and towns, 
especially Amman, where cars stopped in the middle of the streets and young men and women 
danced, bringing traffic to a complete halt for hours. King Husayn chartered a plane to bring the 
players home from Beirut. Upon arrival, the team toured Amman’s streets in a massive convoy 
with supporters (men and women) lining all of Amman’s major thoroughfares. Many Jordanian 
news columnists saw this as a sign of Palestinian-Jordanian unity under one Jordanian identity” 
(2001, pp. 257).   
 
226 
 
 
 
Figure 21: farīq al-wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
Figure 22: Al-Wihdat fans (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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Figure 23: Al-Faisaly fans waving Jordanian hatta (source: Jihad Nijem) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Al-Wihdat, camp dwellers have actively sought to relieve themselves from boredom 
and the overwhelming presence of the political by becoming engaged in a range of 
activities.  
 
During my fieldwork, I have observed celebrations becoming occasions of fun, and 
apolitical events such as football matches turning into movement of political unrest. 
Camp dwellers did this for fun, as a playful alternative to the boredom experienced 
daily in the Camp, and as a reaction to the condition of being “fed up” of politics and 
political parties. The momentary suspension of the political created new spaces of 
agency that allowed refugees to accommodate their need to live an ordinary life as 
Jordanian citizens with the stresses towards an extraordinary existence as living 
symbols of Palestinian nationalism. We have already seen how refugees have sought to 
accomplish this goal through the pursuit of social and economic integration (chapter 2 
and 3) as well as through the performance of a moral and masculine self (chapter 4 and 
5). Likewise, to relieve their existence from boredom, and hence the overexposure to the 
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political, refugees turned to the non-political grammar of loitering. Engagement in these 
activities, however, was not a way for refugees to neglect their nationalistic ideals (cf. 
Jean-Klein 2001), but rather a mode through which they readapted these to the 
concurrent and powerfully felt need to live an ordinary life. By making a nationalist 
celebration an irresistible opportunity to meet girls and listen to live music or simply 
escape boredom, and turning a fun event such as a football match into a political 
demonstration, refugees infused Palestinian nationalism with ordinariness: doing so 
injected it with vitality and adapted it to the protracted temporariness or fragile 
ordinariness of being both refugees and citizens in Jordan.  
 
We might be tempted to describe refugees’ engagement with these activities as entirely 
political. However, I would urge to refrain from doing so, as this would run the risk of 
removing the very thing that enabled the political: the non-political (Candea 2011). It 
was the very dialectic between these two dimensions that allowed the adaptation of 
Palestinian nationalist discourse and the imperative of resistance to the exigencies of 
living a normal life. For example, the ritualism of watching football together, hanging 
around on the streets of the Camp, or attending nationalist commemorations, 
contributed to effectively strengthening a sense of intimacy and, in so doing, the ideal 
values of political unity. Allegiance to national symbols and identity was often re-
enacted in the course of these activities. But “loitering” cannot be framed in 
functionalist terms as a social ritual that served to re-inscribe the subject with nationalist 
values. Neither were these activities, in line with the tradition of resistance studies, a 
space where the hegemony of Palestinian nationalism was challenged and resisted. 
While the centrality of Palestine was never called into question, the politics of 
“loitering” never fully subscribed to nationalist ideals. These activities were an 
expression of the redundant and fundamentally boring nature of the political in the 
Camp, and the fun generated by them was the reflection of camp dwellers’ wish to carry 
out a normal life.  
 
To reiterate, the fun and ludic dimensions of time-off activities allowed refugees to 
reproduce the ideal and ethical values of Palestinian nationalism by mitigating the 
excess of the political and fashioning a shared feeling of belonging to the same 
community. At the same time, however, these activities enabled camp-dwellers to 
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reinterpret these ideals and meanings in a new way that was more suited to their need to 
live a normal life – i.e. outside the imperative of active militancy. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis I have sought to show how refugees have received and responded the 
political messages behind their struggle for national sovereignty in the context of their 
progressive integration in Jordan. To illustrate the complexities and ambiguities of 
camp-dwellers’ experience of the political in ordinary times, I will begin this conclusion 
with two short anecdotes from my 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork amongst 
refugees in Al-Wihdat camp.  
 
Political talks were a veritable source of anxiety in the Camp because exposed people to 
the danger of being overheard. The government took any sort of criticism towards it 
seriously.  As it was confirmed by my friends, many people collaborated with the 
mukhābarāt – the Arab secret service, and a vast network of secret agencies was 
thought to liaise with the local group, most notably the CIA and Mossad122. In the 
Camp, many stories circulated about people being stopped, questioned, and occasionally 
detained for expressing their disapproval against the royal family. Not surprisingly, 
almost everybody avoided publicly expressing opinions about the King and his 
entourage. One day, for example, a friend started a long diatribe in his house whose 
main target was the government (hukūme) and the King (el-malik). There was nothing 
seriously about it – or so it seemed to me – nothing that could have vaguely recalled 
seditious dispositions; there were “merely” a number of insults and injuries addressed to 
the political leaders. So, while one friend was expressing a point of view, another friend 
was anxiously looking at him, gesturing to him to stop. I suspected that I probably was 
the problem. Although I had a sincere friendship with them, I knew that my role as 
researcher did not reassure them completely of a potential security leak. Determined to 
put an end to this, I decided – as a joke – to show them my passport. But in the act of 
putting my hands in the inside pocket of my jacket to take the document, my friends 
froze with fear. Only the sight of my passport relieved them from the deep anxieties that 
what I was showing was neither a tape recorder nor same sort of badge.  
 
                                                        
122
 The Jordanian mukhābarāt and the Israeli secret service are both widely known for being the most 
effective intelligent agencies in the Middle East – rumours, poetry, and lately cinematographic 
transpositions have contributed to strengthen this idea. 
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Ironically, just few months earlier I had to receive the latest rumours with a hint of 
bitterness and anger. Apparently, the father of one of my friends was firmly convinced I 
was a secret agent, a spy (jāsūs), from the mukhābarāt. The brief visit I paid to his 
house upon his invitation did only seem to confirm his suspicions. According to the old 
fidāʾīyyn, my shaky Arabic was only an attempt to dissimulate my true intentions and 
secret plans. But not only the old man did not hesitate to express his suspicions, he even 
urged my friends to chase me out of the Camp. Luckily, they reassured me that I should 
have not paid too much attention to the ravings of old men as they did not reflect what 
they thought about me – “in truth, old people are always suspicious [fil agiga khitiārīn 
dā’iman mashkūlīn]”. Yet, that day, when I took my passport, I could still clearly 
perceive their unease. Only after spending months together did my friends indulge in 
open speculation in front of me. Yet, the spectre of being a spy taunted me for the whole 
period of my stay in Al-Wihdat. And toward the very end of my fieldwork, just few 
weeks before leaving, a man – an Egyptian who worked as a peddler in the market of 
the Camp and to whom I was introduced months earlier – approached me in the street. 
With extreme consideration, he warned me that I could have been killed because there 
were people who suspected me of being a Jewish spy: “people here think that any 
stranger works for the mukhābarāt, Mossad, or CIA. When I came here they though the 
same about me, and there is someone that still believe that I am a spy!”. Luckily, 
nothing happened to me and, as I suspected, the man overestimated the risk of my 
opinionated friend. Yet these episodes remain relevant of the extent of this paranoia in 
Al-Wihdat.  
 
However, as I will show in the second vignette, it was not only fear but also boredom 
that the political inspired in the lives of my informants123.  
 
After few months of fieldwork in Wihdat, I finally managed to leave to Lebanon on a 
trip that I had for long been planning with a friend from the Camp. My travelling 
companion, Ashraf, picked me up with a friend in my house in Wihdat. We took a 
service (public taxis) from Abdali – once Amman’s main bus station124 – to Beirut, via 
                                                        
123
 On the relationship between boredom and fear, see also Kelly 2008 and Taussig 2004. 
124Although no busses departed from Abdali any longer, – the station was closed down because of the 
types of property speculation that were affecting many areas of the city at time of my research – services 
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Damascus. We approached the city five hours later, where we planned to stay for a 
short, two-day trip. Our goal was to do some sightseeing and enjoy the nightlife that 
made Beirut so popular among many youth in the Middle East. On my side, however, I 
also hoped that our short joint travel to Beirut could turn into a good occasion to 
observe my friend’s attitude and relationship to a city that was of central importance to 
Palestinian political memory. Engraved in the streets and corners of Beirut there are still 
memories and physical reminders of the Palestinian history of suffering and nationalist 
struggles decipherable for interested eyes, such as the ruins of Tal Al-Za‘tar and the still 
existing refugee camp of Sabra and Shatila (Khalili 2007)125. It did not, hence, take me 
long to observe my friends’ attitudes toward the political side of Beirut. Hanging around 
on the streets of Beirut downtown, we ended up in front of the historical headquarters of 
the Lebanese Phalange. A sturdy Phalangist126 approached us, questioning in a 
somewhat intimidating way about what we were doing there. Reassured on our 
intentions, he left. I asked Ashraf whether he knew the man. “No, I don’t know him”, he 
replied. “He’s one of those who killed so many Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila”. I 
said. “Ah!”, he replied rather listlessly.  
 
Ashraf, like everybody else in the Camp, knew about the stories of violence and sorrow 
that took place in the city of Beirut – narratives that have so dramatically saturated the 
political imaginations of Palestinians (Allen 2005). Yet, he did not seem to care greatly 
about it. On my part, I was rather disappointed by his answer: after all, Ashraf’s 
patriotism and loyalty to the Palestinian cause was one of my main reasons for 
travelling with him to Beirut. I was puzzled by the fact that Ashraf did not seem to care 
about a man who was obviously a member of a militia that had played a central role in 
one of the worst massacres to have taken place in Palestinian history. Even more 
puzzling was what was about to follow. After the incident, I proposed him that we visit 
the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. Ashraf seemed a little surprised by my 
proposition and asked me why I thought we should do something like that. I told him 
                                                                                                                                                                  
continued to connect the capital with other important locations such as Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and 
Aleppo.   
125In 1976, over four thousand people died following the destruction of Tal Al-Za‘tar refugee camp at the 
hands of Maronite militias during the Lebanese Civil War. Six years after, in the refugee camp of Sabra 
and Shatila, the Lebanese Forces and South Lebanese Army, with the logistic support of Israeli army, 
perpetrated another massacre, killing more than a thousand Palestinian refugees (Sayigh 1997).   
126A member of the Lebanese Phalange Party – a right-wing paramilitary and political organisation, 
mainly supported by Maronite Christians. 
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that these were places important to the history of the Palestinian national struggle. No 
longer surprised but visibly annoyed by my admittedly rather over continuous insistence 
on talking about Palestinian issues, he cut me short: “Luigi, ehna zahgānīn min al 
mukhayyamāt [we are fed up of refugee camps]!” I was taken aback by his response, for 
I expected Ashraf expressing feelings of pride, sorrow, or even anger in relationship to 
the many symbols that stand prominently in the Palestinian nationalistic discourse in 
Beirut; but at that time of my field, I was still not prepared to encounter “boredom” 
among the normative feelings of Palestinian nationalism (Allen 2009). During the rest 
of our time in Beirut, we went on sightseeing. Ashraf never approached the topic of 
politics again and neither did I.  
 
What these two vignettes ultimately tell us is the complexities for camp-dwellers of 
living an “ordinary life” (hayā ‘ādiyye). The real obsession for secrecy and treachery in 
the Camp was indicative of the intrinsic fragility of this project. Mistaking the act of 
taking my passport as a potential threat exposed the exceptionality of their condition. 
The extraordinariness of refugees’ political status was always there, ready to emerge, 
and apt to jeopardise the prospects of an ordinary life. Likewise, when Ashraf 
reproached me for my continuous insistence to uncover the political (“ehnā zahgānīn 
min el mukhayyamāt”), his was an invitation to cut short the exceptionality of their lives 
and let them relax within the comfort of a life carried out in an apparently banal 
ordinariness – something my friend conceived of in terms of flirting with girls or simply 
walking around for Beirut’s nightlife district.  
 
The indication in my fieldwork suggested that being ordinary was not only a state, but 
also a condition that most people in Al-Wihdat aspired to (see also Kelly 2008). It was a 
project that the large majority strived, more or less successfully, to achieve. It was the 
struggle to fill the gap between what Kelly identifies as the normative sense of what 
ordinary “should be” and the empirical sense of what actually “is” that constituted the 
goal of many refugees in Al-Wihdat and often also the cause of much frustration and 
boredom. For refugees, “being ordinary” was not something that could have been easily 
taken for granted, for the search of the ordinary took place in a situation of protracted 
extraordinariness and great ambiguity: Palestinian refugees and Jordanian citizens who 
after 60 years still live in a “temporary” space that is also spatially and economically 
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integrated into the municipality of Amman.  And this condition was further aggravated, 
for, as we have seen throughout the thesis, a sense of communality among camp-
dwellers was often threatened by discrimination and stigma. The determination of many 
people to accomplish an ordinary life with all this might entail – owning a flat, getting 
married, and gaining a decent professional status but also being able to fulfil other 
desires such as having fun or being free to choose a specific dress code127 – was 
sometimes in strident contrast with the extraordinariness of refugee political status and 
their wish to re-enact their allegiance to Palestinian nationalism.  
 
So, boredom and fear were in large part the consequence of not being able to carry out 
an “ordinary life”. But the two anecdotes above tell us something more: boredom and 
fear were brought to light with even more intensity during refugees’ encounter with 
what they perceived to be the corrupted world of the political. If, in many 
anthropological accounts, the political could have worked as a vehicle through which 
such contradictions were co-opted or challenged (e.g.Scott 1985), for the majority of 
camp-dwellers, it was instead an arena where these contradictions were more intensely 
experienced. In this sense, the findings of my research confirm Carl Schmitt’s specific 
understanding of the political. According to the German political philosopher, “at the 
very heart of the political lay the distinction between friend and enemy [italics is mine]” 
(Spencer 2007, p.10). In Jordan the distinction between “enemy/friend” was played out 
in the tension between assimilation and resistance, between refugeeness and citizenship, 
between Jordanianness and Palestinianness, between the efforts of living an ordinary 
life in the context of their integration in Jordan and the nationalistic struggles of an 
exilic community. The tension inherent in camp-dwellers status in Jordan was cankered 
by the politics of the “friend and enemy” dichotomy –  the politics of “us” (Palestinian 
refugees) versus “them” (Jordanian citizen) that left little space for the kind of 
flexibility that refugees needed to accommodate their need to live an ordinary life with 
their wish to uphold their nationalist ideals. Asking Ashraf his opinion on refugee 
camps and political leaders strictly tied with the Palestinian history surely uncovered 
painful memories. But my insistence also operated in the sense of continuously 
reminding him to take a clear stance on his national identity. It sounded like: “are you 
                                                        
127
 On one occasion, for example, a friend lamented the impossibility of dressing like a real pious man 
(zei sheikh hagigi) because especially in refugee camps, this would have given the authorities hints of the 
man being aligned with terrorists.  
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Palestinian, or not?! If so, behave as such and show more commitment”. Ashraf’s 
answer was symptomatic of the fact that, at least at that moment, he did not want to take 
any categorical and exclusivist political position. These dynamics were even more 
evident during the first vignette. Indeed, if the political exacerbated the ambiguities of 
being Palestinian refugees in Jordan, these contradictions were then most intensely 
experience by camp-dwellers in Al-Wihdat – a space endowed with “thick” political 
meanings. For its history and reputation, the Camp was intrinsically political. It was as 
though refugees were constantly asked to whom they pleaded allegiance – the Jordanian 
state or Palestinian nationalism? The anxiety and uneasiness generated by this question 
took the form of a ubiquitous and chronic fear of treachery. The label of being a spy or a 
traitor was indiscriminately stuck to everybody, and refugees from the Camp were even 
more liable to fall into these categories than “outsiders” such as myself. 
 
But if the political required taking a firm stand either as Palestinian refugees or 
Jordanian citizens that camp dwellers were unwilling to take, a descent into the ordinary 
gave them hopes of transcending the incommensurability of the rethoric of “us” versus 
“them”. Working as a kind of counter-politics, the ordinary mitigated the excess of 
political in the lives of refugees and infused their nationalist predicament with 
mundanity. For these reasons, I argued throughout the thesis that if we want to explore 
refugees’ agency, it is hence on the apparently “ordinary” that we should focus – which 
is both what refugees did for a large part of the day and what they aspired to achieve. 
The whole dissertation has been an attempt to do that. Here, I have documented the 
practice, concerns, and experience of everyday life among Palestinian refugees living in 
Jordan, and demonstrated how through daily acts of ordinary life refugees have sought 
to overcome, more or less successfully, the undergoing tensions of their lives as 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan. While exploring the interplay of the political and non-
political may strike some observers as trivialising the struggles of the refugees, an 
investigation of this kind is important if want to produce humanising accounts of the 
everyday lives of Palestinian refugees (and others living in similar circumstances). 
 
ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN 
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The central concern of this thesis has been to explore the political aspects of the 
everyday lives of the refugees living in Al-Wihdat refugee camp in a manner that does 
not fall into the trap of so much work on Palestinians in Jordan and elsewhere that treats 
them as one-dimensional political beings. This is important on different levels. 
 
First, this thesis contributes to Palestinian refugee studies. My account of political life in 
Al-Wihdat differs in substantial ways from other treatments of the nature of political 
agency amongst Palestinian refugees. It remains too often assumed in popular accounts, 
and to a lesser extent also in scholarly work, that Palestinians are either irreducible, 
oppositional others, or passive victims emplaced in disciplinary spaces. By building on 
nuanced studies of life in Palestine by other anthropologists (see, among others, Jean-
Klein 2001, Kelly 2008), I have shown the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that 
for a great number of Palestinian refugees in Al-Wihdat, the fundamental values of 
Palestinian nationalism were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their 
everyday practices did not recoil from a progressive integration within the Kingdom of 
Jordan.  
 
Obviously, whilst Palestinian refugees have enjoyed full citizenship rights since they 
first came to Jordan, there remains the potential for friction. In the eyes of many camp-
dwellers, the causes of these unsettled tensions are often seen as the consequences of 
ethnic and social discrimination exerted by the authorities and the Government. 
Refugees often lamented a not-so-subtle favouritism for East Bankers exerted by the 
regime in the economic and social spheres, forms of harassment when dealing with the 
authorities, blocked upward political and economic mobility, and so on. These tensions 
were also fuelled by those scholars who have excluded the possibility of full integration 
in Jordan (e.g. Al-Khazendar 1997) and by that branch of Jordanian nationalism that 
considers Jordanian-Palestinians as unwelcomed guests.  
 
What I found, however, is all the more interesting because contradicts popular 
expectations. Despite effective discrimination and lasting representations, most camp-
dwellers were actually seeing themselves as pure Jordanians, and devoted a great deal of 
their energies seeking to overcome discrimination and reaching full integration into 
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Jordan, and actively sought to build social and economic relationships that extended far 
beyond the administrative borders of the Camp.  
 
Secondly, my findings are important also because contribute to shed light on the 
political and cultural complexity of Jordan as a multi-dimensional society. My 
exploration problematises approaches to the study of Palestinian-Transjordanian 
relationships that have emphasised the separate and rigid nature of categories such as 
“Transjordanian”, “Jordanian”, “Palestinian of Jordanian origin”, and “camp-dwellers” 
(see, for example, Brand 1995). The findings of the present thesis shed light on the 
diverse spheres where this process of “blending” has taken place: from the physical 
reappropriation of the Camp (chapter II) to the strategies for securing better economic 
prospects (chapter III), and so on. With this I do not mean to suggest that economic 
disparities and ethnic discrimination do not play a role in structuring the relationship 
between camp dwellers and the so-called “Transjordanians” – as we have seen 
throughout the chapters, they clearly do. Indeed, documenting the multidimensionality 
of being refugees does not mean hailing its unbounded fluidity. My account has sought 
to shed light on the unevenness of camp dwellers’ power to live, manage and 
manipulate the interconnected nature of camp space. As I have demonstrated, camp-
dwellers attempt to navigate the complexities of everyday life was not always a story of 
success: paranoia, frustration, and boredom document well the complexity of such an 
endeavour. Yet many refugees have negotiated these differences on a daily basis. This 
confirms the findings of those few studies that have suggested how important 
dimensions of “state sponsored Jordanian national identity are not repudiated, but rather 
adopted and internalised as they are not taken as substitutes for or competitive with 
Palestinian national identity, but rather as complementary” (Massad, 2001, p. 257, see 
also Abu-Odeh, 1999).  
 
ON THE POLITICAL 
 
Finally, by shedding light on how Palestinian refugees handle nationalist pressures and 
accommodate them with the facts of their displacement in Wihdat, this thesis has added 
to a scholarly debate that has recently urged anthropologists to rethink the categories of 
“the political” and “political agency”. 
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Al-Wihdat is radically different not only from other settings densely populated by 
Palestinians in the region, but also from the other refugee camps established in Jordan. 
This difference has doubtless had a great impact on fashioning specific forms of 
political agency in the Camp. However, investigating the ways in which refugees have 
sought to accommodate their wish to live as Jordanian citizens with their genuine 
allegiance with Palestinian national symbols and ideals has signified a critical 
reassessment of “the Foucault-Agamben canon” and has important repercussions also 
on political anthropology in general.  
 
By building on Foucault's and Agamben's analysis of the mechanisms through which 
the state creates the subject-citizen, I have argued that refugees in Jordan have 
progressively identified themselves as citizens of the Kingdom. Their lives were 
oriented toward a progressive integration rather than resisting assimilation. At the same 
time, however, I moved forward by drawing on a growing scholarship that has 
expressed criticism toward some of the limitations inherent this approach (Candea 2011, 
see also Yurchak, 2008 and comments by Dominic Boyer). In their daily lives, refugees 
have displayed forms of agency that cannot be fully explained by “universal schemata 
of force/power relations such as “pouvoir-savoir” (Foucault 1980) and “sovereignty” 
(Agamben 1998). If the increasing inscription of refugees’ lives within the Jordan state 
order has certainly enabled the production of refugees as (relatively) integrated citizens, 
it has also supported the creation of a zone of subjectivity (as Palestinian refugees) that 
the state itself was not able to account. Indeed, refugees’ pursuit of social and economic 
integration, their legal and political assimilation within the territory of Jordan, and their 
desire to be ordinary are what have ultimately allowed the reproduction of the ideals and 
messages of Palestinian nationalism. To put it simply, the more refugees have been 
assimilated, the more they have breathed new life into a political ethos that was 
otherwise dominated by frustration and despair. The opening up of this new zone of 
agency and subjectivity within the very context of their integration has signified 
refugees’ capacity to escape the state’s power to fully determine individuals' 
subjectivity. In this sense, refugees managed to subvert the Jordanian state's attempts at 
total control by constituting themselves as both Jordanians and Palestinians. And they 
did that by actively pursuing integration. In so doing, Camp-dwellers not only exposed 
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the state’s control and its power of subjectification, but also demonstrated that this very 
power can be deployed in multiple ways.  
 
 
Figure 24: Jordanian flag painted on a shelter in Al-Wihdat (source: Jihad Nijem) 
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